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to contemplate, by which they could be solely gov. erned. We can not, in other words, accurately speak of a theoretical subjective or objective test in ascertaining whether a given act shall be regarded as a criminal attempt.

To make an objective test a criterion of attempts, is to lead to many difficulties, as shown by Dr. Wharton. To make a subjective test the criterion is, to shield the intelligent and cunning, and to lessen pro tanto the security which we now enjoy. Little Rock, Ark.

M. M. C.

SOME RECENT FOREIGN DECISIONS.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS CONTRACT CONTAINED IN SEVERAL WRITINGS.- L, a builder, wrote to M, an auctioneer and house agent, and signed the following document: "I hereby agree to purchase" three plats "freehold land for £310, and agree to pay a deposit of £31 as part of the purchase-money." M's name was not mentioned in the document. M signed a receipt for £31 "as a deposit on the purchase" of the three plats. Held, that the writings were sufficient to constitute a contract within the statute of frauds.-Long v. Miller. English Court of Appeal, 27 W. R. 720. SALVAGE-IMPRUDENT NAVIGATION OF TUG OCCASIONING NECESSITY FOR ASSISTANCE. - By the imprudent navigation of a steam tug employed under a towing contract, the ship in tow was placed in a position of danger, from which the same steam tug rescued her after her anchors and chains had been slipped: Held, that the steam tug was not entitled to salvage remuneration, and that the vessel in tow might claim, by way of counterclaim, damages for the loss of her anchors and chains. The Robert Dixon. English High Court, Adm. Div. 27 W. R. 736.

LEASE-CONSTRUCTION OF COVENANT NOT TO ASSIGN OR PART WITH POSSESSION-FORFEITURE. -A lease to H and B, who carried on business upon the demised premises in partnership, contained a covenant by them that "they, their executors, administrators and assigns, or any or either of them," would not assign or "part with the possession" of the premises, or any part thereof, "to any person or persons" without the consent of the lessor. H and B agreed to dissolve partnership, and that H should assign to B all his estate and interest in any leasehold premises on which the partnership business was carried on with the consent of the lessor. No consent was obtained, and no assignment was executed; but B was let into sole possession of the premises by H. Held, that there was no forfeiture under the lease.-Mayor v. Westcott. English Court of Appeal, 27 W. R. 841.

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RIGHT OF WAY APPENDANT OR APPURTENANT -TW WAYS-WAY OF NECESSITY CONVENIENT WAY.-A contracted to sell the land and houses in a certain street, "with the appurtenances." There was a road leading into this street at both ends over freehold property of the vendor, but there were no words in the contract with regard to any right of way. The purchasers claimed a right of way over both the roads. Held, that they were not appendant or appurtenant to the property sold, and, therefore, the purchasers were only entitled to a right of way over one of them as a way of necessity. Held, also, that both ways being convenient, the vendor, as grantor, was entitled to elect over which of the two roads he would grant that right of way.-Bolton v. School Board of London. English High Court, Chy: Div. 40 L. T. Rep. 582.

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daughter. Subsequently to this, when the daughter was eight years old, a petition was presented by her under the above act, by her father as next friend, praying that she might be given up by the mother to the custody of the father. The petition alleged that the mother professed and taught atheistical and irreligious views, and had published a pamphlet which had been found by a jury to be calculated to deprave public morals. Held, that an absolute delegation by a father of his paternal rights over an infant was by law impossible; that the court would consider what was for the benefit of the infant; that it would be greatly to the detriment of the infant to be brought up amid the influences to which it was exposed while under the custody of the mother, and that the infant must be given up to the father.-In re Besant. English Court of Appeal, 27 W. R. 741.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION -AUTHORITY OF BANK MANAGER.-1. An authority in an agent to arrest offenders, and to institute criminal proceedings, can only be implied where the duties which he has to perform can not be efficiently discharged for the benefit of his employer, unless he has power promptly to apprehend offenders on the spot. 2. W, the acting manager of the appellants, commenced criminal proceedings against the respondent, a merchant at Sydney, on a charge of stealing a bill of exchange, which proved to be groundless. In an action for malicious prosecution brought by respondent against the bank, held (reversing the judgment of the court below), that such proceedings not being in the ordinary routine of banking business, and the evidence not showing any case of emergency, the judge misdirected the jury in telling them that such authority was to be inferred from W's position alone; and, in the absence of direct evidence of such authority, the bank was not liable. 3. When interest on the amount of a verdict is given, and included in the judgment, such interest must be taken into account in considering whether the amount at issue reaches the limit allowed for an appeal.Bank of New South Wales v. Owston. English House of Lords, 20 Alb. L. J. 32.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.
June Term, 1879.

DELINQUENT TAX LANDS CAN NOT BE SOLD AFTER THE YEAR IN WHICH THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN RETURNED.-In 1877, the then auditor-general accepted, in his discretion (Houghton County v. AuditorGeneral, 36 Mich. 271), delayed tax returns from a county for the years 1870 and 1871, and directed the lands to be advertised for sale at the time of the regular tax sales in October, 1877. Most of them were struck off to the State for want of bidders, and when the returns were made, the county was credited on the auditor-general's books with the amount of the bids to the State. The account being thus stated, with this credit being a part of it, a balance was found due the county, and the succeeding auditor-general refusing to give a warrant upon the State treasurer for this sum, a mandamus is asked. Held, that the auditor-general could not lawfully order a sale of lands for delinquent taxes in a year subsequent to that in which they should have been returned to him. This would postpone the whole collection of taxes, and might seriously embarass the whole administration of local government. While he might in his discretion have received any returns offered in time for the regular sales of the year, he could have no more power indirectly to

postpone a sale to a subsequent year, by postponing the reception of the return, than to do so by more direct action. A purchaser of lands might be greatly wronged if they might subsequently be sold for a tax long since levied, but appearing when he bought only upon an unaccepted return which the auditor-general then retained, subject to his future discretion. Those provisions of the tax laws, a departure from which would prejudice property owners, can not be held to be merely directory. Clark v. Crane, 5 Mich. 151; Hoyt v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39. All the proceedings in ordering the sale and in stating the account with the county upon the return of such sale were unauthorized and void. Mandamus denied. Opinion by COOLEY, J.-People v. AuditorGeneral.

WARRANT TO COLLECT MONEYS FROM DEFAULTING TOWNSHIP TREASURER-TROVER-EXEMPTION FROM EXECUTION-ASSENT TO PROCESS.-A county treasurer issued to the sheriff a warrant, under § § 1029, 1030, Comp. L.. for collection of the moneys, for which a defaulting township treasurer was bound to account to the county, and the sheriff seized and sold personal property, and after retaining his fees paid the rest to the county treasurer, who carried it to the proper fund, and credited the township treasurer with the amount. In trover by the latter against the county treasurer and the sheriff: Held, 1. That plaintiff could not claim the benefit of the exemption laws for the goods taken, for a joint conversion is here alleged, and the sheriff's non-observance of the exemption, if the latter were applicable to such process, would not be an act of conversion on the county treasurer's part. See Kaley v. Shed, 10 Met. 317. 2. The formal credit to plaintiff on the county treasurer's books could not bar the action; first, because part of the proceeds were retained for sheriff's fees; second, because if at all available as matter of defense, it could only be so used by way of mitigation of damages; and, third, because as the appropriation was only one of the steps in the transaction complained of, it could not avail the defense, even by way of mitigation, unless in some way assented to by the plaintiff. Northrup v. McGill, 27 Mich. 234; Dalton v. Laudahn, Id. 529. 3. While, as was decided in Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201, the principle underlying these statutory provisions is not unconstitutional, a warrant must show, as this fails to do, the facts which presumptively make out a case, in which the county treasurer issuing it bad jurisdiction to do so. 4. The fact that plaintiff was present at the sale under the warrant and made no objection, has no force as between these parties to show his assent. 5. The county treasurer's statement that plaintiff told him the warrant "better be held on to" until the next day, at which time, if he did not appear, "they might issue it," could not, if undenied, be construed as proving that the emission of the warrant actually issued had plaintiff's assent. The consent, if any, was not to a warrant that should be framed in derogation of law, but the parties appear to have aimed expressly at a process of the form contemplated by law. Opinion by GRAVES, J.-Bringard v. Stellwager.

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSA

CHUSETTS.

July, 1879.

JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURT HOW QUESTIONED. In a suit by an administrator to recover funds intrusted by his intestate to the keeping of the defendant, the latter, by his answer in abatement, denied the jurisdiction of the probate court to grant letters of administration to the plaintiff, alleging that the

intestate never was an inhabitant of, or a resident of the county of said court, and left no estate to be administered therein. The records of said court showed that the only ground alleged in the plaintiff's petition for this grant of administration, was that the intestate last dwelt in C in that county. Held, that under Gen. Stats. ch. 117, § 4, providing "that the jurisdiction assumed in any case by the probate court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of a person, shall not be contested in any suit or proceeding, except on an appeal in the original case, or where the want of jurisdiction appears on the same record," the jurisdiction of the probate court could not be contested. Opinion by COLT, J.-McFeely v. Scott.

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Dock DEGREE OF CARE REQUIRED IN OWNER OF. In an action to recover for damages received by the plaintiff's schooner while lying in the defendant's dock, it was held, that the defendant was bound to exercise ordinary and reasonable care that his dock should be in a suitable condition for such vessels as he invited or allowed to come there; and the fact that the defendant exercised ordinary care in keeping his dock safe for vessels, and that this vessel received damage there because she was wider than the width usually occupied by vessels at that dock, but for no other reason, would not exonerate the defendant. Opinion by MORTON, J.-Nickerson v. Tirrell.

LIFE INSURANCE ENDOWMENT POLICY-FORFEITURE. The plaintiff brought suit upon a policy of insurance issued to him by the defendant, and payable to a person named in it in case of the plaintiff's death within ten years, but to the plaintiff if he should survive that period. It contained an express condition "that if any premium due upon this policy shall not be paid at the day when the same is payable, this policy shall thereupon become forfeited and void; this condition, however, being subject to the provisions of the 186th chapter of the acts of the legislature of Massachusetts in the year 1861;" which statute provides that after deducting from the net value of the policy, at the time when the premium becomes due and is not paid, to be ascertained according to the "combined experience" or "actuaries " rate of mortality with interest at four per cent. per annum, any indebtedness to the company or notes held by the company against the assured, four-fifths of what remains shall be considered as a net single premium of temporary insurance, the term to be determined by the age of the party and the assumptions of mortality and interest aforesaid. The second section provides that if the death of the party occur within the terms of such temporary insurance, the company shall be bound to pay the amount of the policy. The policy was issued August 9, 1866, and the premiums were to be paid on or before the 9th day of August in every year until ten annual premiums should have been paid. The plaintiff paid the premiums until August 9, 1875, when he failed to pay the premium that day due. The plaintiff survived said ten years, and the defendant had due notice and proof before action brought. Held, that in construing the forfeiture clause, as qualified by the importation of the statute into it, the expiration of the ten years must be regarded as equivalent to the death of the insured, so far as regards the question when the policy becomes payable; and that as the plaintiff survived the period of ten years and duly notified the defendant of that fact, and the value of the policy when he failed to pay the premium was sufficient to furnish a premium for a temporary insurance extending beyond the expiration of said ten years, he is entitled to recover, and the defendant is bound to pay the amount of the policy, less the amount due from him to the defendant. Opinion by SOULE, J.-Carter v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

[Filed at Ottawa, June 21, 1879.]

ACT

LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS-BANKING EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OF STOCK.-In this case John Naper, the appellee, sued David Dows, the appellant, in the Superior Court of Cook County, and recovered judgment for $1,437.55. He claimed that amount to be due him as a depositor in the savings department of the Marine Company of Chicago. The suit was prosecuted on the theory that appellant was a stockholder in said Marine Company to the amount of $5,000, and as such was liable to appellee for the funds deposited, by virtue of section 10 of the Act of February 21, 1861, amending the charter of said corporation. It is urged by appellant that said amendatory act, inasmuch as it conferred banking powers, and was never voted on by the people of the State, as well as for other reasons suggested, was not a valid enactment, but was unconstitutional, null and void. BAKER, J., says: "We do not deem it necessary to pass upon the constitutionality of the act in question; for, even should we assume the act to be unconstitutional, the case would fall within the rule announced by us in McCarthy v. Lavashe, 89 Ill. 271. It was there held that even though the provisions of a charter may be unconstitutional, yet if the stockholder has acted under it, and thereby induced or contributed to the loss of a creditor of the corporation, then the stockholder is estopped from denying his liability under its provisions. In this case it was shown by the admissions of appellant that he was a stockholder in said Marine Company to the amount of $5,000. ** * We do not know of any rule of law which would compel a creditor of a corporation, seeking to fasten a personal liability on a stockholder to prove the ownership of stock by record evidence." Affirmed.-Dows v. Naper.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-BILL TO SET ASIDEMUST BE BY ONE HAVIng JudgmENT LIEN-ISSUANCE OF EXECUTION. — This was a bill in equity brought by Hugh Tiernan against Salome Weis and others, to remove an alleged fraudulent deed made to Salome Weis by one Wordsworth. It is alleged in the bill that Tiernan had obtained a judgment against Frederick Weis, the husband of defendant; that immediately after obtaining the iudgment an execution was issued, and returned "nulla bona;" that at the time Frederick Weis was the equitable owner of a large interest in real estate, which he afterwards sold and exchanged to one Wordsworth for two hundred acres of land in Lake county, and that he caused the deed of the same to be made to his wife, for the purpose of cheating and defrauding his creditors. Plaintiff asked that the deed be set aside, and that the title be declared in Frederick Weis, etc. On hearing, the court granted the relief sought. Defendant appeals. CRAIG, C. J., says: "Under the issues made, it devolved upon the complainant to prove a judgment, the issuing of an execution within a year from the rendition of the judgment, a return thereof of “nulla bona;" that an alias execution was issued, and returned “nulla bona," and that a pluries execution was issued, and levied on the land as alleged. The proof upon the latter subject is entirely too vague and uncertain. The proof that an execution issued within one year from the rendition of the judgment was indispensable; the right to maintain the bill depended upon such proof, and we are aware of no authority upon which the bill could be maintained without such evidence. The bill could not be sustained if the judgment was not a lien upon the land, and no lien would exist unless an execution had been issued within a year. This is the doctrine of 52 Ill. 98, where a bill like the one under consideration was filed, in which it was said: 'If a party has no lien in the land alleged to be fraudulently conveyed, such

conveyance can do him no injury. The record in this case fails to show that complainant had a lien on tais land, no execution having been issued within one year from its date. The presumption of law is that the Judgment was paid, and to enable the complainant to issue an execution, the judgment would necessarily have to be revived by scire facias.' See, also, 53 Ill. 464. As the judgment set out in the bill was no lien on the lands independent of other questions, the decree was not warranted by the evidence." Reversed.Weis v. Tiernan.

BOOK NOTICE.

AN ANALYTICAL DIGEST OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE of the Courts of Common Law-Divorce, Probate, Admiralty and Bankruptcy-and of the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal of England, comprising the reported cases from 1756 to 1878, with References to the Rules and Statutes, founded on the Digests of Harrison and Fisher. By EPHRAIM A. JACOB, of the New York Bar. Vol. 1. New York: George S. Diossy. 1879.

A complete digest of the English Decisions (except equity) will soon be within the reach of the American lawyer. It is somewhat singular, yet at the same time creditable to the enterprise of American law publishers, that a work like this should appear in this country, before such a one has been even announced in England. The lawyer on that side of the water searching for precedents, is forced to examine many volumesthe five volumes of Fisher's Harrison's Digest, the nine of the Annuals, and the different volumes of the law reports from 1877 to date. The American edition will comprise all these within seven volumes. The incomplete English edition costs $130; the complete American edition will be sold for $7.50 a volume.

The overruled cases have been omitted. This, as well as the following features, distinguish, in its execution, the American from the English work; the new and revised classification of each subject, and the very large number of cross-references which have been made, thereby rendering it comparatively easy to refer to the decisions on any given point of law; the use of appropriate captions to indicate the topic embraced in paragraphs, thereby bringing decisions of a similar character together; and the introduction of a full and complete index. The value of such a work is apparent; and the execution of the venture so far as the first volume is concerned, is excellent. Mr. Jacob's labors deserve the longer notice, which we are compelled for want of time and space to hold over until the work has progressed further.

NOTES.

JUDGE DILLON was recently tendered a banquet, by a numerously signed address, including among its subscribers the leading lawyers, merchants, and citizens of St. Louis. In a letter of the 15th inst., he feelingly expresses his regret that unexpected demands of business in the East prevent him from accepting the proffered honor, as he had hoped to do, saying in closing: "The fearless and independent discharge of the duties of a judge will inevitably bring him in frequent collision with private interests and public sentiment. In such a discharge of duty, the judge needs at at all times the consciousness of the support of the substantial interests of the community. It gives me pleasure to say that I have always noticed a sound, healthy and enlightened public opinion on this subject among your citizens, and every judge in this country, of whatever grade, will be animated, cheered and strengthened by your influence and your example."

The Central Law Journal.

SAINT LOUIS, OCTOBER 3, 1879.

CURRENT TOPICS.

We are indebted to the United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, for a practice decision of some interest, and not heretofore reported. The case is entitled Wolff v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. It arose in April, 1874, the point decided being that costs incurred in a State court prior to the removal of a case to the Circuit Court of the United States, are taxable against the losing party. The cause was commenced in Wayne Circuit Court, and after issue and one continuance in that court, was removed to the United States Circuit Court by defendant. Finally plaintiff discontinued her suit in this court, and judgment was entered against

her for costs. In defendant's bill of costs were items of costs accrued in the State court before removal therefrom, amounting in the aggregate to $15, and $7 50 paid to the clerk of the State court for transcripts in making the removal. These items were objected to on behalf of plaintiff, on the ground that there was no act of Congress allowing such costs to be taxed in this court. LONGYEAR, J., said: "A suit removed from a State court comes into this court impressed with all the rights and liabilities of parties as to costs, which accrued or attached by the laws of the State while the suit remained in the State court. Acts of Congress prescribing what costs may or may not be taxed apply only to such costs as accrue after the removal has become complete and this court is invested with jurisdiction. In the State court, in case of discontinuance, the defendant would be entitled by the State laws to all his costs made up to that time, and I think this court is bound, in case of removal to this court before discontinuance, to administer those laws as to all such costs which accrued while the suit remained in the State court. No adjudicated case involving this exact question has fallen under my notice, but the cases cited below involve principles applicable to this question, and so far as they go, fully sustain the foregoing propositions. I am also informed by my brother, Judge Withey, Vol. 9-No. 14.

of the Western District, that such has always been the uniform practice there. See Ellis v. Jarvis, 3 Mass. 457; Field v. Schell, 4 Blatchf., C. C. 435; Gier v. Gregg, 4 McLean, 202; Awkley v. Vilas, 2 Biss. 110. The clerk is therefore directed in this, and all like cases, to tax to the party recovering costs, all costs to which he would have been entitled under the State laws, accrued while the suit remained in the State court, and up to the time the suit was duly entered in this court." See also on this point, but against the ruling in the case at bar, Clare v. Nationa. City Bank, 4 Blatchf. 445.

IN Jones v. Knauss, to be reported in the next volume of Stewart's New Jersey Equity Reports, it was held by the Court of Chancery of that State that a citizen of another State who comes in to the former one voluntarily, and without a subpoena, for the purpose of giving evidence in a suit pending there, can not be arrested on a ca. sa. His arrest at any time while the court may require his attendance, is an invasion of its prerogative. The court distinguished the case at bar from Rogers v. Bullock, 2 Pen. 517, where it was held that a witness was not entitled to immunity from arrest unless his attendance was in obedience to a subpoena, saying:

"The witness who claimed immunity in that case was, undoubtedly, I think, a citizen of this State, and, as such, amenable to the process of our courts. If the fact had been otherwise, it was quite too important to have escaped mention by the learned reporter, who was a member of the court which decided the case. I think it may, therefore, well be doubted whether, in a case like the present, where the witness is not bound to obey the process of the courts of this State, and whose attendance can not be compelled by compulsory means, and, if procured at all, must be voluntary, it would be held that attendance in obedience to process is necessary to immunity. An absurd purpose should not be imputed to the legislature. They certainly did not intend to deprive the suitors of this State of the testimony of witnesses residing in foreign jurisdictions; nor can it be supposed that they intended to send the writs of our courts into jurisdictions where they would be entitled to no more force than so much blank paper."

In his usual excellent manner, Mr. Stewart has collected the rulings on the subject in a lengthy note. The following cases, where the privilege recognized above has been allowed are given: Where the arrest was made at a subsequent term to which plaintiff's cause had been continued. Com. v. Huggeford, 9 Pick. 257; Smythe v. Banks, 4 Dall. 329. While a de

fendant was returning from an appearance to a habeas corpus issued from a Federal court, and another habeas corpus, issued from a State court, was served on her. Evert's Case, 2 Disn. 33. See Rex v. Deleval, 3 Burr, 1434; Rex v. Blake, 2 Nev. & M. 312. A service of a subpœna to answer a bill in chancery on a witness attending another cause. Martin v. Ramsey, 7 Humph. 260. After one arrest and bail given thereto. Clarke v. Simpson, 1 McMull. 286; although the second arrest was in another county. Sadler v. Ray, 5 Rich, 523. While attending a reference before a master in vacation. Vincent v. Watson, 1 Rich. 194; Huddeson v. Prizer, 9 Phila. 65. While attending from another State, to hear an argument in his own case in the Court of Appeals. Pell's Case, 1 Rich. 197. While attending a suit in the Common Pleas. Harris v. Grantham, Coxe 142. After an insolvent discharge, and while returning from a session of the court, under a notice from the plaintiff. Richards v. Goodson, 2 Va. Cas. 381. While defendant was returning home from attendance on a suit. Hammerskold v. Rose, 7 Jones, 629; or coming voluntarily to attend it, Solomon v. Underhill, 1 Camp. 229; or coming to court under a subpoena, Dickerson's Case, 3 Harring. 517; or voluntarily attending from another State. Ballinger v. Elliott, 72 N. C. 596; May v. Shumway, 16 Gray 86; Thompson's Case, 122 Mass. 428; Person v Pardee, 6 Hun. 477, 66 N. Y. 124; Juneau Bank v. McSpedan, 5 Biss. 64; Brett v. Brown, 13 Abb. P. R (N. S.) 295. Even where both parties were non-residents. Henegar v. Spangler, 29 Ga. 217; attending a police court as a prosecutor, Montague v. Harrison, 3. C. B. (N. S.) 202; or the execution of a writ of inqniry. Walters v. Rees, 4 Moore 34. After

a plaintiff's bill had been dismissed. Andrews v. Walton, 1 McN. & G. 380. Attending the registrar's office with his solicitor. to settle the terms of a decree, Newton v. Askew, 6 Hare 319; or as a witness before a registrar in bankruptcy. Ex parte Burt, 2 M. D. & DeG. 666. A husband of a petitioner, who ought to have been but was not a party to the cause. Ex parte Britten. 4 Jur. 943, 1 Mon. D. & D. 278. A bankrupt, during the forty days allowed for his examination. Ex parte Helsby, 1 Dea. & Ch. 16; Ex parte Donlevy, 7 Ves.

317; Kimball's Case. 2 Ben. 38, 2 Bank. Reg. 114. A defendant attending a master under a warrant to produce papers. Franklyn v. Colqhoun, 1 Madd. 580; Sidgier v. Birch, 9 Ves. 69. Attending a motion against him, Bromley v. Holland, 5 Vesr 2; or before an arbitrator. Moore v. Booth, 3 Ves. 350. A common councilman summoned by the mayor of the corporation to attend an election ordered by mandamus. Nixon v. Burt, 7 Taunt. 682. As to what constitutes an attendance: Merely being a suitor at the time of arrest is not sufficient. Gray v. Ayres, Tappan 164. A party while dining in the evening, after attending his cause all day in court, is exempt. Lightfoot v. Cameron, 2 W. Bl. 1113; Newland v. Harland, 8 Scott 70; Atty.-Gen. v. Skinners Co.. 8 Sim. 377. A plaintiff waiting in the vicinity of the court for his cause to be called. Childerston v. Barrett, 11 East, 439; Walker v. Webb, 3 Anst. 941; Ex parte Hurst, 1 Wash. C. C. 186. Waiting redeundo, in a picture-shop on the way, not an unreasonable time. Luntley v. 1 Cr. & M. 579. Going into a tailor shop on his way home. Pitt v. Coombs, 3 During a detention of a month as a witness before a master. Brown v. McDermott, 2 Ir. Eq. 338; Burke v. Higgins, 2 Hogan 110; Gibbs v. Phillipson. 1 Russ. & M. 19. During an adjournment of the examination by the master. Ex parte Temple, 2 Ves. & B. 395; Spencer v. Newton, 6 Ad. & El. 623; Ex parte Russell, 1 Rose 278. A party going into another county to attend the taking of a deposition, in a suit pending, although he afterwards determine not to have it taken. Wetherill v. Seitzinger, 1 Miles, 237. Coming into town several days before his cause was likely to be heard. Ex parte Tillotson, 2 Stark. 470; Persse v. Persse, 5 H. L. Cas. 671.

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Nev. & M. 212.

COMMON LAW EXEMPTIONS.

It has been already shown1 that the common law exemption was universal in its operation, and embraced within its limits three separate classes of articles, viz.: apparel, bedding, and tools and implements of trade.

When at last a limit was placed upon the value of the exemption, it was fixed at ten pounds.

(1) Ante p. 2.

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