Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign PolicyOxford University Press, 28 okt. 1993 - 272 sidor In the past three decades, the United States government has used special operations repeatedly in an effort to achieve key foreign policy objectives, such as in the overthrow of Fidel Castro in Cuba and the rescuing of American hostages in Iran. Many of these secret missions carried out by highly trained commando forces have failed. In Perilous Options, Lucien Vandenbroucke examines the use and misuse of such special operations through an in-depth analysis of four operations--the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Sontay raid to rescue POWs in North Vietnam, the Mayaguez operation, and the Iran hostage rescue mission. Drawing extensively on declassified government documents, interviews with key decision makers and participants in these episodes, and other primary material, Perilous Options identifies recurrent problems in the way the United States government has prepared and executed such operations. These recurrent problems, outlined by key participants in these four special operations, include faulty intelligence, poor interagency and interservice cooperation and coordination, inadequate information and advice provided to decisionmakers, wishful thinking on the part of decisionmakers, and overcontrol of mission execution from outside the theater of operations. Vandenbroucke also explores the extent to which recent efforts to revitalize the U.S. operations capability have addressed these problems, identifying additional changes that can improve the government's ability to plan, evaluate, and execute such operations. |
Innehåll
3 | |
9 | |
3 Debacle at the Beachhead | 19 |
4 Raid to an Empty Camp | 51 |
5 Last Fiasco in Indochina | 72 |
6 There Are No Snakes on Koh Tang | 94 |
7 Hostages of the Ayatollah | 114 |
8 The Helicopters That Couldnt | 136 |
9 Why We Failed | 152 |
NOTES | 183 |
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY | 227 |
INDEX | 249 |
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Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy Lucien S. Vandenbroucke Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 1993 |
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advisers Air Force aircraft American April Army assault Bay of Pigs Beckwith and Knox Bissell Brigade Brzezinski Bundy Cambodian camp Carter Castro CinCPac Colonel commander covert crew crisis Cuba Cuban D-Day DDEL decision makers Delta Force Desert Eisenhower embassy exiles FOIA Ford Foreign Policy GRFL Guatemala guerrilla Gulf of Thailand helicopters Hickam AFB hostages interview with author invasion Iran Iran rescue mission Iranian island JFKL June Kennedy Kesaris Kissinger Koh Tang Kyle landing Manor Marine Corps Mayaguez Operation McGeorge Bundy Moorer Navy North Vietnam officers PACAF Pentagon planes planners POWs president problems Quoted raid raiders Rescue Mission Report Review Group Robert Rusk Schemmer Schlesinger Secretary of Defense senior ship Sontay special operations forces SS Mayaguez strategic special operations strikes Tehran tion troops Turner U.S. forces U.S. intelligence U.S. military United USSAG Utapao Vietnamese Washington White House York ZAPATA
Populära avsnitt
Sida 163 - A thesis which could not survive an undergraduate seminar in a liberal-arts college becomes accepted doctrine, and the only question is not whether it should be done but how it should be done.
Sida 16 - We must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista democratic anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro. Thus far these fighters for freedom have had virtually no support from our government.
Sida 21 - Each day the crises multiply. Each day their solution grows more difficult. Each day we draw nearer the hour of maximum danger, as weapons spread and hostile forces grow stronger.
Sida 195 - I want to say that there will not be, under any conditions, an intervention in Cuba by the United States armed forces.
Sida 38 - Kennedy had enormous confidence in his ability and luck: 'Everything had broken right for him since 1956. He had won the nomination and the election against all the odds in the book. Everyone around him thought he had the Midas touch and could not lose.
Sida 6 - In Iran we had an ad hoc affair. We went out, found bits and pieces, people and equipment, brought them together occasionally and then asked them to perform a highly complex mission.
Sida 11 - noted the possibility that over the long run the US will not be able to tolerate the Castro regime in Cuba, and suggested that covert contingency planning to accomplish the fall of the Castro government might be in order.
Sida 117 - I've ever spent in the White House. . . . DIARY, FEBRUARY 7,1980 The first week of November 1979 marked the beginning of the most difficult period of my life. The safety and well-being of the American hostages became a constant concern for me, no matter what other duties I was performing as President. I would walk in the White House gardens early in the morning and lie awake at night, trying to think of additional steps I could take to gain their freedom without sacrificing the honor and security...
Sida 37 - somehow the idea took hold around the cabinet table that this would not much matter so long as United States soldiers did not take part in the actual fighting." Thus, despite evidence at hand, the policy-makers ignored the old adage that one must expect any secret known to a large number of people to leak out . Apparently they never discussed the obvious danger that a secret act of military aggression against a neighboring country might be revealed by one...
Sida 225 - ... a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.
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