at the time as a great measure of social reform. It contained the germ of the workhouse, and overladen though it is with three centuries of Acts and regulations, it still contains all the Law and the Prophets of social reform, work for those who can work and relief for those who cannot. We need only read its final section, providing that the Act was to endure no longer than the end of the next session of Parliament, in order to feel sure that its operation would be permanent. The Act was in fact a startling success. Designed as a temporary measure to relieve the poor, it was found to be so successful in increasing the number of the poor that no one had the heart to repeal it. It gave us Bumble and the institutional workhouse, and a machinery so detestable that many of the best of the poor would rather die than avail themselves of its provisions. Eventually the workhouse, with all its odious associations, became the natural destiny of a large proportion of the aged poor who had led honest and laborious lives.

An Act to relieve the Poor Law was obviously indicated by these conditions, and the Old Age Pension Acts, which began in 1908 and ended in 1924, provided for the aged with meagre resources, a sum of money not indeed equal to the cost of their maintenance in a Poor Law institution, but sufficient when eked out by the generosity of the poor, and from other sources, to save a large proportion from resort to that institution. The Acts were primarily Acts to save the aged from the workhouse, and secondarily Acts to transfer the main responsibility for the aged and destitute poor from the rates to the taxes.

The Widows, Orphans and Old Age Contributory Pensions Bill is a continuation of the same process. By way of parenthesis, it may be suggested to the Government that in their search for economies to the extent of ten millions a year (to which they are committed) they should consider the economy to be effected by giving short Short titles to Bills. It may be safely prophesied that the department which has to administer this Bill will have to speak, write, type or print the title of it many thousands of times a year, and if the title consisted of two words instead of eight, a substantial financial saving would result. For the same reason the Bill will, in this article, be referred to as the Widows Bill.

The Bill deals with two subjects which are almost entirely distinct, and much confusion arises from linking them together; the first is old age pensions, and the second is widows' and orphans' pensions.

The first Old Age Pensions Bill was introduced in 1908. It gave a pension of 5s. a week to all persons of seventy who did not possess more than 211. a year from other sources, with a progressively reduced pension for persons with larger resources until the pension disappeared entirely, if the resources amounted to more than 311. 10s. a year.

Three Acts of Parliament in 1911, 1919, 1924, have, as might be expected, either raised the pension or removed the disqualifications. The increase from 5s. to 10s. a week was made in 1919, and represented a rather belated attempt to equate the amount of the pension to the rising cost of living. At first there was an attempt to disqualify those who had 'habitually failed to work according to their ability, opportunity and need.' It is almost impossible for the State to administer such a provision, and it disappeared in 1919. Provisions designed to secure residence in the United Kingdom and the disqualification of those who had been in prison have also been removed or reduced. The most important change, however, has been the gradual, though not complete, disappearance of the poverty qualification. It was altered in 1919 and again in 1924, and, as matters now stand, it is possible for a married couple with 1311. Ios. a year, or an unmarried person with 65l. 5s. a year, to obtain the full old age pension, while a reduced pension can be awarded to a married couple with 1771. 15s., or a single person with 88l. 17s. 6d. These changes were introduced mainly on the ground that the refusal of pensions to persons who had means discouraged thrift, and the progressive charges on the Exchequer thereby imposed are illustrative of the dangers inherent in a public non-contributory system of pensions.

Old age pensions might have been expected to relieve the Poor Law, and a similar anticipation of relief to the Poor Law is based on the present proposals. It is therefore important to notice that since old age pensions were introduced the cost of the Poor Law has risen from fifteen millions to forty millions a year, and this may be a measure by which to gauge how far Mr. Chamberlain is likely to be right in his estimate that the Widows Bill will relieve the Poor Law of a sum rising from three millions to seven millions a year.

The Widows Bill, as respects old age pensions, does three things-first, it gives to insured persons and the wives of insured persons who are over sixty-five old age pensions at sixty-five instead of seventy; secondly, it removes for insured persons the existing disqualifications for old age pensions, so that an alien with 10,000l. a year could get an old age pension; thirdly, it requires insured persons and their employers to pay in part for old age pensions between sixty-five and seventy, but not for the expense involved in the removal of the existing disqualification. The first of these alterations comes into operation on January 2, 1928, the second on July 2, 1926, and the third on January 4, 1926. The grant of pensions to insured persons between sixty-five

and seventy costs in the first full year (1928-29) 12,400,000l., and gradually rises to 21,500,000l. in 1965. At the outset this benefit represents about half the cost of the benefits conferred by the Bill, but the cost does not rise so rapidly as the cost of widows' and orphans' pensions, and ultimately the cost is only about one-third of the total cost.

The release of insured persons from the existing disqualifications for old age pensions costs 2,700,000l. in the first full year, and rises in 1965 to 7,600,000l. The capital cost to the Exchequer is 126,000,000l. The greater part of this enormous sum appears to be devoted to giving old age pensions to persons who are at present disqualified by the possession of other resources. It is provided at the general cost of the community, and the agricultural labourer will pay more for his tea, tobacco, sugar and beer in order to provide old age pensions for persons who are infinitely better off than himself. We are passing from Acts for the relief of the poor to Acts for the relief of the moderately well-to-do at the expense of the poor. It would be difficult to discover a direction in which a large sum of public money could be less usefully spent.

It is important to note the rising cost of old age pensions. In 1925-26 they cost twenty-seven millions. The effect of giving old age pensions at sixty-five, together with the other proposals of the Bill, will be a cost of forty-six millions in 1928-29, about fifty-eight millions in 1935-36, and about eighty-six millions in 1965-66. As against this must be set a receipt from contributions attributable to old age pensions which may be roughly estimated at eleven millions in 1928-29, twelve millions in 1935-36, and fifteen millions in 1965-66, making a net charge on the Exchequer of thirty-five, forty-six, and seventy-one millions respectively.

The scheme for widows and orphans provides 10s. a week for the widow of an insured man, with 5s. for the first dependent child and 3s. for each other child up to the age of fourteen. The allowance for orphans is 7s. 6d. for the eldest and 6s. for each of the younger children. Security against death-bed marriages is provided by the fact that the widow of an insured man who marries after the introduction of the Bill, and above the age of sixty, does not get a pension unless he leaves children, or has been married five years at death, or unless his widow was entitled to a widow's pension in respect of a previous marriage. In passing it may be said that there is not much substance in the outcry against pensions to childless widows. The main reason for granting them is that their husbands have paid for them (in part), and it is not desirable to multiply the already too swollen list of those who pay under the Widows Bill and get nothing. This is a mere summary of the main provisions. There are many special clauses relating to special classes, and more particularly to widows of insured persons who died before the commencement of the Bill, which cannot be set out in an article.

The cost of these benefits in the first year is 10,900,000l., rising to nearly double that amount in 1935 and to 38,800,000l. in the year 1965.

In the Actuary's report the capital cost to the Exchequer is not segregated from the capital cost due to granting old age pensions at sixty-five, but the joint capital cost is (in addition to the 126,000,0ool. already mentioned) 620,000,000l. The balance of the capital cost will be derived from the contributions of employers and employed. As a purely conjectural figure, it may be assumed that considerably more than half of this sum of 620,000,000l. is attributable to widows' and orphans' pensions. It is, however, quite certain that this will not be the end of the capital charge on the Exchequer. Almost before the Bill was out of the printers' hands a clamour arose for an additional benefit here and a removal of disqualification there. The Labour Party want contributions to be abolished. Educational experts and others want children's allowances to be continued till sixteen. Others point out that the allowances provided by the Bill are entirely insufficient for maintenance. Members of Parliament will be deluged with letters containing the exceeding bitter cry of contributors to the fund who derive no benefit from it, and of non-contributors who support the scheme out of the taxes and find it benefits persons much richer than themselves. Oliver Twist asked for more, and everyone who is a possible beneficiary of schemes for the relief of the poor is always asking for more. The improvement of the Widows Bill will for many years to come be a pawn in the game which political parties play, and the party which can advance that pawn furthest will have the best chance of success. The Bill is a bottomless pit for public expenditure.

The first reason why the capital charge to the Exchequer is so large is that benefits and contributions begin substantially at the same moment. For many years to come people will be reaping the full benefits of the Bill who have either paid no contributions or have paid contributions entirely disproportionate to the benefits insured. It is as if an insurance company were to offer to insure at once the lives of the whole population for 1000l. on condition that they all pay in future the premiums appropriate to a young and good life.

Secondly, the Bill actually antedates the insurance and gives benefits to the widows and children of persons who died before the Bill was even introduced. This concession brings in 196,000 widows and 386,000 children at a capital cost of 42,000,000l.

Thirdly, under certain conditions, persons who are no longer insured are allowed to remain in or enter the scheme as voluntary contributors on paying the full rates. It is obvious that those who will avail themselves of this benefit will be those who are likely to profit by it. In other words, the Exchequer will take over those who are likely to be a loss to the scheme, but not those who are likely to be a profit. The amount of loss which will arise from this cause is almost entirely conjectural.

Fourthly, the scheme is self-supporting, and in fact more than self-supporting, on the assumption that future beneficiaries enter into and remain in insurance from sixteen to sixty-five, subject to allowances for periods of ill-health and unemployment. The Exchequer bears the loss arising from the fact that many persons enter insurance at a later age and are very intermittently employed.

If the scheme were an ordinary insurance scheme the cost to the Exchequer would be practically nothing. Contributions would be paid at the rate proportionate to the age of entry, which runs for a man from 10d. at the age of sixteen to 16s. 8d. at the age of sixty, and for a woman from 5d. at the age of sixteen to 8s. 4d. at the age of sixty. The Exchequer burden arises from the fact that a man of sixty will pay gd. a week when he ought to be paying 16s. 8d. This burden will be repeated whenever the benefits given by the Bill are increased. In politics the promised land must always be near at hand, and no votes are to be secured by promising to young men of sixteen benefits at the age of sixty-five. In order to provide the right political effect the promise must be held out to the old men of sixty, for whom of course the young have to pay. Financial effect is given to these proposals by taking from the young man of sixteen the contribution necessary (and in many cases far more than what is necessary) to secure him the benefits of the Bill at sixty-five, and using that money at once, not on the grant of those benefits, but on the award of benefits to old men who have not paid adequate contributions to the scheme. When the time comes to pay the young man his money will have been spent, and it will be necessary to resort to the taxpayer. If this plan was carried out to the full, there would at the outset actually be a large surplus available for the relief of taxation, since at the outset contributions under the Bill greatly exceed expenditure. This process is, however, mitigated by the fact that for the first ten years of the scheme the Treasury pay four millions a year into the fund out of the taxes. The result is that the taxpayer of next year will relieve the taxpayer of 1935. For the next ten years the charges on the Exchequer after allowing for certain relief to the Exchequer under the Health Insurance and Un