CHAPTER XI.

The Nature of Positive Institutions illustrated and established.

THE main argument for the baptism of infants being founded on the covenant which God made with Abraham, and professedly exhibiting no other kind of proof than that which is derived from inference and analogy, it becomes a question of very serious importance, whether inferential proof is admissible in the case of a positive institution; whether we are under the necessity, or are at liberty to infer our duty in regard to one positive institution, from the duty enjoined in another.

This, then, is a proper place to examine the nature of positive institutions.

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There is manifestly a material difference between moral cepts and those which are positive. A few testimonies from eminent Pedobaptist authors may be here pertinently introduced. I shall insert them as they are quoted in Rev. Mr. Frey's Essays on Baptism. Bishop Butler says: "Moral precepts are precepts, the reason of which we see; positive precepts are precepts, the reason of which we do not see. Moral duties

arise out of the nature of the case itself, prior to external command; positive duties do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external command; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command, received from him whose creatures and subjects we are."

President Edwards says: "Positive precepts are the greatest and most proper trial of our obedience; because in them the mere authority and will of the legislator is the sole ground of the obligation, and nothing in the nature of the things themselves; and, therefore, they are the greatest trial of any person's respect to that authority and will."

And Dr. Sherlock says: "What is matter of institution depends wholly upon the divine will and pleasure; and though all men will grant that God and Christ have great reason for their institutions, yet it is not the reason, but the authority which makes the institution. Though we do not understand the reasons of the institution, if we have the command we must obey;

and though we could fancy a great many reasons why there should be such an institution, if no such institution appear, we are free, and ought not to believe there is such an institution because we think there are reasons assigned why it should be."

The distinction noted by these authors between moral and positive precepts, is manifestly correct and important. It is plain to every observing mind. Therefore, from the very nature of positive institutions, the aforesaid questions must be answered in the negative. Inference and analogy, though allowed in the case of a moral duty, are not in the case of a positive law. For the very nature of a positive law implies that it is not based upon any previous fitness in the thing itself, but solely on the pleasure of the lawgiver. Hence this pleasure must be signified in the law itself. And we have no right to supply any deficiency which we may think we discover, by comparing it with a previous positive institution, and reasoning therefrom; but we are expressly limited in our interpretation to the law itself. The very enactment itself must contain the rule of duty. This principle is the one which all Protestants proceed upon when contending with the Roman Catholicks, in regard to their peculiar rites and prerogatives. They very justly and forcibly plead, that nothing short of "an explicit grant, a positive command, or a plain example in the New Testament, can prove their divine origin.

The Non-Conformists also proceed upon the same principle in their controversy with the Episcopalians in regard to the peculiar claims of their Bishops, and the peculiar usages of their church. They say, 66 produce your warrant for this, that, and the other, from our only rule of faith and practice--a divine precept, or an apostolick example, relating to the point in dispute."

Now, if this ground, which is taken with Papists and Epis copalians, be correct and scriptural, it ought to be taken with Pedobaptists. Why should they, themselves, take it in the other cases, and abandon it in this? Surely, we have as good a right to demand a divine precept, or an apostolick example, for infant baptism, as Protestants in general, and Non-Conformists in particular, have to demand the one or the other, of the Papists and Episcopalians, for their peculiar opinions and practices. We do but take the very ground occupied by them when we insist that the warrant for infant baptism, if it be a duty, must be contained in the institution for baptism, as delivered by Christ and his apostles, or in some plain apostolick example. In the controversy with the abovementioned orders, all can see the inconsistency and danger of reasoning by way of inference and analogy in regard to the subject of positive in

stitutions; and yet the Pedobaptists build the whole superstructure of infant baptism upon this very kind of reasoning. They have confessedly nothing better. It is evident, therefore, that they are inconsistent with themselves.

In the one case, they unquestionably reason correctly, but in the other incorrectly; and here lies the inconsistency complained of. Let the principles adopted and acted upon in relation to positive institutions in the abovementioned cases, be adopted and acted upon in this; and the plea that we have a divine warrant for infant baptism would be for ever abandoned.

We should no longer be referred to the Abrahamick covenant and circumcision for the due interpretation of our Saviour's command for Christian baptism, but be limited by the command itself, which, as I have abundantly shown, contains merely a warrant for the baptism of believers.

I might, therefore, justly set aside all which can be inferred from the Abrahamick covenant, and the practice of circumcision, or from any thing else pertaining to the Old Testament economy, as not being the kind of proof required in the present controversy; baptism being a positive institution of the New Testament.

And in doing this, I should not only take good and reasonable ground in itself, but I should take the very ground which Pedobaptists themselves take in defending the Protestant principles in general against the claims of Roman Catholicks, and the principles of Dissenters in particular against the claims of Episcopalians.

But as my object is to enlighten as far as possible, I will meet the aforesaid argument for infant baptism on other ground, i. e. I shall show, that provided the kind of proof which is plead for and attempted to be introduced by Pedobaptists in relation to this controversy were admitted to be sufficient, it does not exist. There are no premises, or data, contained in the Abrahamick covenant, or in any part of the Old Testament scriptures, from which the right of infants to baptism can be fairly and conclusively inferred, or be made out upon the strict priuciples of analogy.

CHAPTER XII.

The Abrahamick covenant, though a gracious covenant, or a dispensation of the covenant of grace, yet shown to be distinct from the covenant of grace itself.

It is generally maintained by Pedobaptists, that the covenant which God made with Abraham, and ratified by circumcision, was the covenant of grace. But on careful examination, this

notion will be found to be incorrect.

It may be properly termed a covenant of grace, or a dispensation of the covenant of grace, but not the covenant of grace itself.

When we speak properly of the covenant of grace, we are restricted by the phrase to one definite engagement or transaction, containing the method of salvation by grace through a Mediator in contradistinction to the covenant of works. The definite article which is prefixed, limits the idea to one and the same co

venant.

But when we speak of a covenant of grace, we are referred to one gracious engagement, or stipulation, in distinction from certain other engagements equally founded in grace. The indefinite article which is prefixed, implies that there are more covenants of grace than one, or that God has entered into various distinct engagements with men in their fallen state, or with some portion of them, which engagements, from the very nature of the case, must be wholly of grace or unmerited fa

vour.

And when we speak of a dispensation of the covenant of grace, the definite and proper meaning is a particular mode or method of dispensing the blessings of that covenant. This manner of expression also implies that there are different modes of dispensing the blessings of this covenant, all tending to the same great and glorious result.

These distinctions are of, high importance.

If God has, in fact, entered into various distinct covenants of grace with men, or that there have been various modes or ways