1. Minor children may by Code, §2791, recover for the homicide of
the mother as well as of the father. Atlanta & West Point
R. R. Co. vs. Venable, next friend, 55.
2. Where a city council suspends its ordinance forbidding the run-
ning at large of cattle, one gored by a cow in the street has
no cause of action against the city. No cause of action arises
from negligence in the exercise of legislative functions by
municipality. Rivers vs. City Council of Augusta, 376.
3. A tenant has no cause of action to recover rents paid from his
landlord whose title has failed, where he has not been dis-
turbed in the enjoyment of his term. Dwinell vs. Brown,
476.
4. A sheriff has no right of action against a purchaser at sheriff's
sale who was enjoined from paying over the money, and af-
terwards a decree rendered making said injunction perpet-
ual, even where he charged misconduct against said pur-
chaser at said sale, and in allowing said decree. A decla-
ration to this effect is demurrable. Cherry, sheriff, vs. The
Planters' Warehouse Co. et al., 535.
5. When bonds are feloniously taken and disposed of, the prosecu-
tion of the taker is not a condition precedent to a suit to
recover them from a third person, and a judgment in such suit
would conclude the question of such prosecution on a bill in
equity based thereon. The Merchants' & Planters' National
Bank et al. vs. The Trustees of the Masonic Hall, 603.
6. Failure to sue within twelve months from its record on a con-
tractor's lien against a railroad, is not excused because such
railroad has been seized by the governor for default on inter-
est on bonds; such seizure does not abrogate its obligations to
others, and such failure destroys lien. Cherry, for use, vs.
North & South R. R., 633.
7. Where breach of warranty is unmixed with fraud, the remedy is
by suit on the warranty; when there has been fraud in ex-
change of property, party defrauded may sue on the warranty
or bring suit to recover the property exchanged. Dawson vs.
Pennaman, 698.
ADMINISTRATORS AND EXECUTORS.
1. If executors fraudulently bought realty and personalty belonging
to the estate at their own sale, and one of them conveys his
interest in the realty to a purchaser, with notice, such pur-
chaser will be not liable to the same extent as the executor,
but only for the realty purchased. Willis et al. vs. Foster,
trustee, 82.
2. Purchase by executor at his own sale, not void; it may be set
aside by parties injured thereby; until that is done, legal title is
in purchaser. Thornton, ord'y., vs. Willis, trustee, 184.
3. Possession of note made by deceased by his administrator, who
is also executor of another estate, raises no presumption of its
payment where he is enforcing same as such executor against
the indorser, his co-administrator. Haywood vs. Lewis,
executor, 221.
4. Where a note against one individually is sued in the short form,
declaration cannot be amended by alleging same to be given
by executrix for money used for benefit of estate under a pro-
vision in the will directing it to be kept together, especially
when amendment was barred. Lynch, adm'r, vs. Kirby,
adm'r, 279.
5. An executor cannot bind the estate by a note given as such.
Ibid.
6. After division of lands by commissioners on application of ad-
ministrator and return made to the ordinary, the share allotted
to an heir is subject to judgment against him. That adminis-
trator never accepted the heir's receipt for the land makes no
difference. DuBose, adm'r, vs. Cleghorn, Herring & Co.
et al., 302.
7. Mortgage with power of sale, on default, did not vest such
power as would survive the mortgagor and take precedence of
dower, year's support, expenses of administration, trust debts,
etc. Lathrop & Co. vs. Brown, ex'r, et al., 312.
8. That part of money was used to purchase property mortgaged
to secure it, makes no difference, there being no agreement as
to it. Ibid.
9. Where testator rents and assigns rent note, and then re-rents
to same tenant, and executor collects rent under second con-
tract, and with it pays year's support, etc, and tenant be-
comes insolvent, the estate is liable for amount so collected
before payment of money entrusted to testator. Ibid.
10. Where a will provided a life estate in entire estate for the widow,
with remainder in certain land, and for a distribution of the per-
sonalty among the legatees at her death, but that the negroes
were not to be sold, but equally divided as possible, differ-
ences in their value to be equalized in money, said will did
not contemplate the retention of funds by the executor for
purposes of equalization at widow's death, but that that
should be done by inter-payments between the legatees;
where, therefore, executor returned certain cash left by testa-
tor at death as on hand in 1857, and never paid it over and
died in 1866, and his estate remained unrepresented until
1876, and the widow died in 1877, a suit brought by admin-
istrator de bonis non of original testator in 1879, is barred by
the act of 1869. Summerlin et al., adm'rs, vs. Dorsett,
adm'r, 397.
11. Courts of ordinary are courts of general jurisdiction in matters
of administration, and a judgment granting letters cannot be
collaterally attacked on the ground of non-residence of deced-
ent in the county, especially where it recites that deceased
was of said county. The attack must be made in the court
rendering judgment. Tant et al. vs. Wigfall, 412.
12. Where an executrix has contracted an account for plantation
and family supplies, money, etc., and gives her note as execu-
trix therefor, and intermarries and dies, there being no pro-
vision in the testator's will charging the land for such a debt,
and it not appearing that said executrix or her estate was in-
solvent, or that said account permanently benefited testator's
estate, it being alleged that testator, in his last illness, asked
complainant to assist his wife, the executrix, to run said ac-
count, and that this was the main inducement to give credit;
a settlement between the legatees and the administrator de
bonis non whereby they agree to take all the estate, mainly
land, and pay the debts, the land to be turned over without
first paying the debts, will not be enjoined, nor payment of
this debt decreed out of said estate. Deas, adm'r, vs.
McRea, adm'r, et al., 531.
13. Where there are conflicting claims as to intestate's estate,
and the same is insolvent, and the debts are of doubtful prior-
ity, and some debts have been paid by administrator, he sup-
posing estate to be solvent, and homestead has been set apart
in all the realty, and a year's support has been allowed, some
perishable property has been sold, some accounts have been
or can be collected and others cannot, one debt has been
reduced to judgment and the fi. fa. levied on said realty,
and other suits and complications will follow, a bill to mar-
shal assets, enjoin creditors, and for direction as to administra-
tion, is not demurrable. Johnson, adm'r, vs. Flanders et al.,
691.
1. Alimony is granted in pending divorce suits and suits where
there is a voluntary separation, and where husband abandons
wife. In these latter cases equity may, by decree, compel
husband to make provision for support of wife and children.
Gray Bros. et al. vs. Gray, 193.
2. Injunction granted as well against others co-operative with him
as against husband to prevent alienation of his property to
defeat alimony. Ibid.
3. Alimony may be allowed out of any property mentioned in the
schedule, and is not confined to that owned by husband at
date of verdict. Halleman vs. Halleman, 476.
4. A verdict for alimony is not illegal because it does not provide
for the payment of husband's debts; that may be considered
on question whether the allowance is excessive. The decree
is not good as against debts created before the schedule was
filed. Ibid.
1. There is no need for action of judge on an amendment except
where the opposing party's rights may be affected by the
amending party's negligence. Strange, adm'r, vs. Barrow
et al., ex'rs, 23.
2. Amendment may be filed and served at first term, or after a con-
tinuance, or at any time when questions of negligence do not
arise, without leave or the imposition of terms. Ibid.
3. A copy of a lost amendment filed at a previous term, may be es-
tablished in the absence of an entry on the bench docket or
order on the minutes allowing same, and on evidence other
than the records of the court. Ibid.
4. The copy of the note sued on attached to the declaration can
be amended so as to conform to the original. Chapman vs.
Skellie et al., 124.
5. Counter-affidavit to a distress warrant is pleading so far as to be
amendable by adding a plea of bankruptcy, if it operates to
discharge the debt. The ruling in 55 Ga., 56, will not be ex-
tended. Rountree et al. vs. Rutherford, adm'r, 444.
6. The Code provides that amendment may take place of supple-
mental bill, so an amendment to a bill against a bank to reach
equitable assets, by a creditor with an execution returned un-
satisfied, requiring the president to account for assets in his
hands to pay the debt, was proper. The Merchants' and
Planters' National Bank et al. vs. The Trustees of the Ma-
sonic Hall, 603.
7. Amendment before answer, discovery may be waived by. Ibid.
8. A proper amendment does not postpone the trial term; matter
of giving time or continuing rests in the court's discretion.
Ibid.
9. An amendment not adding a new cause of action, but giving
more certainty to that already brought, was proper. Cooper,
adm'r, et al. vs. Lockett, 702.
APPEAL. See Jury, 9; Justice Courts, 6.
1. Discrepancy between attachment and levy as to whose posses-
sion property was in, immaterial after replevy. Cooper,
adm'r, et al., vs. Lockett, 702.
1. Communications made by a prosecutrix to an attorney in con-
templation of employment although before it, cannot be in-
quired into, but if she repeat a part of a conversation so had
on direct examination, she may be required to give it all, and
if she refuses on the ground that it would criminate her, the
whole conversation should be excluded. Young vs. State,
525.
2. The relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confi-
dence. Where an attorney to collect a note from principal
was himself second indorser, the statute of limitations ran
as to him from the time when the debt was not collectible
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