Osborn vs. Elder. against the purchaser at said sale, unless he had done something to prevent the purchaser from looking into the authority of the sheriff to sell, or his conduct had been such as to mislead the purchaser on this point and induce him not to make the investigation as to the sheriff's authority, which otherwise he would be bound to make." Upon the foregoing evidence and charge of the court, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. The plaintiff in error made a motion for a new trial upon the grounds that the court erred in charging the jury that the levy was void and charging the foregoing as the law of the case. 1. We are of opinion the levy was too uncertain-in fact was no levy in legal contemplation, and that the court committed no error in so charging. 2. In reference to the rulings of the judge in the remainder of the charge we are not able to arrive at the conclusion in said charge as to the doctrine of estoppel. The decision of the judge seems to rest upon the fact that the levy in the case was void, and the purchaser was bound by the maxim of caveat emptor-that if the levy had been a sufficient one and the plaintiff had induced the purchaser to invest his money, then he would have been estopped, but the same conduct on the part of the plaintiff at a sale under a void levy and by which a purchaser was deceived and misled would not estop him except where the fraud prevented inquiry as to the authority of the sheriff to make a valid judicial sale. We think the distinction of the judge as to acts and conduct amounting to estoppel, between void, voidable, and valid sales, does not exist except perhaps as to such sales as are contrary to public policy and adhorrent to law, such as for usury, etc., but the principle that a man shall not be allowed to assert a contrary right to one who by his acts or omissions has been induced to change his circumstances without fault, and being induced so to do by the other, applies to all sales, and this whether without such conduct the purchaser would obtain a good or bad title. Osborn vs. Elder. When Elder sought to recover this land from Osborn upon the title he exhibited, it was competent to show that Osborn was misled by the plaintiff and changed his situation, invested $205.00 in good faith- and if he showed that fact, then Elder could not assert the contrary, and whether Osborn had a valid title to the land, or whether the sale was good or void, was immaterial to maintain his possession against another title now sought to be enforced by Elder. His possession was quite sufficient to protect him from a recovery by Elder if his silence and conduct at the sale amounted to fraud. We conceive that mere personal silence when an act is about to be performed affecting rights would be less convincing than an authority or positive consent to the doing, but neither would create an estoppel unless fraud was an element and both would not in the absence of fraud. The direction of the court confined the estoppel to the knowledge of the purchaser as to the legality of the sale and the conduct of the said Elder in misleading Osborn upon the authority of the sheriff to sell, and excluded from the consideration of the jury whether (considering the sale to be void), the conduct of Elder, his presence and silence induced Osborn to purchase to such an extent that it was a fraud upon him to assert the contrary, and if so then he was estopped, otherwise he was not. We reverse the ruling of the court on its charge to the jury and grant a new trial. See Rorer on Judicial Sales, pages 193, 457. Judgment reversed. Shackleford vs. Hooper et ux. SHACKLEFORD vs. HOOPER et ux. 1. Where a judgment was rendered in favor of "R. P. Hooper and his wife, for the use of L. P. Hooper," a fi. fa. in favor of "R. P. Hooper and Louisa P. Hooper" did not follow the judgment, and was illegal. 2. Recitals in a deed under a tax sale are prima facie evidence of the acts of the officer who made the sale-such as the advertisement, place, manner of sale, etc., but not as to the authority to sell. 3. Whilst excessive levies are not to be made, yet the mere fact that property sold for taxes did not bring its value will not raise a legal presumption that the sale was void. Execution. Judgment. Deed.. Evidence. Presump'tion. Tax. Levy and sale. Before Judge WRIGHT. Dougherty Superior Court. April Term, 1880. A fi. fa. in favor of "R. P. Hooper and Louisa P. Hooper" was levied on certain land as the property of Shackleford, and he interposed a claim on behalf of his wife and children. This claim was based on a tax sale against the defendant, at which his wife bought. The deed recited the levy under a tax fi. fa., advertisement, offering the land in parcels, sale, etc. It appeared that the land only brought the amount of taxes and costs, although it was worth much more. Under the charge of the court, the jury found the property subject. Claimant moved for a new trial on the following, among other grounds: (1). Because the verdict was contrary to law and the evidence. (2). Because the court refused to dismiss the levy and reject the fi. fa., it appearing that the fi. fa. was in favor of R. P. Hooper and Louisa P. Hooper, and the judgment was in favor of R. P. Hooper and his wife, for the use of L. P. Hooper. (3). Because the court erred in charging the jury as follows in reference to the tax sale: "it is necessary to Shackleford vs. Hooper et ux * * show that it was levied upon, it is necessary to show that it was advertised. If it is a considerable amount of property for a small debt, it must appear that it was offered in parcels, and I charge you that the recitals in the sheriff's deed will not be evidence of that fact. It must appear from other evidence. "I charge you further, that a tax sale of a large amount of property greatly disproportioned to the amount that the property brought and with the amount of the taxes due, the law presumes it to be null and void, and it is incumbent upon the party who claims under the tax sale to show that it was a bona fide sale and made in terms of the law. If that fact appears to you from the evidence, that a large amount of property was sold, largely disproportionate to the amount of the fi. fa., the amount it was sold for at the sale, the law presumes that sale a fraudulent sale, and the onus is upon the party who seeks a benefit under that sale to show its fairness and legality." The motion was overruled, and claimant excepted. D. A. VASON, for plaintiff in error. D. H. POPE, for defendants. CRAWFORD, Justice. The record in this case presents several questions for our judgment: 1. Where a judgment is rendered in favor of R. P. Hooper and his wife, for the use of L. P. Hooper, and the fi. fa. issued thereon is in favor of R. P. Hooper and Louisa P. Hooper, is that such a material variance as to render it illegal? This suit was brought and this judgment was rendered for the benefit of the usee, L. P. Hooper, who is the real plaintiff in the case, and the real party at interest; shall, therefore, that character be maintained from the commencement of the action up to and including the judg Shackleford vs. Hooper et ux. ment and then dropped when the final process is reached? We think not. If it were material in the beginning, it becomes none the less so in the ending, and it should have been preserved. Code, $3636. The name of a nominal party may be stricken, and if a legal right remain in the usee the action may be continued. 56 Ga., 554; 59 Ga., 644. But in no case does it appear that the usee may have his rights impaired by omitting to preserve his legal relation to the same. 2. The next question made is, whether the recitals in a tax deed are not prima evidence to support the same. That would depend in our judgment upon what the recitals were. To say that all the recitals in such a deed would be good, would be to commit the rights of parties to the hands of many very unskilled and unlearned men ; on the other hand, to say that none were good would be to change what we understand to have been the rulings of this court. Our judgment therefore is, that they are prima evidence of the acts of the officer himself, such for instance as the advertisement, place, hours of, and manner of sale, but the authority to sell stands upon a different footing and must be proven. 53 Ga., 455; 55 lb., 573. 3. Another assignment of error is the charge of the judge, that if at a tax sale a large amount of property is sold, disproportionate in value to the amount of taxes due and the amount for which it sells, then the law presumes it to be null and void, and it is incumbent on the party claiming under it, to show that it was a bona fide sale and made in terms of the law. Whilst it has been the purpose of this court to prevent and restrain officers of this class from gross, wanton and excessive levies upon property for taxes, yet we cannot find where the rule of law laid down here has been carried to the extent stated by the judge below. The value of property sold for taxes in a large majority of cases, must |