V. COMMAND AND CONTROL: THE PROBLEM OF OVERSIGHT A. Within the Bureau 1. Internal Administration The Bureau attempted to exercise stringent internal controls over COINTELPRO. All counterintelligence proposals had to be approved by headquarters. Every originating COINTELPRO document contains a strong warning to the field that "no counterintelligence action may be initiated by the field without specific Bureau authorization.” The field would send a proposal under the COINTELPRO caption to the Seat of Government-the Bureau term for headquarterswhere it would be routed to the Section Chief of the section handling the particular COINTELPRO program.252 The recommendation would then be attached to the proposal, beginning the process of administrative review. The lowest level on which a proposal could be approved was the Assistant Director, Domestic Intelligence Division, to whom the Section Chief reported via the Branch Chief. More often, the proposal would go through the Assistant to the Director and often to the Director himself. 2. Coordination The Counterintelligence programs were coordinated with the rest of the section's work primarily through informal contacts, but also through section meetings and the Section Chief's knowledge of the work of his entire section. Further, although the initial COINTELPRO was an effort to centralize what had been an ad hoc series of field actions, the programs continued to be essentially field-oriented with little target selection by headquarters. However, the Section Chief would attempt to make sure targets were being effectively chosen by occasionally sending out directives to field offices to intensify the investigation of a particular individual or group and to consider the subject for counterintelligence action.253 3. Results Participating field offices were required to send in status letters (usually every ninety days) reporting any tangible results. They were instructed to resolve any doubts as to whether a counterintelligence action caused the observed result in their favor. Nevertheless, results were reported in only 527 cases, or 22 percent, of the approved actions. When a "good" result was reported, the field office or agent involved frequently received a letter of commendation or incentive award.254 The CPUSA, SWP, and New Left programs were handled in the Internal Security Section; the White Hate program was first handled in a short-lived three-man "COINTELPRO unit" which, during the three years of its existence, supervised the CP and SWP programs as well, and then was transferred to the Extremists Section; the Black Nationalist program was supervised by the Racial Intelligence Section. The Section Chief would then route the proposal to the COINTELPRO supervisor for each program. Occasionally the Section Chief made a recommendation as to the proposal; more often the supervisor made the initial decision to approve or deny. 253 No control file was maintained of these directives. Since these directives were sent out under the investigative caption, the first time the COINTELPRO caption would be used was on the field proposal which responded to the directives. 254 (Unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 167.) There is no central file of such awards, so the number is retrievable only by searching each agent's personnel file. 4. Blurred Distinction Between Counterintelligence and In vestigation It is possible that some actions did not receive headquarters scrutiny simply because the field offices were never told precisely what "counterintelligence" was. Although Bureau procedures strictly required COINTELPRO proposals to be approved at headquarters and a control file to be maintained both in the field and at headquarters, the field offices had no way to determine with any certainty just what was counterintelligence and what was investigation. Many of the techniques overlap: contacts with employers, contacts with family members, contacts with local law enforcement, even straight interviewing, are all investigative techniques which were used in COINTELPRO actions.255 More importantly, actions in the Rev. Martin Luther King case which cannot, by any stretch of the language, be called "investigative" were not called COINTELPRO, but were carried under the investigative caption.256 The Bureau witnesses agree that COINTELPRO has no fixed definition, and that there is a large grey area between what is counterintelligence and what is aggressive investigation. As the Black Nationalist supervisor put it, "Basically actions taken to neutralize an individual or disrupt an organization would be COINTELPRO; actions which were primarily investigative would have been handled by the investigative desks," even though the investigative action had disruptive effects. 256 Aggressive investigation continues, and in many cases may be as disruptive as COINTELPRO, because in an investigation the Bureau can and does reveal its interest. An anonymous letter (COIN TELPRO) can be discarded as the work of a crank; but if the local FBI agent says the subject of an investigation is a subversive an employer or family member pays attention. 5. Inspection The Inspection Division attempted to ensure that standard procedures were being followed. The Inspectors focused on two things: field office participation, and the mechanics of headquarters approval. However, the Inspection Division did not exercise oversight, in the sense of looking for wrongdoing. Rather, it was an active participant in COINTELPRO by attempting to make sure that it was being efficiently and enthusiastically conducted.257 225 According to Moore, even the "snitch jacket"-labeling a group member as an informant when he is not-is not solely a counterintelligence technique, but may be used, in an ordinary investigation, to protect a real informant, "Maybe you had an informant whose life was at stake because somebody suspected him and the degree of response. . . might be the degree that you would have to use in order to sow enough suspicion on other people to take it away from your informant." (Moore, 11/3/75, p. 70) ... 256 See Dr. Martin Luther King Report. 256 Black Nationalist deposition, 10/17/75, p. 15. 257 As Moore put it, "This was a program, and whenever the Bureau had a program, you had to produce results because it was scrutinized by the inspectors, not only during your own inspection on a yearly basis, but also scrutinized in the field during field inspections." (Moore, 11/3/75, p. 43.) The New Left supervisor, who received copies of the inspection reports, stated that "it would be an innocuous type report in every instance I can recall." (New Left supervisor, 10/28/75, p. 72) For example, one Domestic Intelligence Division inspection report on the "White Hate" programs noted under "Accomplishments" that the decline in Klan organizations is attributable to "hard-hitting investigations, counterintelligence (Continued) As the Assistant Director then in charge of the Inspection Division testified, the "propriety" of COINTELPRO was not investigated. He agreed that his job was to "determine whether the program was being pursued effectively as opposed to whether it was proper," and added, "There was no instruction to me, nor do I believe there is any instruction in the Inspector's manual that the Inspector should be on the alert to see that constitutional values are being protected." B. Outside the Bureau: 1956-1971 97 258 There is no clear answer to the question whether anyone outside the Bureau knew about COINTELPRO. One of the hallmarks of COINTELPRO was its secrecy. No one outside the Bureau was to know it existed.259 A characteristic instruction appeared in the Black Nationalist originating letter: You are also cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor Thus, for example, anonymous letters had to be written on commercially purchased stationery; newsmen had to be so completely trustworthy that they were guaranteed not to reveal the Bureau's interest; and inquiries of law enforcement officials had to be under investigative pretext. In approving or denying any proposal, the primary consideration was preventing "embarrassment to the Bureau." Embarrassment is a term of art. It means both public relations embarrassmentcriticism and any revelation of the Bureau's investigative interest to the subject, which may then be expected to take countermeasures.261 (Continued) programs directed at them, and penetration . . . by our racial informants." The report then lists several specific actions, including the defeat of a candidate with Klan affiliations; the removal from office of a high Klan official; and the issuance of a derogatory press release. (Inspection, Domestic Intelligence Division, 1/826/71, pp. 15, 17-19.) 25 Mark Felt testimony, 2/3/76, pp. 56, 65. 250 For security reasons, no instructions were printed in the Manual. In service training for intelligence agents did contain an hour on COINTELPRO, so it may be assumed that most agents knew something about the programs. For instances in which Attorneys General, the Cabinet, and the House Subcommittee on Appropriations were allegedly informed of the existence of the CPUSA and Klan COINTELPROS. 200 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/25/67. 201 One example of the lengths to which the Bureau went in maintaining secrecy may be instructive. The Bureau sent a letter to Klan members purporting to be from the "National Intelligence Committee"-a super-secret Klan disciplinary body. The letter fired the North Carolina Grand Dragon and suspended the Imperial Wizard, Robert Shelton. Shelton complained to both the local postal inspector and the FBI resident agency (which solemnly assured him that his complaint was not within the Bureau's jurisdiction). The Bureau had intended to mail a second "NIC" letter, but the plans were held in abeyance until it could be learned whether the postal inspector intended to act on Shelton's complaint. The Bureau, therefore, contacted the local postal inspector, using their investigation of Shelton's complaint as a pretext, to see what the inspector intended to do. The field office reported that the local inspector had forwarded the complaint to regional headquarters, which in turn referred it to a Chief Postal Inspector in Washington, D.C. The Bureau's liaison agent was then sent to that office to determine what action the postal authorities planned to take. He returned with the information that the Post Office had referred the matter to the Fraud Section of the Department of Justice's Criminal Division, under a cover This secrecy has an obvious impact on the oversight process. There is some question whether anyone with oversight responsibility outside the Bureau was informed of COINTELPRO. In response to the Committee's request, the Bureau has assembled all documents available in its files which indicate that members of the executive and legislative branches were so informed.2 262 1. Executive Branch On May 8, 1958, Director Hoover sent two letters, one to the Honorable Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, and the other to Attorney General William Rogers, containing the same information. The Attorney General's letter is captioned "COMMUNIST PARTY, USA-INTERNAL SECURITY." The letters are fairly explicit notification of the CPUSA COINTELPRO: In August of 1956, this Bureau initiated a program designed 263 The letters go on to detail use of informants to engage in controversial discussions, after which "acrimonious debates ensued, suspicions were aroused, and jealousies fomented"; and anonymous mailings of anti-communist material, both reprinted and Bureau-prepared, to active CP members.264 (Two examples of the Bureau's product were enclosed.) "Tangible accomplishments” achieved by the program were "disillusionment and defection among Party members and increased factionalism at all levels." 265 However, the only techniques disclosed were use of informants and anonymous propaganda mailings. There is no record of any reply to these letters. letter stating that since Shelton's allegations "appear to involve an internal struggle" for Klan control, and "since the evidence of mail fraud was somewhat tenuous in nature," the Post Office did not contemplate any investigation. Neither, apparently, did the Department. The Bureau did not inform either the Postal Inspector or the Criminal Division that it had authored the letter under review. Instead, when it appeared the FBI's role would not be discovered, the Bureau prepared to send out the second letter-a plan which was discontinued when the Klan "notional" was proposed. Memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/9/67; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office, 5/24/67; memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/31/67; memorandum from Atlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/7/67; memorandum from Atlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/13/67; memorandum from Birmingham Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/14/67; memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/28/67; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Atlanta and Charlotte Field Offices, 6/29/67; memorandum from Atlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/27/67; memorandum from Bernard Rachner to Charles Brennan, 7/11/67; memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/22/67; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office, 8/21/67. 262 These documents were also made available to the Petersen Committee. The Petersen Committee twice asked the Bureau for documents showing outside knowledge, and twice was told there were none. Only as the Petersen report was ready to go to press did the Bureau find the documents delivered. (Staff interview with Henry Petersen.) 263 Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 5/8/58. 264 Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 5/8/58. 265 Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 5/8/58. On January 10, 1961, letters from the Director were sent to Dean Rusk, Robert Kennedy, and Byron R. White, who were about to take office as Secretary of State, Attorney General, and Deputy Attorney General, respectively. The letters enclosed a top secret summary memorandum setting forth the overall activities of the Communist Party, USA, and stated, "Our responsibilities in the internal security field and our counterattack against the CPUSA are also set out in this memorandum." 266 The five-page memorandum contains one section entitled "FBI Counterattack." This section details penetration of the Party at all levels with security informants; use of various techniques to keep the Party off-balance and disillusioned; infiltration by informants; intensive investigation of Party members; and prosecution. Only one paragraph of that report appears at all related to the Bureau's claim that the CPUSA COINTELPRO was disclosed: As an adjunct to our regular investigative operations, we carry on a carefully planned program of counterattack against the CPUSA which keeps it off balance. Our primary purpose in this program is to bring about disillusionment on the part of individual members which is carried on from both inside and outside the Party organization. [Sentence on use of informants to disrupt excised for security reasons.] In certain instances we have been successful in preventing communists from seizing control of legitimate mass organizations and have discredited others who were secretly operating inside such organizations. For example, during 1959 we were able to prevent the CPUSA from seizing control of the 20,000-member branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in Chicago, Illinois. 267 The only techniques disclosed were use of informants and COMINFIL exposure. There is no record of any replies to these letters. On September 2, 1965, letters were sent to the Honorable Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to President Johnson and Attorney General Katzenbach (whose letter was captioned "PENETRATION AND DISRUPTION OF KLAN ORGANIZATIONS-RACIAL MATTERS"). These two-page letters refer to the Bureau's success in solving a number of cases involving racial violence in the South. They then detail the development of a large number of informants and the value of the information received from them. One paragraph deals with "disruption": 263 267 We also are seizing every opportunity to disrupt the activities Memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 1/10/61. |