inist" revolutionary socialist groups were investigated because, even though they opposed the Soviet regime, the FBI viewed them as regarding the Soviet Union "as the center for world revolution." 121 Moreover, the FBI's concept of "subversive infiltration" was so broad that it permitted the investigation for decades of peaceful protest groups such as the NAACP. (1) The Number of Investigations. By 1960 the FBI had opened approximately 432,000 files at headquarters on individuals and groups in the "subversive" intelligence field. Between 1960 and 1963 an additional 9,000 such files were opened. 122 An even larger number of investigative files were maintained at FBI field offices.123 Under the Bureau's filing system, a single file on a group could include references to hundreds or thousands of group members or other persons associated with the group in any way; and such names were indexed so that the information was readily retrievable. (2) Vague and Sweeping Standards.-The FBI conducted continuing investigations of persons whose membership in the Communist Party or in "a revolutionary group" had "not been proven," but who had "anarchistic or revolutionary beliefs" and had "committed past acts of violence during strikes, riots, or demonstrations." Persons not currently engaged in "activity of a subversive nature" were still investigated if they had engaged in such activity "several years ago" and there was no "positive indication of disaffection." 124 The FBI Manual stated that it was "not possible to formulate any hard-and-fast standards" for measuring "the dangerousness of individual members or affiliates of revolutionary organizations." Persons could be investigated if they were "espousing the line" of "revolutionary movements". Anonymous allegations could start an investigation if they were "sufficiently specific and of sufficient weight." The Manual added, Where there is doubt an individual may be a current threat The FBI Manual did not define "subversive" groups in terms of their links to a foreign government. Instead, they were "Marxist revolutionary-type" organizations "seeking the overthrow of the U.S. Government." 126 One purpose of investigation was possible prosecu 122 121 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 3/5/46. Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 10/28/75. An indication of the breadth of the investigations is illustrated by the fact that the number of files far exceeded the Bureau's estimate of the "all time high" in Communist Party membership which was 80.000 in 1944 and steadily declined thereafter. (William C. Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 33–34.) 123 Report to the House Committee on the Judiciary by the Comptroller General of the United States, 2/24/76, pp. 118-119. 124 Such investigations were conducted because the Communist Party had issued instructions that "sleepers" should leave the Party and go "underground," still maintaining secret links to the Party. (Memorandum from J. F. Bland to A. H. Belmont, 7/30/58.) "Refusal to cooperate" with an FBI agent's interview was "taken into consideration along with other facts" in determining whether to continue the investigation. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Deputy Attorney General Peyton Ford, 6/28/51.) 125 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, p. 5. 126 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, p. 5. 1 tion under the Smith Act. But no prosecutions were initiated under the Act after 1957.127 The Justice Department advised the FBI in 1956 that such a prosecution required "an actual plan for a violent revolution." 128 The Department's position in 1960 was that "incitement to action in the foreseeable future" was needed.129 Despite the strict requirements for prosecution, the FBI continued to investigate "subversive" organizations "from an intelligence viewpoint" to appraise their "strength" and "dangerousness." 130 (3) COMINFIL.-The FBI's broadest program for collecting intelligence was carried out under the heading COMINFIL, or Communist infiltration.131 The FBI collected intelligence about Communist "influence" under the following categories: Political activities Domestic administration issues Negro question Youth matters Women's matters Farmers' Matters Cultural activities Veterans' matters 134 or to FBI investigations covered "the entire spectrum of the social and labor movement in the country." 133 The purpose-as publicly disclosed in the Attorney General's Annual Reports-was pure intelligence: to "fortify" the Government against "subversive pressures," "strengthen" the Government against "subversive campaigns." 135 In other words, the COMINFIL program supplied the Attorney General and the President with intelligence about a wide range of groups seeking to influence national policy under the rationale of determining whether Communists were involved.136 The FBI said it was not concerned with the "legitimate activities" of "nonsubversive groups," but only with whether Communists were "gaining a dominant 127 The Supreme Court's last decision upholding a Smith Act conviction was Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), which reiterated that there must be "advocacy of action." See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Tompkins to Director, FBI, 128 3/15/56. 129 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to Director, FBI, 5/17/60. 130 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, p. 5. 131 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 83-84. 132 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 5-11. 133 Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1955, p. 195. 134 Annual Report for 1958, p. 338. 130 (Examples of such reports to the White House are set forth later, pp. 5153.) The Chief of the Internal Security Section of the FBI Intelligence Division in 1948-1966 testified that the Bureau "had to be certain" that a group's position did not coincide with the Communist line "just by accident." The FBI would not "open a case" until it had "specific information" that "the Communists were there" and were "influencing" the group to "assist the Communist movement." (F. J. Baumgardner testimony, 10/8/75 p. 47.) role." 137 Nevertheless, COMINFIL reports inevitably described "legitimate activities" totally unrelated to the alleged "subversive activity." This is vividly demonstrated by the COMINFIL reports on American's leading civil rights group in this period, the NAACP.138 The investigation continued for at least twenty-five years in cities. throughout the nation, although no evidence was ever found to rebut the observation that the NAACP had a "strong tendency" to "steer clear of Communist activities." 139 (4) Exaggeration of Communist Influence.-The FBI and the Justice Department justified the continuation of COMINFIL investigations, despite the Communist Party's steady decline in the fifties and early sixities, on the theory that the Party was "seeking to repair its losses" with the "hope" of being able to "move in" on movements with "laudable objectives." 140 The FBI reported to the White House in 1961 that the Communist Party had "attempted" to take advantage of "racial disturbances" in the South and had "endeavored" to bring "pressure to bear" on government officials "through the press, labor unions, and student groups." At that time the FBI was investigating "two hundred known or suspected communist front and communist-infiltrated organizations." 141 By not stating how effective the "attempts" and "endeavors" of the Communists were, and by not indicating whether they were 'becoming more or less successful, the FBI offered a deficient rationale for its sweeping intelligence collection policy. William C. Sullivan, a former head of the FBI Intelligence Division, has testified that such language was deliberately used to exaggerate the threat of Communist influence. "Attempts" and "influence" were "very significant words" in FBI reports, he said. These terms obscured what he felt to be the more significant criterion—the degree of Communist success. The Bureau "did not discuss this because we would have to say that they did not hit the target, hardly any." 142 A distorted picture of Communist "infiltration" later served to justify the FBI's intensive investigations of the groups involved in protests against the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. 137 Annual Report for 1955, p. 195. 138 For more detailed discussion of the FBI investigations of the NAACP and other civil rights groups see the Report on the Development of FBI Domestic Intelligence Investigations. 139 Report of Oklahoma City Field Office, 9/19/41. This report continued: "Nevertheless, there is a strong movement on the part of the Communists to attempt to dominate this group. . . Consequently, the activities of the NAACP will be closely observed and scrutinized in the future." [Emphasis added.] This stress on Communist "attempts" rather than their actual achievements is typical of COMINFIL reports. The annual reports on the FBI's COMINFIL investigation of the NAACP indicate that the Communists consistently failed in these "attempts" at the national level, although the Bureau took credit for using covert tactics to prevent a Communist takeover of a major NAACP chapter. (Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General-elect Robert F. Kennedy, 1/10/61 attached memorandum, subject: Communist Party, USA-FBI Counterattack.) 140 Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1959, pp. 247-248. 141 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security, 7/25/61, enclosing IIC Report, Status of U.S. Internal Security Programs. 142 William C. Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 40-41. 68-786 O 76-5 b. "Racial Matters" and "Hate Groups" In the 1950s, the FBI also developed intelligence programs to investigate "Racial Matters" and "hate organizations" unrelated to "revolutionary-type" subversives. "Hate organizations" were investigated if they had "allegedly adopted a policy of advocating, condoning, or inciting the use of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution." Like the COMINFIL program, however, the Bureau used its "established sources" to monitor the activities of "hate groups" which did not "qualify" under the "advocacy of violence" standard.143 In 1963, FBI field offices were instructed to report "the formation and identities" of "rightist or extremist groups" in the "anticommunist field." Headquarters approval was needed for investigating "groups in this field whose activities are not in violation of any statutes." 144 Under these programs, the FBI collected and disseminated intelligence about the John Birch Society and its founder, Robert Welch, in 1959.145 The activities of another right-wing spokesman, Gerald L. K. Smith, who headed the Christian Nationalist Crusade, were the subject of FBI reports even after the Justice Department had concluded that the group had not violated federal law and that there was no basis for including the group on the "Attorney General's list." 146 The FBI program for collecting intelligence on "General Racial Matters" was even broader. It went beyond "race riots" to include "civil demonstrations" and "similar developments." These "developments" included: proposed or actual activities of individuals, officials, commit- The FBI's "intelligence function" was to advise "appropriate" federal and local officials of "pertinent information" about "racial incidents." 148 A briefing of the Cabinet by Director Hoover in 1956 illustrates the breadth of collection and dissemination under the racial matters program. The briefing covered not only incidents of violence and the "efforts" and "plans" of Communists to "influence" the civil rights movement, but also the legislative strategy of the NAACP and the activities of Southern Governors and Congressmen on behalf of groups opposing integration peacefully.149 143 1960 FBI Manual Section 122, p. 1. 144 SAC Letter No. 63-27, 6/11/63. 145 The FBI has denied that it ever conducted a "security-type investigation" of the Birch Society or Welch, but states the Boston field office "was instructed in 1959 to obtain background data" on Welch using public sources. (Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 2/10/76.) A 1963 internal FBI memorandum stated that the Bureau "checked into the background of the Birch Society because of its scurrilous attack on President Eisenhower and other high Government officials." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 5/29/63.) Reports were sent to the White House, see footnote 164. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Tompkins to Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President, 11/22/54; letters from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President, 10/15/57, and 1/17/58. (Eisenhower Library.) 146 149 "Racial Tensions and Civil Rights," 3/1/56, statement used by the FBI Director at Cabinet briefing, 3/9/56. c. FBI Political Intelligence for the White House Numerous items of political intelligence were supplied by the FB1 to the White House in each of the three administrations during the Cold War era, apparently satisfying the desires of Presidents and their staffs.150 153 President Truman and his aides received regular letters from Director Hoover labeled "Personal and Confidential" containing tidbits of political intelligence. The letters reported on such subjects as: inside information about the negotiating position of a non-Communist labor union; 151 the activities of a former Roosevelt aide who was trying to influence the Truman administration's appointments; 152 a report from a "confidential source" that a "scandal" was brewing which would be "very embarrassing" to the Democratic administration; a report from a "very confidential source" about a meeting of newspaper representatives in Chicago to plan publication of stories exposing organized crime and corrupt politicians; 154 the contents of an in-house communication from Newsweek magazine reporters to their editors about a story they had obtained from the State Department,155 and criticism of the government's internal security programs by a former Assistant to the Attorney General.156 Letters discussing Communist "influence" provided a considerable amount of extraneous information about the legislative process, including lobbying activities in support of civil rights legislation 157 and the political activities of Senators and Congressmen.158 President Eisenhower and his aides received similar tid-bits of political intelligence, including an advance text of a speech to be delivered by a prominent labor leader,159 reports from Bureau "sources" on the meetings of an NAACP delegation with Senators Paul Douglas and Everett Dirksen of Illinois; 160 the report of an "informant" on the role of the United Auto Workers Union at an NAACP conference,161 summaries of data in FBI files on thirteen persons (including Norman Thomas, Linus Pauling, and Bertrand Russell) who had filed suit to stop nuclear testing,162 a report of a "confidential source" on plans of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt to hold a reception for the head of 150 See p. 37 for discussion of White House wiretap requests in 1945-1948. 151 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to George E. Allen, Director, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 12/13/46. (Harry S. Truman Library.) 153 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Maj. Gen. Harry H. Vaughn, Military Aide to the President, 2/15/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.) 153 Letter from Hoover to Vaughn, 6/25/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.) 154 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to the President, 1/27/50. (Harry S. Truman Library.) 155 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 4/1/46. (Harry S. Truman Library.) 156 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Maj. Gen. Harry H. Vaughn, Military Aide to the President, 11/13/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.) 157 Letters from J. Edgar Hoover to Brig. Gen. Harry H. Vaughn, Military Aide to the President, 1/11/46 and 1/17/46. (Harry S. Truman Library.) 158 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to George E. Allen, Director, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 5/29/49. (Harry S. Truman Library.) 159 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President, 4/21/55. (Eisenhower Library.) 160 Letter from Hoover to Anderson, 3/6/56. (Eisenhower Library.) 161 Letter from Hoover to Anderson, 3/5/56. (Eisenhower Library.) 162 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President, 4/11/58. (Eisenhower Library.) |