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UNIVERSITY

CALIFOR

CHAPTER XXIII.

The doctrine of "Substitution" defended-Christ a consenting party in the work of redemption-God the Father not vindictive in offering up His Son-Love and mercy actuated the Son in offering Himself up -Love and mercy alone ust be ascribed as the cause which moved the Father to permit the Son to be sacrificed-"Substitution" cannot be denied on the ground that the substitute has not suffered all the consequences entailed through the offender's disobedience-Adam and Christ the representatives of human nature-The disobedience of Adam and the obedience of Christ contrasted-The question as to the length of time Christ suffered-The reasons generally given why Christ descended into Hades considered-The absurdity and futility of transubstantiation.

BEFORE leaving the subject of the atonement, we feel bound to say a few words in answer to other objections which have recently been advanced against the doctrine of "Substitution." The doctrine of "Substitution" is objected to on the ground that it represents God the Father as cruel and vindictive in delivering up His innocent Son to suffer the punishment due to guilty man. This objection is one-sided and superficial, inasmuch as it entirely overlooks the prominent fact, that Christ was a willing and consenting party to the undertaking of human redemption. This is manifestly implied in many passages of Scripture, three of which I shall adduce. In the Gospel of St. John (x. 18) we have these remarkable words: "No man (literally, no one) taketh my life from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again." Again, in the Epistle to the Hebrews (ix. 14) it is written, that Christ "through the Eternal Spirit offered Himself without spot to God." And in the same Epistle to the Hebrews (x. 12), we read to this purpose: "But this man, after He had offered one sacrifice for sins forever, sat down on the right hand of God." These three texts cited from the

Bible prove, to a demonstration, that the death of Christ was a voluntary death. We cannot perceive a shadow of compulsion in any one step of the Saviour's redemptive history. Now, considering that our Blessed Lord, so far as His Divine nature was concerned, had nothing to gain by redeeming man from eternal perdition, what could have induced Him to undergo such unprecedented degradation and such unparalleled sufferings in order to accomplish so stupendous a work? Infinite love and boundless mercy must have moved the Divine Being to procure man's everlasting salvation. No other cause can be assigned Then, since love and mercy alone moved the Son of God to offer Himself to the Eternal Father as a sacrifice for human transgression, how can it be said that he was treated either with cruelty or vindictiveness? His having voluntarily presented Himself as an immolation on the altar of God, excludes every idea of compulsion, or coercion; and if there were neither compulsion nor coercion connected with the act, we are constrained to infer that the entire responsibility rests with Him who first manifested His willingness to become a substitute for sinful man. In the suffering inflicted upon the Son there was, therefore, neither unfairness nor injustice. cruelty be laid to the charge of the Father? We answer with an emphatic no. Bearing in mind that the Messiah. was God's Son, His only Son, and His Beloved Son, we can be at no loss in ascertaining the moving cause by which the Father was induced to deliver up His Beloved One as a ransom for the sins of a lost and ruined world.

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Nothing but love and mercy can be ascribed as the cause which moved the Father to permit His only begotten Son to be made a propitiation for the sins of the human race. The truth of this assertion we learn from Scripture, for it is therein written (John iii. 16), “ God so loved the world (meaning mankind) that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life." To assert, then, that the Son of God was ill used in becoming a "Substitute" for man, or to affirm that the Father was cruel and vindictive in the acceptance of such " Substitution," is a gross

misrepresentation of the whole facts and nature of the case. Every phase in human redemption is stamped with the love and mercy of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. These facts, I trust, sufficiently answer the first objection.

The doctrine of "Substitution" has also been ridiculed and even scouted, because Christ did not suffer in His own person each phase and every degree of punishment that man has been compelled to undergo. These objectors imagine that there can be no such thing as "Substitution," unless the substitute bear the entire consequences entailed through the offender's disobedience. I give a most unqualified denial to the soundness of this objection, add consider it unreasonable, unphilosophical, and unscriptural. I venture to assert that there is scarcely an instance on record in which the entire punishment due to the guilty was, or ever could be, inflicted upon the "Substitute." Let us illustrate this by example. Supposing a certain debtor owed his creditor a large sum of money, and in consequence of not having the wherewithal to pay the amount, was cast into prison, and compelled to remain there until the debt was liquidated. It is manifest that his incarceration will be prolonged till there shall have been a settlement of the account. Granting that the man thus treated has a wife and family dependent upon him for support, and assuming that he had the feelings and affection that a husband and a father ought to have, who can measure the anguish, distress, and misery both of the prisoner and his wife and family so long as he is detained in custody? Now, supposing further that some friend, out of love to the debtor, and moved by pity for the wife and children, should undertake to pay the whole amount in money, or, indeed, submit to imprisonment for a time. until he had procured the means essential to satisfy the demands of the creditor, would any one imagine for a moment that the "Substitute" could feel one jot of the pain and punishment which the debtor, and his wife and helpless children, must, of necessity, experience? His imprisonment, on the contrary, would be rendered more tolerable from a consciousness of the fact that in thus suffer

ing he was doing a noble, unselfish, and generous deed, in causing a whole family to be delivered from ignominy, wretchedness, misery, and starvation. Would it, therefore, be logically true to deny that there had been any "Substitution" made, merely because the innocent party did not suffer all the consequences necessarily arising from the inability of the debtor to settle his creditor's account in due time? It is impossible in the very nature of things that the innocent, in becoming a "Substitute" for the guilty, should undergo, in its various ramifications, all the punishment that would be inflicted upon the offender himself. Men repent, feel remorse, experience shame, and are occasionally driven almost to desperation, in consequence of the sins they have at certain times committed; but our Divine Master could not have had any such feelings. His righteous soul could not have been distressed by any one of them. Never having been guilty of sin, He could not, properly speaking, repent; and never having failed to fulfill any part of God's law, it was impossible for Him ever to promise amendment of life. We see, then, the unreasonableness of expecting the innocent “Substitute" to suffer, in every particular, the punishment which the guilty, if left alone, must of necessity undergo. In determining the real merits of a case of this nature between the lawgiver and the lawbreaker, it is of prime importance to ascertain the essential point that constitutes the offense, and accurately to distinguish between it and any consequences that may flow directly or indirectly therefrom. Though there exists a connection between them, they are, nevertheless, as radically distinct from. each other as cause and effect. In dealing with the doctrine of "Substitution" our attention should be mainly fixed upon the former, while we should not be altogether regardless of the latter.

The sin committed by Adam, which involved himself and his posterity in guilt, consisted of one offense, namely, the violation of a negative command. Through that single disobedient act all men became subject to physical death in this world, and liable to eternal death in the next world; and if nothing had been done by way of reparation, the

whole human race must ultimately have been consigned to the everlasting punishment of hell. Now, in order to make atonement for the sin thus committed by our forefather, and at the same time to satisfy the violated law and the justice of God, the question is this: What degree of punishment and what length of time ought the "Substitute" to have suffered? In answering this question we must maintain the distinction before intimated, between the original disobedient act and the ultimate consequences to which that disobedience would, if not atoned for in due course, necessarily lead. In making reparation for the law as violated by Adam, it was indispensable that the "Substitute" should pay the penalty incurred by that one unlawful act.

Now, there are degrees in guilt and condemnation, and while we believe that sin unrepented of will in the end lead to the everlasting torments of hell, we are bound, however, to regard such extreme punishment not as an immediate, but rather as a final consequence of man's original transgression. In showing how Christ bore the punishment due to man's sin, or became his "Substitute," we must remember that both the first Adam and the second Adam were respectively the representatives of human nature. What Adam did in his own person was virtually, therefore, the act of human nature, and in like manner that which was done by our Blessed Lord in His redemptive character as the representative of our common nature, is regarded in the sight of God as having been effected by the totality of mankind. Christ being the embodiment of human nature, His merits extend to all men, and, consequently, His death is our death, and His resurrection the cause of our resurrection. One or two examples will serve to illustrate these facts. When God told Adam that he should, in consequence of his disobedience, die, and return to that dust from which he had been taken, He did not pronounce the sentence upon Adam's person simply, but upon human nature at large. Hence all men, even the best men, are subject to mortality, and in due course revert to the dust, after the example of their progenitor. Had the sentence been leveled against the per

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