the jurisdiction of the state courts is concurrent with that of the U. States courts in civil cases; and where it is not, the line of exclusive jurisdiction is broadly marked out. For instance, the admiralty and prize jurisdiction is exclusive in the courts of the U. States; but in controversies between citizens of different states, the jurisdiction is concurrent. One state cannot sue another in its own courts. The suit must be in the supreme court of the U. States. The courts of the U. States, like the courts in England, have general authority to make rules for the orderly course of their business, to issue writs and executions, to take bail, to grant injunctions, to permit amendments, to punish for contempts, &c., in the same way as the courts in England. Writs and executions do not run, that is to say, cannot be executed, beyond the limits of the particular district in which the court sits, with a few exceptions, among which are subpanas for witnesses and executions on judgments in suits in favor of the U. States. There are various sorts of process to compel the performance of judgments, as in England. Such are writs of fieri facias, on which the goods and chattels of the debtor or defendant may be taken or sold; writs of levari facias, on which his lands may be taken for a term ; writs of capias, on which his person may be arrested and imprisoned; and other writs, on which his lands may be taken and set off to the creditor, at an appraised value, or sold at public auction. In criminal cases, the courts of the U. States direct the punishment against the party according to the rules prescribed by the law. If the punishment is death, the court, before which the trial is had, declares the time and place when and where the execution of it shall take place. If the punishment is discretionary, as by fine, or by imprisonment, or by fine not exceeding a certain sum, or by imprisonment not exceeding a certain period of time, the court fixes the fine, or imprisonment, or both, in its sentence, according to the circumstances of each particular case. As all trials, both civil and criminal, are public, and reports are printed, from time to time, of those which are most interesting either as to law or facts; as the opinion of the court is always publicly given, and, generally, the reasons of that opinion, it is not easy for any court to trespass upon the known principles of law or the rights of the parties. In the U. States, as in England, the citizens at large watch with jealousy the proceedings of courts of justice. The very

great number of lawyers engaged in the profession also furnishes an additional security. The rules of admission to the bar are not very strict; and usually, after three years' preparatory study, any citizen of good education and character is admissible to the inferior courts, and, after two or three years' practice there, is admissible to the highest courts. Generally speaking, lawyers are entitled to the same privileges, upon the same terms, in the U. States courts, as in the state courts. Few but eminent lawyers, in fact, practise in the supreme court of the U. States, although the admission to it is quite easy. Throughout the U. States, the bar of the highest courts is characterized by learning and talent, a spirit of independence and integrity, and a manliness of conduct, which give it great weight and popularity. Lawyers, more than any other class, are the favorite candidates for seats in the legislative and executive departments of the government.-The foregoing sketch is necessarily imperfect; but it may give the common reader a general outline of the jurisprudence and organization of the national courts, as contradistinguished from the state courts. To treat the subject with the fulness which belongs to it, would require a volume.

COURTS OF THE SEVERAL STATES IN THE UNITED STATES. The limits of this work will not permit a particular account of all the courts of the several states in the Union. In some respects, their judicial systems correspond with each other. The office of justice of the peace is very similar in all, the general police of the counties being confided mostly to these magistrates. They generally have authority to cause offenders and criminals, and all disturbers of the peace, to be arrested, and, if the offence is small, to fix its punishment; if it falls without their jurisdiction, they commit the offenders to prison, to be detained for trial before the proper tribunals. But for all considerable offences, the parties are liable to be put upon trial only on a bill being found against them by a grand jury. In the county courts of sessions, the assembled justices, or a select number of them, in many of the states, have a pretty extensive jurisdiction in matters of police, in the regulation of the affairs of the county, such as building court-houses, assessing county taxes, laying out roads, licensing taverns and victualling houses, and, in some states, granting the right to erect mills, and settling the questions of damages thereby occasioned. In Virginia, the county sessions have a still more ex

tensive jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, the civil jurisdiction extending to suits in which an amount not exceeding $300 is in dispute; and, though a vast amount of the business of both descriptions comes into these courts, the justices discharge all their duties without fees, and this paternal, friendly superintendence of the general interests of the county is supposed to have a very salutary influence upon the community. Besides this general superintendence of the police, and maintenance of the peace and good order of the community, exercised by the justices individually or collectively, they have, in most of the states, a jurisdiction of civil actions to amounts varying from $13 to $100, reserving to the parties a right to appeal, and have a new trial before the county sessions or county courts of common pleas, or some other superior tribunals, in cases where the sum in dispute exceeds a certain amount. In some states, there is a right of appeal in case the amount of $4 or more is in dispute: in others, the final jurisdiction of the justices extends to a greater sum; in Massachusetts, to $20; and there is a distinction, in some states, in the local extent of the civil and criminal jurisdiction of justices, the former extending only to the town in which the magistrate resides, the latter to the whole county. In some of the capitals and more considerable towns, special courts are established, to which is assigned the jurisdiction of many of the offences and suits, which, in the counties, generally come under the cognizance of the justices, individually or collectively. In all the states, another class of county courts is established, variously denominated,courts of common pleas, county, district or circuit courts,-which have original jurisdiction of the great mass of civil actions at law, or indictments for crimes not capital; and over these are established the superior or supreme courts, or courts of errors or appeals. In some states, the county courts for trials by jury are held by one of the judges of the supreme court, and all questions of law are reserv ed for the determination of all the judges. In others, the judge of the supreme court, who presides in trials by jury, in the counties, is assisted by associate justices: this is the case in Maryland. In other states, trials by jury are held in the counties by a court of which the jurisdiction is limited to the county; and, in case of the amount in dispute exceeding a certain sum, varying, in the different states, from $100 to $300, or in cases involving land

titles, and some others, either party may appeal, and have another trial of the same facts, by jury, before a judge of the superior court. This trial of the same facts a second time, by jury, without the allegation of any error or misdirection on the first trial, or any surprise on the part of either of the litigants, or any discovery of new evidence, or, indeed, any other reason than to give the parties opportunity for another contest, upon precisely the same footing as the first, is an anomaly. It is, in effect, an appeal from one jury to another, for which there might be more reason if juries were, like courts, differently constituted, so that one should be considered superior to the other; but this is not the case, the juries in both courts being selected upon the same principles. This is a feature of some of the state courts, by which they are distinguished from the English courts, and also from those of the U. States. A similar practice prevails, in some of the states, in criminal trials, except for felonies or the more heinous offences, of which the superior court has original and exclusive cognizance. This right to two trials of the same case, in the same state of it, though theoretically an irregularity not easily reconciled to any principle, is yet not the cause of any very serious inconvenience in practice, for very few of those actions in which the parties have a right to two trials are, in fact, tried more than once. The equity jurisdiction is in a distinct court in some of the states, as New York, Maryland, Virginia; in others, the same courts act as courts of law and equity, as in Massachusetts, Ohio, North Carolina; and there is a great diversity in the extent of equity jurisdiction possessed by the courts, those of Pennsylvania, for instance, having very circumscribed powers; and in the New England states, excepting Connecticut, the prejudices against equity courts and proceedings derived from some of the old common law writers, particularly lord Coke, have taken deep root, and are the more difficult to eradicate, as they have no definite foundation, but rest upon a vague notion of the delays supposed to be necessarily attendant upon chancery proceedings, and the still more groundless notion that a court of chancery proceeds, without any regard to the law or to principles, upon the mere arbitrary discretion of the judge. These prejudices are, however, gradually wearing away, and the remedies, which can only be obtained by proceedings in equity, are from time to time introduced by successive legislative acts.

In all the states in which the two species of courts are distinguished, the tribunal of final resort, as in England, is the same in appeals from courts, both of law and equity. There is established, in the city of New York, a tribunal called the marine court, having jurisdiction of marine torts and questions between masters of vessels and their crews; but, in general, all subjects of commercial and maritime jurisdiction, not belonging exclusively to the courts of the U. States, but remaining in the state tribunals, either exclusively or concurrently with the courts of the U. States-such as bills of exchange, bills of lading, charter-parties, policies of insurance, claims for seamen's wages, claims for contributions in general average, and maritime torts-are within the jurisdiction of the same courts which have cognizance of other contracts, and torts of similar amounts. In most of the states, the jurisdiction of the subject of wills, and granting administration on the estates of persons deceased intestate, and the appointing of guardians to minors, is assigned to certain tribunals, denominated courts of probate, orphans' courts, sometimes the register's court; and, in one state, a part of this jurisdiction is vested in the court of the ordinary. These courts are held in the several counties. An appeal lies from them, generally, to the higher tribunals. In some states, the sessions of the tribunal of final resort are held only at the capital; in others, again, the sessions are held in the several counties, one session or more in the year being devoted, in each county, to the determination of questions of law, for which purpose all the judges make a circuit of the state in a body.

COURT-MARTIAL. (See Martial Law.) COURTS OF LOVE (cours d'amour, corti d'amore). In the chivalric period of the middle ages, when love was not satisfied with remaining a cherished secret of the heart, but stood forth to public view; when enamored knights were ambitious to draw the attention of the world, and prove the ardor of their passion, by deeds of daring; when ladies were the soul and ornament of the tourney; and love, in short, was the serious business of life among the higher classes of society,-subtle questions on topics of gallantry were discussed in mixed companies, and often made subjects of poetical competition by the Troubadours or poets in their tensons; such, for example, as the following: "Which is most easy to be endured, the death or inconstancy of a mistress?" "Should you rather see me leave your mis

tress as you approach, or approach as you retire ?" "Who suffers most, a husband whose wife, or a lover whose mistress, is unfaithful?" At this period, when love was regarded as the source of nobleness of character; when even bishops sung its praises, and the uncultivated and unoccupied minds of a feudal nobility were at a loss for intellectual entertainment, the doubts and difficulties which grew out of the belle passion led to the institution of courts of love. The first was probably established in Provence, about the 12th century. These courts were composed of knights, poets and ladies, who gave their decisions as arrêts d'amour, after the manner of the parliaments. In 1803, Christopher von Aretin published a collection of these decisions from ancient manuscripts. There is likewise an older collection of them, by Martial d'Auvergne. This species of amusement was so popular, that hardly any court festival took place without a contest in a cour d'amour. These courts reached their highest splendor, in France, under Charles VI, through the influence of his consort, Isabella of Bavaria, whose court was established in 1380. (See Die Minnehöfe des Mittelalters und ihre Entscheidungen oder Aussprüche, &c., Leipsic, 1821.) Under Louis XIV, an academy of love was instituted by cardinal Richelieu (assemblée galante) at Ruel. It was an imitation of the courts of love. The princess Maria of Gonzaga presided, and mademoiselle Scudery was attorneygeneral. We conclude with the interesting decision, somewhat at variance with the notions of our times, given by the countess of Champagne on the question, "Can true love exist between husband and wife?" The "opinion" was: Nous disons et assurons, par la teneur des présentes, que l'amour ne peut étendre ses droits sur deux personnes mariées. En effet, les amants s'accordent tout mutuellement et gratuitement, sans être contraints par aucune nécessité, tandis que les époux sont tenus par devoir de subir réciproquement leurs volontés, et de ne se refuser rien les uns aux autres. Que ce jugement, que nous avons rendu avec une extrême prudence, et d'après l'avis d'un grand nombre d'autres dames, soit pour vous d'une autorité constante et irrefragable. Ainsi jugé, l'an 1174, le troisième jour des calendes de Mai, indiction septième.

COURT DE GEBELIN, Antoine; born at Nismes in 1724; died at Paris in 1784. His father, a Protestant, left France on the revocation of the edict of Nantes, and repaired to Switzerland. The young Gébelin studied with eagerness the writ

ings of the ancients. In his 12th year, he gained the admiration of all by the extent of his knowledge. His studies embraced natural history, mathematics, the dead and living languages, mythology, antiquities and archæology. After his father's death, he made a journey to Languedoc, where he resigned to his sister his small patrimony, and went himself to Paris. Here he soon became connected with the most distinguished men. After 10 years, he published, from 1773 to 1784, Le Monde Primitif. The learning displayed in this work excited universal admiration, It proves the existence of an original language, and explains the absurdities of mythology. It describes the formation of the first human societies, their laws and customs, and general character. The French academy, to assist him in his useful and expensive undertaking, granted him, twice in succession, the prize belonging to the writer who, in the course of the year, had published the most valuable work. Another production of his is the Muséum. Court de Gébelin was remarkable for his amiable and simple manners. He looked with aversion on the quarrels of writers. Towards the end of his life, he became a believer in animal magnetism, which was at that time much in vogue. He defended Mesmer, the author of the theory, in his Lettre sur le Magnétisme Animal (Paris, 1784, 4to.), shortly after which he died.

COURTESY, or CURTESY, tenure by, is where a man marries a woman seized of an estate of inheritance, and has by her issue born alive, which was capable of inheriting her estate. In this case, on the death of his wife, he holds the lands for his life, as tenant by courtesy.

COURTRAY, OF CORTRIJK (anciently Cortoriacum); a fortified town in the Netherlands, in West Flanders; 22 miles S. W. Ghent, 24 S. Bruges; lon. 3° 16′ E.; lat. 50° 49′ N.; population, 15,800. It is situated on the river Lys, and celebrated for its manufacture of table linen and lace. Near Courtray, in 1302, the Flemings, under the command of the count of Namur and William of Juliers, defeated the French, who suffered so severely, that, after the battle, 4000 gilt spurs were found on the field of battle, whence the engagement was called la bataille des éperons. In 1793, the French gained a victory over the English at this place.

COUSIN, Victor; born in 1791; one of the most learned and popular teachers of philosophy in France, who seems to combine the French tact and taste with German

erudition and zeal. He appears to have received his first instruction in philosophy under the distinguished M. Royer-Collard, who resided at Paris during the reign of Napoleon, ostensibly as a private man, though, in fact, as is now generally understood, a secret agent of the Bourbons. Royer-Collard gave lectures on intellectual and moral philosophy, and first brought into notice, in France, the writers of the modern Scotch school of metaphysics, particularly Reid. Cousin seems not to have been long satisfied with the Edinburgh metaphysicians, and soon devoted himself to the writings of the two nations who have most multifariously investigated intellectual philosophy-the ancient Greeks and modern Germans. He published, for the first time, some works of Proclus, consisting of commentaries on Plato, which were preserved, in manuscript, in the royal library at Paris. After the return of the Bourbons, Royer-Collard was appointed professor of moral philosophy in the university of France, and Cousin was made adjunct professor in the same branch. At a later period, he succeeded his teacher in this chair. But both these gentlemen soon became obnoxious to the royalist party, and were prohibited from lecturing under the administration of Villèle. Cousin published the first volume of his Philosophical Fragments at Paris in 1826, and travelled to Germany in company with the young duke of Montebello, the son of marshal Lannes. Here the different governments were busily engaged in persecuting the liberals, and the Prussian government took the liberty to send police officers into Saxony, to arrest Cousin in Dresden. A large volume was afterwards published by the Prussian government to prove the right which they had to commit this act, which most people would call a breach of the law of nations. The philosopher was detained for some time in Berlin, was at last set free, and returned to Paris, where he was replaced in his chair, after the overthrow of Villèle's administration, at the time when Royer-Collard was chosen president of the chamber of deputies; but, on the overthrow of the liberal ministry, and the accession of the ultra royalists under prince Polignac, a committee was appointed to inquire into the tendency of M. Cousin's lectures. The result of this inquiry has not as yet reached us. Cousin combines with his learning great skill in teaching, of which he is fond, and brilliant eloquence. His opinions are likely to have much influence on the phi