PARIS, 20th July 1875. WE suddenly discover sometimes, when an interesting subject attracts our particular attention, that it is difficult, if not indeed impossible, to obtain reliable instruction on it. We had imagined, until that moment, that, on all questions of real importance, complete information invariably exists somewhere, and that we had but to inquire of competent people in order to learn where to put our hand upon it. We had supposed that, in this century of growing knowledge, nothing could keep successfully out of sight, and that inquisitiveness, interest, or vanity, had triumphed over all discretions, had routed out all hidingplaces, and had brought to light all secrets. So it is certainly with most things; but there are exceptions to all rules; and the prevailing ignorance of the real condition of the French army is a striking instance of exception to this one. If there be just now a curiosity in Europe, it is to know exactly what France is doing in order to rebuild her strength. Foreigners are asking eager questions on it everywhere; and it might have been supposed

VOL. CXVIII-NO. DCCXVIII.

that to the French themselves it presents an irresistible attraction. Yet, though the Chamber and the newspapers have indulged, since 1871, in a scarcely measurable amount of theoretical discussion on military matters; though the columns of debate upon them would stretch, if laid out straight, from Versailles to Canton,-not one single narration of distinct facts-except on trifling points of detail-has come before the public during the last four years. The blank is so thorough that the most ardent seeker could find no collective account of the position; no full description of it exists in print; it is by personal inquiry alone that the elements of the tale can be scraped. together. The following details have been collected by that means, from several sources: they are, of course, most incomplete; but, so far as they extend, they are correct. They indicate the main features of the situation; and they are given now, in the entire absence of authoritative statements, in order to partially fill up the rough outline of the state of the French army which was sketched in these pages

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two months ago. * Their publication cannot possibly do harm to France, for the Prussian staff-office knows all about them, and a vast deal more besides.

The subject is divisible into many sections; but in order to adopt the simplest plan, it is grouped here into three heads only-Direction, Organisation, and Matériel. A more elaborate classification would lead us into needless detail. Our object is not to specify particulars, but merely to give a general idea of the chief bearings of the question as a whole.

The faculty of "direction" is so notable a quality of the French— they are such admirable conductors of great industrial undertakingsthey succeed so remarkably in "administration" in nearly all its forms -that a similar capacity might, presumptively, be looked for in the ruling of their army. Their civil government, their railways, their manufactories, their steamships, are ordered with such skill that their military management might, not unreasonably, be expected to exhibit a somewhat analogous ability, and to attain a somewhat parallel success. The methods employed are virtually identical in the two cases; we find in each of them minute attention to little details, innumerable rules and regulations, rigorous pursuit of small economies, unceasing watchfulness and supervision. But the results are not so similar as the means-success on one side is ac

companied by something very much like failure on the other; and it may be said with tolerable exactness, after considering the two aspects of commercial prosperity and military weakness which France is now presenting, that though precision, system, and routine have manifestly led her to much wealth, they have

not helped her to obtain a wellregulated army. There would, indeed, be little exaggeration in going further still, and in asserting that the same national characteristics which have enabled the French to become so prosperous and so rich have largely aided to disintegrate their material strength; and that their fighting power has been enfeebled by the very spirit of official prejudice, of bureaucratic excellencies, of hierarchical despotism, which has contributed to make the fortune of their railway companies. would be difficult to discover a better example of the défauts d'une qualité than this striking contrast between two products of the same process.

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The unsatisfactory situation of the French army is not, however, a consequence of over administration only. Routine and red-tapism have, it is true, a terrible deal to answer for, but they are not the sole causes of actual deficiencies. The temperament of the race has also helped to generate them; insouciance, selfconfidence, and chauvinism have had a share-and not a small one

in producing the break-down. The conceit of invincibility which was bequeathed to France by the first Empire, the absence of all fighting on the Continent during forty years, had led the nation to the conviction that courage and intelligence amongst the soldiers were the main elements of military success; and that strategy, good management, and scientific instruction amongst the officers were relatively unimportant details, almost unworthy of brilliant conquerors. The warfare in Algeria aided to consolidate this impression; and, though the experience gained before Sebastopol was not altogether gratifying, it was not till 1859 that the clearer

sighted of the French began to seriously doubt whether their army really merited the reputation which it still managed to maintain. Even the public began to vaguely comprehend that something more than dash and pluck and a strong talent for adroitly stealing chickens are wanted in modern war. As hap pens usually in Paris, discontent broke out in jokes: the disarrayed confused victory of Solferino was described as "une fuite en avant;" while the entire campaign which finished at Villafranca was painted in the well-known phrase, "elle est comme la confiance, on la gagne, mais on ne la commande pas.'

But habit was too deeply rooted to be eradicated by a mot, and things went on unchanged till 1870: the "Napoleonic legend" retained its hold on popular impressions; routine retained its force at the Ministry of War. Then came defeat, and ruin, and deception, and everybody outside the Ministry blamed everybody but himself, and shouted that everything must be changed at once. This was the state of feeling when General de Cissey was appointed, in 1871, to the position which he has occupied, with little interruption, ever since.

Now, if ever a new-fledged Minister had a chance of sending down his name to history, of covering himself with solid fame, of winning a nation's gratitude and admiration, it was, assuredly, this lucky general, who, almost unknown the day before, was suddenly intrusted with the dazzling but most noble task of remodelling and reconstituting the whole French army. Backed up by an eager nation and a willing Parliament, with everything in pieces round him, he had but to brush away the crumbling rubbish, and then rebuild a monument worthy of the occasion and the place. "The finest site in Europe" was really

there before him; immensity of space, abundance of ideas, exuber-ance of budgets, were all at his disposal. With a thousandth part of his means of action, Von Scharnhorst prepared that Prussian army which wiped out the memory of Jena. It was indeed an opportunity for ambition, a fortune which every patriot might envy. But General de Cissey had not the strength for such a task. An honest man, a capable tactician, a straight and valiant soldier, known every where for the bravery and energy he displayed at Borny and at Rézonville, he was deficient in nearly all the special qualities needed for the grand mission he had undertaken. During forty years of service he had passed his life in camps and barracks, doing slow, weary, regimental duty. At last, one day, without inquiring if he were really fit to bear the heaviest burden which this generation has seen imposed upon a French commander, M. Thiers created him Minister of War, and told him to reorganise the troops of France. He would probably have got along neither better nor worse than other people, if he had stumbled on to quiet times, or if he had been backed up by a really able, vigorous, generous-hearted officestaff. But.he was not the man to exterminate routine, to crush abuses, to enforce new rules, to suppress bad habits, to stamp down opposition. He found the people in his Ministry determined to prop up the tottering wreck, and to sist the radical transformation which the nation called for; he did not like to struggle with them, so he abandoned the idea of a clean sweep, and, under pretext of "gradual improvement," kept the old principle of management as he found it. A general he was the day before, a general he remained on the morrow; his nomination did not

bestow on him the temperament of a great Minister. He arrived in the Rue St. Dominique with an ingenuous desire for reform; but within a month his "bureaux" stopped him, and within two months they mastered him. Like all his predecessors, he dropped down powerless before the resistless torpor of routine.

We know a little of red-tape in England, but our practice of it is altogether infantine compared to that which prevails in France. Redtape there is a power against which no man since Napoleon has been able to contend; it is one of the great forces of the commonwealth. If King, Lords, Commons, and the Press existed in France, red-tape would rank with them as the fifth element of the State. And lest this comparison should seem exaggerated to English readers we will at once supply a proof of its precision. One day, three years ago, Duke d'Audiffret Pasquier, the President of the Commission appointed to examine into the contracts made during the campaign, had a warm discussion with General Suzanne, who was then Director of Matériel at the Ministry of War. Excited by the wrongs he had discovered, and somewhat, perhaps, by his touchy temper too, the Duke lashed out against the "bureaux," and spoke most bitterly of their inert stolidity, of their lifeless routine, and of the barrier which they oppose to all real progress. The General answered: It is ungrateful of you to abuse the bureaux; it is they who furnish to all you politicians the means of making revolutions." The observation was singularly cynical, but it showed a keen appreciation of the facts of the situation. France is, in reality, governed by the "bureaux""les Ministres pas sent, les bureaux restent;" the business of the State goes on in

spite of revolutions; and therefore, in the eyes of the "bureaux," there is no reason why revolutions should not take place if other people like them. A change of dynasty or of constitution has no effect whatever on the "bureaux:" a new minister arrives, his "bureaux" bow to him, salute his ignorance, entangle him in their indispensable aid, impose upon him their traditions, stifle his enthusiasms and his projects, and in six weeks he is their slave. It is, however, fair to add that all this is not absolutely limited to France alone: it glares out there certainly far more vividly than elsewhere; but it is, in varying degrees, a general condition of all Governments, and, if report speaks truth, is not absolutely unknown in London.

General de Cissey did not escape the universal influence; he gave way before it and capitulated; the Ministry went on unchanged-and that is why the system of direction, the principles which guide it, and the prejudices which enfeeble it, remain exactly as they were under Charles X., under Louis Philippe, under Napoleon III. The Chamber has indeed voted certain laws and has introduced important modifications into the organisation of the army; but the application of those laws, the working out of those modifications, depend upon the Ministry, and there, as we shall see presently, the "direction" retains its mastery of the situation, and does as little as it can. non-military minister might possibly have resisted the contagionthat is, provided he had obstinacy enough; he would, at all events, have had the great advantage of being free from hierarchical observances, from camaraderie and old habits; but it would have indeed been difficult to find a Louvois. Here lies the main cause of the weakness of the French army: it

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has no supreme head; it is governed by no vigorous and independent mind; it is directed by no strong initiating genius, by no will capable of beating down the special obstacles of the position. It has -long been, and continues still to be, the property of the "bureaux."

The spirit of the officers is far superior, as a whole, to that of the Ministry which presides over them. The majority of the officers have known the humiliation of defeat, and have keenly felt that they must work to wipe it out; a good many of them have struggled, with infinitely more goodwill than their chiefs, against the crushing pressure of usage and tradition, and have taken seriously to study, regardless of the rooted prejudice which has so long existed amongst the generals against "cossacks," as reading officers are called. The number of new books which they are producing is really wonderful; and that those books are bought and read is proved by the fact that Dumaine, the army publisher, is selling now about twelve times as many volumes as he could get rid of before the war. And many of the writers have at tained real excellence. The names of some of them-of Fay, of Samuel, of Lewal, for instance-have become almost as authoritative on military questions as those of the best known authors in the German or the English army.

But they are not all of this progressive class. A large number of them have to contend against a difficulty which follows them through life, and renders it impossible for them to keep pace with the new necessities which the scientific character of modern war is now imposing on all soldiers, they want early education. The officers who have passed through the military school at St. Cyr are of course well trained for further labour, and they consti

tute about two-thirds of the entire number; but by far the greater portion of the other third are unfit to begin to learn at 30, the age at which, in ordinary cases, they are promoted from the ranks. To this considerable section of French officers the higher branches of military instruction are inaccessible; as corporals and sergeants they were excellent, but they are altogether unprepared for the intellectual efforts which now attach to military command, and for the new obligations and responsibilities which it creates. And this element of inferiority has largely grown since 1870, from the following cause. A quantity of former noncommissioned officers who had left the army, presented themselves for service as soon as the war broke out, and, in the dearth of qualified officers, were appointed lieutenants, captains, and some of them even majors, in the new regiments which were got together in the departments. To recompense their patriotic zeal, the Commission for the revision of grades confirmed the greater part of them as officers after the peace, though generally in lower ranks than they had been temporarily called upon to occupy. The result is that, according to calculations. which seem to be admitted everywhere as correct, about one-sixth of the present officers of infantry have acquired their commissions in this way. There are amongst them some intelligent and clever men; but there is no denying that the great mass of this particular group are ignorant of everything which constitutes an ordinary education; they all can read and write, but there stops the knowledge of a good many of them. It is computed that twenty years must pass before the army will get quite rid of this heavy stock of incapacity.

There is, however, fortunately, a