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B. Issues presented..

377

II. Historical Antecedents-World War I, the "Red Scare," and Attorney
General Harlan Fiske Stone's Reforms__

378

A. Pre-World War I programs.

378

A. The 1936 Roosevelt directive_

B. Domestic intelligence in World War I...

C. The post-war "Red scare" and the "Palmer raids"

D. Attorney General Stone's reforms__

III. The Establishment of a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure, 1936-45____

B. The original legal authority for domestic intelligence_

C. The FBI intelligence program, 1936-38-

D. FBI intelligence authority and "subversion".

E. Congress and FBI intelligence-

F. The scope of FBI domestic intelligence

G. The custodial detention program..

H. FBI wartime operations..

IV. Domestic Intelligence in the Cold War Era: 1945-63

A. The anti-Communist consensus

B. The postwar expansion of FBI domestic intelligence..

C. The Federal loyalty-security program..

D. The emergency detention program, 1946-50

E. The Emergency Detention Act of 1950 and FBI/Justice
Department noncompliance----

F. The scope of FBI "subversion" investigations.

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407

412

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436

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448

G. The Justice Department and FBI intelligence investigations.

452

H. FBI investigations of "hate groups" and "racial matters".
I. Legal authority for domestic intelligence__ _

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D. COMINFIL investigations-The antiwar movement and
student groups - -

483

489

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I. Investigations of "foreign influence" on domestic unrest..

519

J. Intensifications after the 1970 "Huston plan".

525

K. The 1971 inspection reports--

531

L. The "new" Internal Security Division and turmoil in the
FBI, 1971--

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF FBI DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

During the past forty years, FBI intelligence investigations have been one of the federal government's main resources for the protection of domestic security. The executive branch, not the Congress, too, the initiative in 1936 to establish the Bureau's intelligence structure. Until this Committee's investigation, there has never been a substantial inquiry by the Congress into the policies and practices of the FBI and the executive for the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations. The purpose of this report is to set forth chronologically the development of these policies and practices, as shown by the materials obtained by the Committee from the FBI and the Justice Department.

A. Scope of the Report

There are several major limits on the scope of this report and of the inquiry it represents. Since it spans sixty years of American history, the report does not purport to be an exhaustive discussion of all the outside events which were the setting for policy decisions and the development of Bureau programs. Nor does this report touch on many of the most controversial cases in the FBI's past, such as the Hiss and Rosenberg cases, which have recently been the subject of extensive historical reconsideration on the basis of materials made public under the Freedom of Information Act. Rather, the narrative which follows concentrates on the Bureau's general policies and formal programs, with specific illustrations of what appear to be typical applications of these investigative standards.1

Furthermore, the Committee has not attempted to secure from the FBI and the Justice Department an exhaustive compilation of all policy materials relating to domestic intelligence over the entire period since 1936. For example, the Committee has reviewed all versions of the FBI Manual Sections pertaining to intelligence only as far back as 1960. The same cut-off date was used in the Committee's requests for such basic policy documents as the "SAC Letters" (regular instructions to the Special Agents in Charge of all FBI field offices from Bureau headquarters) and memoranda recording decisions of the FBI's Executive Conference (composed of all Bureau executives at the level of Assistant Director and above). However, substantial information about pre-1960 intelligence policies was obtained in con

1 Separate Committee Reports deal with the most intrusive investigative techniques (Electronic Surveilliance. Surreptitious Entry, Mail Opening, and Informants), FBI programs going beyond investigation to the disruption of targeted groups and individuals (COINTELPRO), and one specific case stud combining all types of Bureau operations (Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.).

nection with the Committee's review of the FBI's Security Index and related programs going back to 1939. Other materials on the FBI's overall policy mandate from the President were located in the various Presidential libraries; and the Bureau volunteered to the Committee an extensive collection of documents on its operations as part of an analysis of the origins of its legal authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations.2

The most significant omission from this report is the FBI's foreign counterintelligence policies. While they are mentioned from time to time as part of the larger context for the Bureau's intelligence operations as a whole, they are not considered in the same depth as FBI domestic intelligence investigations not directed specifically at the activities of hostile foreign intelligence services in this country.3

Nevertheless, it is essential to examine the nature of foreign counterintelligence investigations in order to understand the origins of FBI domestic intelligence. Counterintelligence investigations are a necessary response to the threat of espionage and related hostile intelligence activities of foreign governments. Foreign espionage is a tangible and obvious danger; and clandestine investigations of foreign agents are a minimal intrusion upon the rights of Americans (even if some foreign agents are citizens). The crimes a foreign agent may commit on behalf of his principal are extraordinarily serious, for they may result in disclosure of the nation's most sensitive defense information to a foreign adversary. The positive foreign intelligence by-product of counterintelligence may have great significance, since it can alert the United States to impending hostilities and provide information about the larger intentions and objectives of other nations.

Before World War II the governments of Nazi Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union mounted intelligence efforts directed at the United States. While their extent was not fully known at the time, there were sufficient indications as early as the mid-1930s. Given the international climate and the activities of German and Soviet officials in the United States, there was every reason to believe that this country needed a counterintelligence capability to identify and possibly disrupt the work of hostile intelligence services.

From today's perspective it is harder to understand the nature of the domestic threats to security which, along with foreign espionage, were the reasons for establishing the FBI's intelligence program in the 1930s. President Roosevelt and the Congress were not just concerned about spies and foreign agents in the pre-World War II period. They saw a threat which combined both foreign and domestic elements, and FBI intelligence was assigned to deal with it. Only by a closer examination of the historical record can this assignment be fully explained. Factors of political belief and association, group membership and nationality affiliation, became the criteria for intelligence investigations

2 FBI Intelligence Division, Position Paper on Jurisdiction, 2/13/75; FBI Intelligence Division, An Analysis of FBI Domestic Security Intelligence Investigations: Authority, Official Attitudes, and Activities in Historical Perspective, 10/28/75.

A separate Committee report considers the subject of foreign counterintelligence as it relates to both the FBI and U.S. foreign and military intelligence agencies.

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