mate civil rights organization" and "assuming a militant black nationalist posture." The FBI reached this conclusion on the grounds that "some leaders in their public statements" had condoned "violence as a means of attaining Negro rights." The investigation was intensified, even though it was recognized there was no information that its members "advocate violence" or "participate in actual violence." 290 The same overbreadth characterized the FBI's collection of intelligence about "white militant groups." Among the groups investigated were those "known to sponsor demonstrations against integration and against the busing of Negro students to white schools." As soon as a new organization of this sort was formed, the Bureau used its informants and "established sources" to determine "the aims and purposes of the organization, its leaders, approximate membership," and other "background data" bearing upon "the militancy" of the group.290a (2) "New Left" Intelligence.-The FBI collected intelligence under its VIDEM (Vietnam Demonstration) and STAG (Student Agitation) Programs on "anti-Government demonstrations and protest rallies" which the Bureau considered "disruptive." Field offices were warned against "incomplete and nonspecific reporting" which neglected such details as "number of protesters present, identities of organizations, and identities of speakers and leading activists." 291 The FBI attempted to define the "New Left," but with little success. The Bureau agent who was in charge of New Left intelligence conceded that: It has never been strictly defined, as far as I know.... It's more 292 He also stated that the definition was expanded continually.2 Field offices were told that the New Left was a "subversive force" dedicated to destroying our "traditional values." Although it had "no definable ideology," it was seen as having "strong Marxist, existentialist, nihilist and anarchist overtones." Field offices were instructed that "proper areas of inquiry" regarding the subjects of "New Left" investigations were "public statements, the writings and the leadership activities" which might establish their "rejection of law and order" and thus their "potential" threat to security. Such persons would also be placed on the Security Index (for detention in a time of emergency) because of these "anarchistic tendencies," even if the Bureau could not prove "membership in a subversive organization." "293 A Bureau memorandum which recommended the use of disruptive techniques against the "New Left" paid particular attention to one of its "anarchistic tendencies": 200 SAC Letter 68-16, 3/12/68, Subject: Congress of Racial Equality. 200a SAC Letter 68-25, 4/30/68. 201 SAC Memorandum 1-72; 5/23/72, Subject: Reporting of Protest Demonstrations. 293 Supervisor, FBI Intelligence Division, deposition, 10/28/75, pp. 7–8. 293 SAC Letter 68-21, 4/2/68. This directive did caution that "mere dissent and opposition to Governmental policies pursued in a legal constitutional manner" was "not sufficient to warrant inclusion in the Security Index." Moreover, "antiVietnam or peace group sentiments" were not, in themselves, supposed to "justify an investigation." The failure of this admonition to achieve its stated objective is discussed in the findings on "Overbreadth" and "Covert Action to Disrupt." the New Left has on many occasions viciously and scurrilously attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt to hamper our investigations and drive us off the college campuses. 294 Later instructions to the field stated that the term "New Left" did not refer to "a definite organization," but to a "loosely-bound, freewheeling, college-oriented movement" and to the "more extreme and militant anti-Vietnam war and antidraft protest organizations." These instructions directed a "comprehensive study of the whole movement" for the purpose of assessing its "dangerousness." Quarterly reports were to be prepared, and "subfiles" opened, under the following headings: Organizations ("when organized, objectives, locality which Membership (and "sympathizers"-use "best available in- Finances (including identity of "angels" and funds from Communist Influence Publications ("describe publications, show circulation and Violence Religion ("support of movement by religious groups or in- Race Relations Political Activities ("details relating to position taken on Ideology Education ("courses given together with any educational out- Social Reform ("demonstrations aimed at social reform") Public Appearances of Leaders ("on radio and television" Security Measures International Relations ("travel in foreign countries," "at- Mass Media ("indications of support of New Left by mass Through these massive reports, the FBI hoped to discover "the true nature of the New Left movement." 295 Few Bureau programs better reflect "pure intelligence" objectives which extended far beyond even the most generous definition of "preventive intelligence." 296 294 Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/9/68. 295 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACS, 10/28/68, and enclosure, Subject: New Left Movement-Report Outline. 296 A further reason for collecting information on the New Left was put forward by Assistant Director Brennan, head of the FBI Intelligence Division in 1970-1971. Since New Left "leaders" had "publicly professed" their desire to overthrow the Government, the Bureau should file the names of anyone who "joined in membership" for "future reference" in case they ever "obtained a sensitive Government position." (Charles Brennan testimony, 9/25/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, pp. 116-117.) Apart from the massive general reports required on the "New Left," examples of particular investigations included: a stockholders group planning to protest their corporation's war production at the annual stockholders meeting; 297 a university professor who was "an active participant in New Left demonstrations," publicly surrendered his draft card, and had been arrested in antiwar demonstrations, but not convicted; 298 and two university instructors who helped support a student "underground" newspaper whose editorial policy was described as "left-of-center, anti-establishment, and opposed [to] the University administration." 299 The FBI also investigated emerging "New Left" groups, such as "Free Universities" attached to various college campuses, to determine whether they were connected "in any way" with "subversive groups.' For example, when an article appeared in a newspaper stating that one "Free University" was being formed and that it was "anti-institutional," the FBI sought to determine its "origin," the persons responsible for its "formation," and whether they had "subversive backgrounds." 300 The resulting report described in detail the formation, curriculum content, and associates of the group. It was disseminated to military intelligence and Secret Service field offices and headquarters in Washington as well as to the State Department and the Justice Department.301 b. FBI Informants The FBI Manual has never significantly limited informant reporting about the lawful political activities or personal lives of American citizens, except for prohibiting reports about legal defense "plans or strategy," "employer-employee relationships" connected with labor unions, and "legitimate campus activities." 302 In practice, FBI agents imposed no other limitations on the informants they handled and, on occasion, disregarded the prohibitions of the Manual.303 (1) Infiltration of the Klan.-In mid-1964, Justice Department officials became increasingly concerned about the spread of Ku Klux Klan activity and violence in the Deep South. Attorney General Kennedy advised President Johnson that, because of the "unique difficulty" presented by a situation where "lawless activities" had the "sanction of local law enforcement agencies," the FBI should apply to the Klan the same "techniques" used previously "in the infiltration of Communist groups." 304 Former Attorney General Katzenbach, under whose tenure FBI activities against the Klan expanded, vigorously defended this deci 27 Memorandum from Minneapolis field office to FBI Headquarters, 4/1/70. 298 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh field office, 5/1/70. 299 Memorandum from Mobile field office to FBI Headquarters, 12/9/70. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit field offices, 2/17/66. 301 Memorandum from Detroit field office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66. 303 FBI Manual, Section 107. 300 303 See Findings on use of informants in "Intrusive Techniques," p. 192. 304 Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to the President, June 1964, quoted in Victor Navasky, Kennedy Justice (New York: Atheneum, 1971), pp. 105-106. The President asked former CIA Director Allen Dulles to evaluate the situation in Mississippi. Upon his return from a survey of the state, Dulles endorsed the Attorney General's recommendation that the FBI be used to "control the terrorist activities." ("Dulles Requests More FBI Agents for Mississippi," New York Times, 6/27/64.) sion as necessary to "deter violence" by sowing "deep mistrust among Klan members" and making them aware that they were "under constant observation." 305 The FBI Manual did, in fact, advise Bureau agents against "wholesale investigations" of persons who "mererly attend meetings on a regular basis." 306 But FBI intelligence officials chafed under this restriction and sought expanded informant coverage. Subsequently, the Manual was revised in 1967 to require the field to furnish the "details" of Klan "rallies" and "demonstrations." 308 By 1971, the Special Agents in Charge of field offices had the discretion to investigate not only persons with "a potential for violence,” but also anyone else who in the SAC's "judgment" was an "extremist." 309 307 (2) "Listening Posts" in the Black Community.-Two special informant programs illustrates the breadth of the Bureau's infiltration of the black community. In 1970, the FBI used its "established informants" to determine the "background, aims and purposes, leaders and Key Activists" in every black student group in the country, "regardless of [the group's] past or present involvement in disorders." 310 Field offices were instructed to "target informants" against these groups and to "develop such coverage" where informants were not already available.311 In response to Attorney General Clark's instructions regarding civil disorders intelligence in 1967, the Bureau launched a "ghetto informant program" which lasted until 1973.312 The number of ghetto informants expanded rapidly: 4,067 in 1969 and 7,402 by 1972.313 The original concept was to establish a "listening post" 314 by recruiting a person "who lives or works in a ghetto area" to provide information regarding the "racial situation" and "racial activities." 315 Such informants could include "the proprietor of a candy store or barber shop." As the program developed, however, ghetto informants were: utilized to attend public meetings held by extremists, to iden- 316 305 Testimony of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 12/3/75. Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 207. 306 1965 FBI manual, Section 122, pp. 1–2. 307 FBI Executives conference memorandum, 3/24/66, Subject: Establishment of a Special Squad Against the Ku Klux Klan. 308 1967 FBI manual, Section 122, p. 2. 309 1971 FBI manual, Section 122, p. 2. 310 Memorandum from FBI Executive Conference to Mr. Tolson, 10/29/70. 311 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACS. 11/4/70. 312 Memorandum from G. C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, 10/11/67. For Attorney General Clark's order, see pp. 83-84. 313 Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 8/20/75 and enclosures.) 314 Memorandum from G. C. Moore to E. S. Miller, 9/8/72. 315 Memorandum from G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan, 10/27/70. 316 Memorandum from Moore to Miller, 9/27/72. This program continued until 1973, when the FBI decided to rely on its regular extremist informants "for 'byproduct' information on civil unrest." The most "productive" ghetto informants were "converted" into regular informants. (FBI Inspection Division Memorandum, 11/24/72; Memorandum from Director Clarence M. Kelley to all SACs, 7/31/73.) Material to be furnished by ghetto informants included names of "Afro-American type book stores" and their "owners, operators and clientele." 99 317 (3) Infiltration of the "New Left".-The FBI used its "security" informant program to report extensively on all activities relating to opposition to the Vietnam war. Moreover, informants already in groups considered "subversive" by the FBI also reported on the activities of other organizations and their members, if the latter were being "infiltrated" by the former groups.318 The agent who handled one informant in an antiwar group believed to be infiltrated by "subversive groups and/or violent elements" testified that the informant told him "everything she knew" about the chapter she joined.319 Summaries of her reports indicate that she reported extensively about personal matters and lawful political activity.320 This informant estimated that her reports identified as many as 1,000 people to the FBI over an 18-month period. The vast majority of these persons were members of peaceful and law-abiding groups, including the United Church for Christ, which were engaged in joint social welfare projects with the antiwar group which the informant had infiltrated 321 Other FBI informants reported, for example, on the Women's Liberation Movement, identifying its members at several mid-western universities 322 and reporting statements made by women concerning their personal reasons for participating in the women's movement.323 Moreover, as in the case of informants in the black community, efforts were made to greatly increase the number of informants who could report on antiwar and related groups. In 1969, the Justice Department specifically asked the FBI to use not only "existing sources," but also "any other sources you may be able to develop" to collect information about "serious campus disorders." 324 The Bureau ordered its field offices in 1970 to "make every effort" to obtain "informant coverage" of every "New Left commune." 325 Later that year, after Director Hoover lifted restrictions against recruiting 18 to 21-year-old informants, field offices were urged to take advantage of this "tremendous opportunity" to expand coverage of New Left "collectives, communes, and staffs of their underground newspapers." 326 317 Philadelphia Field Office memo 8/12/68, re Racial Informant. 318 FBI Manual Section 87. 319 Testimony of FBI Special Agent, 11/20/75, p. 55. 320 Staff review of informant report summaries. 321 Mary Jo Cook, testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 111, 119-120. 322 Report of Kansas City Field Office, 10/20/70. 323 Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/28/69. 324 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to J. Edgar Hoover, 3/3/69. This memorandum stated that the Department was considering "conducting a grand jury investigation” under the antiriot act and other statutes. 325 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACS, 4/17/70. This directive defined a "commune" as "a group of individuals residing in one location who practice communal living, i.e., they share income and adhere to the philosophy of a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-oriented violent revolution." 226 SAC Letter 70-48, 9/15/70. This directive implemented one provision of the "Huston Plan," which had been disapproved as a domestic intelligence package. See pp. 113, 116. |