case, the vote of a single representative is equal to two senators; but in the other, the vote of one senator is equal to seventeen representatives. What propriety can there be, that the number of senators from Illinois should be equal to those from NewYork? I know of none. The large states are not entitled to, and cannot receive, any equivalent for this sacrifice. It does not increase the number of representatives in the house, or diminish its proportion of direct taxes; both of these are apportioned according to the population of each state, without any relation to that of senators. If population is the correct principle for representatives and taxes, why should it not equally apply to senators? Let each state, however small its population, have one senator, and fix a ratio that would entitle the states to a further number of senators according to their population, provided the whole number of senators should never exceed one third of the whole number of representatives. This would render the principles of our government more equal and uniform, and a small increase of senators would give the senate greater weight and influence, and more freedom in negativing such proceedings of the house as may appear to them inexpedient and improper.

Though I was in 1788 a zealous advocate for the adoption of the constitution of the United States, I never approved of the principle by which it apportioned senators, or the number to which it limited the senate; but such was the state of the nation at that time, and such the necessity for a more efficient government than then existed, as would have justified the adoption of a constitution much less perfect than the one we now enjoy. But in a time of peace,and when the spirit of party has subsided, is the proper season to discuss the subject; and when the public mind is disposed,amend and render that excellent constitution still more valuable. There are a few other defects in that instrument, which in the course of these essays, I may suggest for consideration.

I now proceed to make some remarks upon the numbers which are most suitable for state legislatures. I know of no nation that has so many legislators (certainly none of equal population) as we have, or that pays so much for legislation as we do. I have taken considerable pains to ascertain the present number in each state, which by their constitutions they may elect, and in many instances actually do; and though I will not vouch for the accuracy of my information in some of the states, yet I believe it is substantially correct. It appears, that the several state legislatures consist of five hundred fifty-nine senators,and three thousand one hundred ninety-eight representatives. To these we must add the senators, representatives, and delegates in Congress, amounting in all to four thousand and twenty-four legislators! A number more than equal to two thirds of the army of the United States. The expense of such a host of legislators is very great -an object worthy of consideration, when we deliberate upon the number of which a legislature ought to be composed. This

expense will be more particularly stated when I consider the salaries and compensations granted to the officers of our govern

ment.

In my opinion, the best number for the popular branch of our state legislatures, except in small states, is one hundred, and the senate one fourth of that number. That number would give three thousand state legislators, which is seven hundred fiftyseven less than the present number. The constitutions of the several states make various and different provisions on this subject. In twelve of the states, the number of their representatives is limited; in one state at forty, one at fifty, one at seventytwo, six at one hundred, one at one hundred twenty-four, one at one hundred twenty-eight, and one at two hundred. Nine of the states are limited by the number either of their counties or towns; and three of the states, New-Hampshire, Massachusetts and Vermont, are limited only by their population. In fourteen of the states, the representatives cannot exceed one hundred, and in sixteen cannot extend to one hundred and thirty.

In several of the states the house of representatives is too numerous,and the senators too few. in New-Hampshire, there is more than two hundred in the House, but the senate cannot exceed twelve. So small a number of senators may subject a state to serious inconvenience. The death, resignation, or absence of two or three senators may embarrass their proceedings, and obstruct the course of public business. In 1816, two of the New-Hampshire senators resigned, and the vacancies could not be filled, because in the districts which elected those two there were no constitutional candidates nominated by the people to fill those vacancies. If such an event should occur when the spirit of party bears rule, the secession of three senators would reduce the number to seven, and the assent of five of them would be necessary to render their acts and proceedings valid. Such a secession was threatened in 1816, and but for one man, it is probable, would have been executed. So small a senate will seldom, if ever, prove such a salutary check upon the house as the constitution contemplated. It is to be hoped, that when the period shall arrive for submitting the question for the revision of the constitution, that they will reduce the number of representatives, and increase that of senators, and also modify the mode of electing them.

In a preceding number,I stated briefly, but with precision, the various subjects upon which the national and state legislatures have authority to make laws. But they may on those subjects transcend the limits which sound policy requires, and unnecessarily encroach upon the rights and interests of individuals,and that without promoting the public welfare. The power given Congress to regulate commerce, was never intended to give them authority to destroy commerce, or make such regulations as would embarrass and perplex it, and virtually amount either to a partial or total prohibition. The purpose for which they were

vested with power to impose duties upon imports, was to raise a revenue to support government, defend the nation, and pay the public debt; but not to build up manufacturers, artizans, or any other class of people, at the expense of the nation,or to the prejudice and injury of individuals. Nor have, either Congress or the state legislatures, any rightful authority to interfere in the private business and concerns of individuals, or the management of their affairs; and whenever legislators have attempted such an interference, they have usually injured some other portion of the Percommunity, and sometimes those they intended to benefit. sons who are directly interested in a particular branch of business, and who have devoted their lives to the pursuit, understand and manage it much better, both for themselves and the community, than a legislature can, though it is often difficult to convince legislators of the fact, or dissuade them from interfering. "There are," says Bentham," two points in politics very hard to compass. One is to persuade legislators that they do not understand shoemaking better than shoemakers; the other is to persuade shoemakers that they do not understand legislating better than legislators. The latter point is particularly difficult in our dear country; but the other is the hardest of all hard things every where."

The laws which legislators make, ought to be founded in such sound principles of equity and justice, as to make it the interest of the great body of the people strictly and literally to obey, encroach upon the But when laws are severe, not violate them. rights, or unnecessarily restrain, the freedom of individuals, every art will be practised to evade thern, till they fall into contempt, and eventually become obsolete. Every man acquainted Such with our statutes can refer to too many of this nature. laws are not merely useless-they weaken, and ultima.ely destroy the respect, esteem, and confidence which the people otherwise would have for those statutes that are wholesome and necessary. When legislators enact statutes which diminish the veneration and esteem of the people for the laws, they inflict a serious evil upon the community-they weaken the ties, and break one of the strong pillars which unite and support society and government itself.

If we expect to see virtue flourish in a nation, we must look for it in the nature of its government, and the justice, equity, It is a melancholy fact, which all ages and fitness of its laws. and countries confirm, that human laws impose the greatest restraint men, and afford the most certain security wicked upon against their violence. Though the principle of honor, the moral sense, and religious considerations, are sufficient to restrain the better portion of mankind from the commission of wrong, they are not of themselves able to withhold the wicked and abandoned from committing depredations upon the property, and violence against the persons of others. Nothing but the laws, and those strictly executed, can restrain wicked men, of which

there are too many in every country. This consideration renders it peculiarly necessary that the laws for the punishment of offenders should be so just and rational, as to interest the feelings of every good man to lend his aid in carrying them into execution. But if the laws against crimes and offences are too sanguinary, or too severe and penal, the better feelings of the human heart will revolt against them, and the laws themselves will have no good effect: they will not be executed. Though the crime may not be forgotten, yet pity and compassion for the offender will extenuate his guilt, and judges, jurors, and even witnesses, will be acute in devising means to effect his acquittal. Many instances have occurred where jurors have acquitted, where they would have found the accused guily, if the law had not been so severe. No law can be carried into effect against the common and prevalent opinion of the people. It is therefore extremely impolitic, as well as cruel, for the law to impose penalties and punishments for crimes and offences that are more sanguinary and excessive than the offences require. "All penalties," says the New-Hampshire constitution, "ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offence. No wise legislator will affix the same punishment to the crimes of theft, forgery, and the like, which they do to those of murder and treason; where the same undistinguishing severity is exerted against all offences, the people are led to forget the real distinction in the crimes themselves, and to commit the most flagrant with as little compunction as they do the lightest offences: for the same reason a multitude of sanguinary laws is both impolitic and unjust. The true design of all punishment being to reform, not to exterminate mankind."

Within a few years, a milder and more rational system of criminal law has been established in this and several other states. Confinement and hard labor, where the convict by his services may make some atonement for the injury he has done society, has been substituted for the pillory, branding, and the whippingpost. How this milder system will succeed, time and experience will determine; but wherever it has been judiciously carried into effect, it has not disappointed the expectations of rational and well informed men, though it has those who expected it would prove an effectual reformation to the worst of men.

The subject of making laws will be further considered.
CINCINNATUS.

September 27, 1823.

Arsenical Cobalt ore, has been found abundantly at Franconia, crystallized in 8dra, the solid angles of which are deeply truncated.

A company is engaged in exploring the vein of copper ore at Franconia, with flattering prospects of success. J. F. D.

Literary Notices, &c.

The Massachusetts Historical Society have just published the twentieth volume of their Historical Collections. The contents are as follow:-A memoir of the Hon Joshua Thomas, of Plymouth, who was an early member of the society, and died in Jan. 1821-An account of three cases of pretended witchcraft in the year 1720, at Littleton, by the Rev. Mr. Turell, of Medford-A list of the Representatives of the town of Boston, from 1634, to 1784-A letter from Dr. Isaac Watts, to a friend in New-England, dated May 8, 1734, which was found in a book belonging to the library of Harvard College-A topographical description of Cummington-Notices of the effects of the gale of Sept. 23, 1815, in Barnstable County-Churches and ministers in Dunstable and Litchfield, New-Hampshire-Notes on Duxbury-Description and history of Boscawen, N. H.--A biographical notice of the Hon. James Winthrop, who died at Cambridge in Sept. 1821-Dr. Edwards' observations on the Mohegan language, with an introduction, copious notes, and several subsidiary articles relative to the Indian languages, by the Hon. John Pickering-An obituary notice of Professor Peck-Memoirs of William Blackstone, the first settler in Boston-The meaning of the aboriginal word Shawnut-Note on the Spring of Boston-List of persons who have died in New-Hampshire over a hundred years old-Four ancient letters from a large collection of manuscripts, formerly in possession of Gov. Hutchinson, and lately deposited with the Historical Society-Donations to the Library acknowledged-and a list of members elected since the publication of the first volume.-There is also a perfect index to the last ten volumes. It contains a luminous reference to every thing contained in them, and occupies 200 pages.

Messrs. Flagg & Gould, of Andover, have issued proposals for publishing a Greek and English Lexicon of the New-Testament, translated from the Latin and German work of Wahl, published at Leipsic in 1822; by Mr. Edward Robinson, Assistant Instructor in the department of Sacred Literature, in the Theological Seminary at Andover.

Professor Stuart has just published the second edition of his Hebrew Grammar.