(5) to prevent the long range growth of these organizations, especially among youth, by developing specific tactics to "prevent these groups from recruiting young people." "4 6. The Panther Directives.-The Black Panther Party ("BPP”) was not included in the first two lists of primary targets (August 1967 and March 1968) because it had not attained national importance. By November 1968, apparently the BPP had become sufficiently active to be considered a primary target. A letter to certain field offices with BPP activity dated November 25, 1968, ordered recipient offices to submit "imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP." Proposals were to be received every two weeks. Particular attention was to be given to capitalizing upon the differences between the BPP and US, Inc. (Ron Karenga's group), which had reached such proportions that "it is taking on the aura of gang warfare with attendant threats of murder and reprisals."

95

On January 30, 1969, this program against the BPP was expanded to additional offices, noting that the BPP was attempting to create a better image. In line with this effort, Bobby Seale was conducting a "purge" 96 of the party, including expelling police informants. Recipient offices were instructed to take advantage of the opportunity to further plant the seeds of suspicion concerning disloyalty among ranking officials.97

Bureau witnesses are not certain whether the Black Nationalist program was effective. Mr. Moore stated:

I know that the . . . overall results of the Klan [COINTEL
PRO] was much more effective from what I have been told
than the Black Extremism [COINTELPRO] because of the
number of informants in the Klan who could take action
which would be more effective. In the Black Extremism
Group . we got a late start because we did not have ex-
tremist activity [until] '67 and '68. Then we had to play
catch-up.... It is not easy to measure effectiveness.... There
were policemen killed in those days. There were bombs
thrown. There were establishments burned with molotov
cocktails.... We can measure that damage. You cannot meas-
ure over on the other side, what lives were saved because
somebody did not leave the organization or suspicion was
sown on his leadership and this organization gradually de-
clined and [there was] suspicion within it, or this organiza-
tion did not join with [that] organization as a result of a
black power conference which was aimed towards consolida-
tion efforts. All we know, either through their own ineptitude,
maybe it emerged through counterintelligence, maybe, I think
we like to think that that helped to do it, that there was not
this development. . . . What part did counterintelligence
[play?] We hope that it did play a part. Maybe we just gave
it a nudge." 98

Memorandum from FBI headquarters to all SAC's, 3/4/68, pp. 3-4. 95 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office, 11/25/68. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's. 1/30/69.

This technique, the "snitch jacket," was used in all COINTELPRO programs.

08 Moore, 11/3/75, pp. 34, 50–52.

7. New Left.-The Internal Security Section had undergone a slow transition from concentrating on the "Old Left"-the CPUSA and SWP-to focusing primarily on the activities of the "New Left”—a term which had no precise definition within the Bureau.99 Some agents defined "New Left" functionally, by connection with protests. Others defined it by philosophy, particularly antiwar philosophy.

On October 28, 1968, the fifth and final COINTELPRO was started against this undefined group. The program was triggered in part by the Columbia campus disturbance. Once again, law enforcement methods had broken down, largely (in the Bureau's opinion) because college administrators refused to call the police on campus to deal with student demonstrations. The atmosphere at the time was described by the Headquarters agent who supervised the New Left COINTELPRO:

During that particular time, there was considerable public,
Administration-I mean governmental Administration-
[and] news media interest in the protest movement to the ex-
tent that some groups, I don't recall any specifics, but some
groups were calling for something to be done to blunt or re-
duce the protest movements that were disrupting campuses.
I can't classify it as exactly an hysteria, but there was con-
siderable interest [and concern]. That was the framework
that we were working with. . . . It would be my impression
that as a result of this hysteria, some governmental leaders
were looking to the Bureau. 100

And, once again, the combination of perceived threat, public outcry, and law enforcement frustration produced a COINTELPRO.

According to the initiating letter, the counterintelligence program's purpose was to "expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize" the activities of the various New Left organizations, their leadership, and adherents, with particular attention to Key Activists, "the moving forces behind the New Left." The final paragraph contains an exhortation to a "forward look, enthusiasm, and interest" because of the Bureau's concern that "the anarchist activities of a few can paralyze institutions of learning, induction centers, cripple traffic, and tie the arms of law enforcement officials all to the detriment of our society." The internal memorandum recommending the program further sets forth the Bureau's concerns:

Our Nation is undergoing an era of disruption and violence
caused to a large extent by various individuals generally con-
nected with the New Left. Some of these activists urge revolu-
tion in America and call for the defeat of the United States
in Vietnam. They continually and falsely allege police bru-

"As the New Left supervisor put it, “I cannot recall any document that was written defining New Left as such. It is my impression that the characterization of New Left groups rather than being defined at any specific time by document, it more or less grew. . . . Agreeing it was a very amorphous term, he added: "It has never been strictly defined, as far as I know. It is more or less an attitude, I would think." (New Left supervisor, 10/28/75, pp. 7-8.)

100

New Left supervisor, 10/28/75, pp. 21-22.

tality and do not hesitate to utilize unlawful acts to further their so-called causes.

The document continues:

The New Left has on many occasions viciously and scurrilously attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt to hamper our investigation of it and to drive us off the college campuses. 101

Based on those factors, the Bureau decided to institute a new COINTELPRO.

8. New Left Directives.-The Bureau's concern with "tying the hands of law enforcement officers," and with the perceived weakness of college administrators in refusing to call police onto the campus, led to a May 23, 1968, directive to all participating field offices to gather information on three categories of New Left activities:

(1) false allegations of police brutality, to "counter the wide-spread charges of police brutality that invariably arise following student-police encounters";

(2) immorality, depicting the "scurrilous and depraved nature of many of the characters, activities, habits, and living conditions representative of New Left adherents"; and

(3) action by college administrators, "to show the value of college administrators and school officials taking a firm stand," and pointing out "whether and to what extent faculty members rendered aid and encouragement."

The letter continues, "Every avenue of possible embarrassment must be vigorously and enthusiastically explored. It cannot be expected that information of this type will be easily obtained, and an imaginative approach by your personnel is imperative to its success." 103

The order to furnish information on "immorality" was not carried out with sufficient enthusiasm. On October 9, 1968, headquarters sent another letter to all offices, taking them to task for their failure to "remain alert for and to seek specific data depicting the depraved nature and moral looseness of the New Left" and to "use this material in a vigorous and enthusiastic approach to neutralizing them." 104 Recipient offices were again instructed to be "particularly alert for this type of data" 105 and told:

101 Memorandum from Charles D. Brennan to William C. Sullivan, 5/9/68. 103 Memorandum from FBI headquarters to all SAC's, 5/23/68.

104 Memorandum from FBI headquarters to all SACs, 10/9/68.

105

This time the field offices got the message. One example of information furnished under the "Immorality" caption comes from the Boston field office; "[Informant] who has provided reliable information in the past concerning the activities of the New Left in the Metropolitan Boston area, has advised that numerous meetings concerning anti-Vietnam and/or draft activity are conducted by members sitting around the table or a living room completely in the nude. These same individuals, both male and female, live and sleep together regularly and it is not unusual to have these people take up residence with a different partner after a six or seven month period.

"According to the informant, the living conditions and habits of some of the New Left adherents are appalling in that certain individuals have been known to wear the same clothes for an estimated period of weeks and in some instances

As the current school year commences, it can be expected that
the New Left with its anti-war and anti-draft entourage will
make every effort to confront college authorities, stifle mili-
tary recruiting, and frustrate the Selective Service System.
Each office will be expected, therefore, to afford this program
continuous effective attention in order that no opportunity
will be missed to destroy this insidious movement.106

As to the police brutality and "college administrator" categories, the Bureau's belief that getting tough with students and demonstrators would solve the problem, and that any injuries which resulted were deserved, is reflected in the Bureau's reaction to allegations of police brutality following the Chicago Democratic Convention.

On August 28, 1968, a letter was sent to the Chicago field office instructing it to "obtain all possible evidence that would disprove these charges" [that the Chicago police used undue force] and to "consider measures by which cooperative news media may be used to counteract these allegations." The administrative "note" (for the file)

states:

Once again, the liberal press and the bleeding hearts and the
forces on the left are taking advantage of the situation in
Chicago surrounding the Democratic National Convention to
attack the police and organized law enforcement agencies....
We should be mindful of this situation and develop all pos-
sible evidence to expose this activity and to refute these false
allegations.

107

In the same vein, on September 9, 1968, an instruction was sent to all offices which had sent informants to the Chicago convention demonstrations, ordering them to debrief the informants for information "indicating incidents were staged to show police reacted with undue force and any information that authorities were baited by militants into using force." 108 The offices were also to obtain evidence of possible violations of anti-riot laws.109

The originating New Left letter had asked all recipient offices to respond with suggestions for counterintelligence action. Those re

for months. Personal hygiene and eating habits are equally neglected by these people, the informant said.

"The informant has noted that those individuals who most recently joined the movement are in most instances the worst offenders as far as moral and personal habits are concerned. However, if these individuals remain in the movement for any length of time, their appearance and personal habits appear to improve somewhat." (Memorandum from Boston Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/13/68.)

108 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACS, 10/9/68.

107 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 8/28/68. 108 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 9/9/68.

100 Note that there was no attempt to determine whether the allegations were true. Ramsey Clark, Attorney General at the time, testified that he did not know that either directive had been issued and that "they are highly improper." He also noted that the Bureau's close working relationship with state and local police forces had made it necessary to "preempt the FBI" in cases involving the investigation of police misconduct; "we found it necessary to use the Civil Rights Division, and that is basically what we did." (Clark, 12/3/75, Hearings Vol. 6. pp. 254-255.)

sponses were analyzed and a letter sent to all offices on July 6, 1968, setting forth twelve suggestions for counterintelligence action which could be utilized by all offices. Briefly the techniques are:

(1) preparing leaflets designed to discredit student demonstrators, using photographs of New Left leadership at the respective universities. "Naturally, the most obnoxious pictures should be used”;

(2) instigating "personal conflicts or animosities" between New Left leaders;

(3) creating the impression that leaders are "informants for the Bureau or other law enforcement agencies";

(4) sending articles from student newspapers or the "underground press" which show the depravity of the New Left to university officials, donors, legislators, and parents. "Articles showing advocation. of the use of narcotics and free sex are ideal";

(5) having members arrested on marijuana charges;

(6) sending anonymous letters about a student's activities to parents, neighbors, and the parents' employers. "This could have the effect of forcing the parents to take action";

(7) sending anonymous letters or leaflets describing the "activities and associations" of New Left faculty members and graduate assistants to university officials, legislators, Boards of Regents, and the press. "These letters should be signed 'A Concerned Alumni,' or 'A Concerned Taxpayer' ";

(8) using "cooperative press contacts" to emphasize that the "disruptive elements" constitute a "minority" of the students. "The press should demand an immediate referendum on the issue in question";

(9) exploiting the "hostility" among the SDS and other New Left groups toward the SWP, YSA, and Progressive Labor Party;

(10) using "friendly news media" and law enforcement officials to disrupt New Left coffeehouses near military bases which are attempting to "influence members of the Armed Forces";

(11) using cartoons, photographs, and anonymous letters to "ridicule" the New Left; and

(12) using "misinformation" to "confuse and disrupt" New Left activities, such as by notifying members that events have been cancelled.110

111

As noted earlier, the lack of any Bureau definition of "New Left" resulted in targeting almost every anti-war group, and spread to students demonstrating against anything. One notable example is a proposal targeting a student who carried an "obscene" sign in a demonstration protesting administration censorship of the school newspaper,

110 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 7/6/68.

"The New Left supervisor confirmed what the documents reveal: “legitimate" (nonviolent) antiwar groups were targeted because they were "lending aid and comfort" to more disruptive groups. According to the New Left supervisor:

"This [nonviolent groups protesting against the war] was the type of thing that the New Left, the violent portion, would seize upon. They could use the legitimacy of an accepted college group or outside group to further their interests." (New Left supervisor, 10/28/75, p. 39)

Nonviolent groups were thus disrupted so there would be less opportunity for a violent group to make use of them and their respectability. Professors active in "New Left matters," whether involved in violence or just in general protest, were targeted for "using [their] good offices to lend aid and comfort to the entire protest movement or to help disrupt the school through [their] programs." (New Left supervisor, 10/28/75, p. 69.)