doth not express the true and real character of God; but one infinitely the reverse; exhibiting in words, anger which hath no existence in the divine mind, and dressing the great governor of the world in vengeance, while anger is not in him. Nothing, therefore, can more directly subvert the first principles of divine revelation, than the supposition that it is unnecessary to the glory of the divine character, that God should express, in natural evil, his displeasure against sin. That opinion which supposeth that sin might have been forgiven without atonement, clothes the divine Being in a character exceedingly diverse from that in which he appears in the moral law; and represents him as being possessed of a goodness of an exceedingly different nature from that which the moral law naturally exhibits. Therefore, for Christ to come, and magnify this law and do it honor; when it exhibits a character, in God, so infinitely diverse from that which would certainly have saved sinners, even though Christ had never appeared on earth; would be very far from being pleasing to the Father: And never, in his view, could have merited that high station to which he is now exalted.

THESE Consequences necessarily flow from a denial of the necessity of an atonement; if it be granted that the moral law, as promulgated in the sacred scriptures, speaks the mind and will of God. If the divine will, the feelings of the divine mind, perfectly correspond with the written law; it is inconceivable that God's anger against sinners should not be expressed, in his moral government, by natural evil. And when we consider the supremacy and mighty power of God, to deny the need of natural evil in order truly to express the character of God, when sin hath actually taken place; is the same as to deny that there are any feelings in the divine mind, which, in their natural consequences and expressions would bring evil on sinners.

For if such feelings exist in the divine mind, they cannot be known otherwise than by being expressed in God's works. And if it is God's great end to make himself known, and in works exhibit his true character to the views of his creatures; there is no more reason to suppose that the scenes of divine government will be destitute of the fruits of this part of the char acter of God, than of those which directly express his approbation of virtue.

THE supposition, therefore, that atonement is not necessary to the exercise of mercy toward sinners, evidently implies that the written law doth not, in fact, speak the very mind and will of God: But that the law itself, at furthest, intimates no more than that the sinner who persists in wickedness shall fall under the divine anger. But that persevering wickedness and impenitency, and these only, shall subject us to the anger of God, is so far from being the language of the divine law, that it curseth every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them. If, therefore, nothing but persevering wickedness so incurs the divine anger as to expose to natural evil; nothing can be more certain than that the written law doth not indeed truly express the will of God. This must be true, unless the plain and natural language of the law, is that only certain, atrocious sins shall be punished. And if the consequen ces of a denial of the necessity of atonement, which have already been mentioned, be admitted to stand until this can be found to be the language of God's written law; they will not suddenly be subverted.

HE that can put such a construction on the moral laws as leaves room for the escape of sinners of certain denominations and characters; with an equal degree of dexterity in criticism and construction, will soon discover that sinners of every denomination may, even by

law, be exempted from punishment: And therefore enjoy, for a little while, the poor consolation of believing that anger is not in God, and that there are no punishments for the wicked.

2. Ir it be unnecessary to the glory of the divine government, that God's anger against sinners should be expressed in bringing natural evil; it is equally unnecessary that any such displeasure as would, in its natural fruits and operation, bring evil on sinners, should ever have existence in the divine mind. The supposition that divine anger need not be exercised and expressed, implies that it is of no use; and therefore not an excellency in God: And consequently can have no existence in him.

THUS the opinion that there is no necessity for God's expressing his anger against sinners, by bringing natural evils upon them; not only cuts off the penalties of the law, but exhibits the divine character itself in a point of light exceedingly diverse from that which the moral law naturally expresseth. And the denial of any necessity of atonement, in order to a consistent exercise of pardon and mercy; plainly amounts to a denial of the necessity of punishments, under the divine government; or of any necessity arising from the divine perfection, that God should ever express displeasure by inflicting natural evil.

NEARLY the same consequences are involved in the opinion that the persevering obedience of Christ was all that was necessary in order to open a way for mercy to sinners. For unless this persevering obedience expressed divine anger against sinners; it is manifest that there is no necessity that God should either exercise, or express anger: And therefore, all the consequences which flow from a denial of the ne

cessity of atonement, flow equally from this construction of the nature of it.

BUT to say that Christ's obedience expressed divine anger against sinners, is the same as to say that all that anger which exists in the divine mind, against them, may be expressed without natural evil-without punishments. This is evident; because it is implied in the supposition before us, that Christ expressed and acted out the character of God;—that the disposition of the divine mind was perfectly delineated in Christ, and in his obedience. And if the whole disposition of the divine mind toward sinners, may be expressed without natural evil, without punishment; it is plain that no punishment is ever to be expected or feared: And that for this obvious reason, that there is in fact no disposition in the divine mind actually to punish offenders; or to bring natural evil upon them.

FURTHER; to say that God expresseth displeasure against sinners by rewarding the obedience of Christ with a pardon to sinners; is still saying that there is no anger in God, but what may be properly and fully expressed by bestowing rewards. It would be ab

surd to suppose that the rewards which a master, or a parent, bestows upon an obedient servant, or child, express displeasure against the rest of the family. And if such be all the anger that ever exists in the head of the family; neither children, nor servants, need ever be afraid of punishment. So if all the displeasure which exists in the divine mind against sinners, may be expressed in rewarding the obedience of Christ; it is apparent that there is no displeasure which need ever be expressed in inflicting punishment.

SHOULD it be urged that both the Father and the Son expressed displeasure against sinners, by united

ly acting against the cause of sin; and that this is all the way in which it is necessary the divine anger should appear; the consequence would still be that there is no disposition in the divine mind to punish of fenders. Because this implies that God may express all the displeasure which he really hath against sinners, by acting in such a manner, in his providence, for the cause of righteousness, and against that of iniquity, as would render all punishment unnecessary.

THE denial of any necessity of atonement, and every construction of the nature of it which renders pun ishments unnecessary; are equally subversive of the moral law. Every explanation of the nature of atonement which implies it to be unnecessary that God should express anger against sinners by natural evils; invests the divine Being with a character very differ. ent from that which the moral law naturally express es. All such ideas, either of the necessity or nature of atonement, suppose that there is nothing in the moral law which would naturally and necessarily forbid an expectation of pardon, upon repentance, even though Christ had never come into the world: And therefore, that the penalties of the law do not, in words, express any such displeasure against sinners, as, in its natural operation and fruits, would bring the punishments spoken of in the law, upon them. Such ideas of atonement imply that, whatever disapproba tion may exist in the divine mind, of the characters of sinners; still it is of such a nature that it may all be expressed without natural evil: Or, at least, that we could not have inferred from the clearest view we could have had of it, that God would ever punish sinners: even had Christ never come into the world and died.

THE whole controversy respecting atonement, therefore, turns upon the explanation of the moral