and you will notice that near the end of that PROF note Colonel North suggests to Admiral Poindexter that there be a quiet meeting with Bud McFarlane and the President prior to the departure of the mission, and he queries whether the participants in that suggested meeting ought to include you and Secretary of Defense and the DCI. Do you see that?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, I see that.

Mr. BELNICK. If you turn please to the next exhibit GPS-25, you will see Admiral Poindexter's reply to that suggestion in the last sentence of the PROF messages that he sends back, and I quote, "I don't want a meeting with RR, Shultz, and Weinberger." I take it you were unaware of this exchange as well?

Secretary SHULTZ. Obviously.

Mr. BELNICK. And again, sir, when you spoke to Don Regan and Admiral Poindexter at the summit in May of 1986, about this information, nobody told you that a few weeks later the former National Security Adviser was heading to Iran with U.S. arms? Secretary SHULTZ. No, they did not.

Mr. BELNICK. Now, sir, there came a time on July 26, 1986, that Admiral Poindexter, according to the chronology, advised you of the release from captivity of Father Jenco. Did the admiral inform you that this release had been achieved in any way as a result of the U.S. Iran initiative?

Secretary SHULTZ. No.

Mr. BELNICK. At that time, sir, in fact were you operating under the assumption that there was no initiative?

Secretary SHULTZ. I was operating under the assumption after the stand-down discussion that we would continue to work at the problems presented by Iran, and we had normal ways of doing that. And I think by that time we had initiated one additional one that you never know what may have some promise, but, anyway, it was a different and official proper way of trying to have a sensible discourse with them.

So that I didn't assume that we had lost interest in the Iran problem, we didn't, we never lost interest in it, but it is a question of how you do it.

Mr. BELNICK. By the way, the stand-down discussion was in late May or early June 1986, am I right?

Secretary SHULTZ. That's my recollection. I don't have a note in my records about it, but that is my, what is in my head.

Mr. BELNICK. But you understood when Admiral Poindexter told you that the people involved had been told to stand down that it was over?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes.

Mr. BELNICK. Now Admiral Poindexter has testified that in parlance, the term "stand down" means that there's only a temporary hiatus, it is an intermission. But that's not how you understood it.

Secretary SHULTZ. That's not how I understood it, but I'm not, I'm a Marine, I'm not a Navy man. So I may be wrong about that. Somebody looked it up in the dictionary, though.

Mr. BELNICK. What did they find?

Secretary SHULTZ. Stand down means it's done, according to the dictionary.

Mr. BELNICK. A dictionary does not take sides between the services.

Secretary SHULTZ. That's not necessarily a naval dictionary. I accede to Admiral Poindexter on that, but, what I understood that to mean was that this has been conducted and worked at and they went all the way to Tehran, and it fizzled. So, enough.

Mr. BELNICK. Whether Army, Navy, or Marines, the admiral did not say to you we expect this to be rejuvenated within the next several weeks or any particular point in time?

Secretary SHULTZ. No. Although the initiative or effort that I mentioned a moment ago I think was something that he suggested, and I thought it was a good suggestion. I worked on it and a few of the key people who knew a lot about Iran in the State Department worked on it, and so it wasn't as though things were dead, as I said.

Mr. BELNICK. But to be clear, as I understand your testimony, and please correct me if I'm wrong, this other initiative did not include or envision arms shipments to Iran?

Secretary SHULTZ. No.

Mr. BELNICK. Mr. Secretary, you testified earlier when we began this line of questioning that you had told Admiral Poindexter that while you didn't need to be informed of what you called operational details, you did want and need to be kept informed of those facts which you needed in order to do your job, correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. Correct.

Mr. BELNICK. Sir, in order to do your job as the nation's chief diplomat and as a statutory member of the National Security Council at a time when, through Operation Staunch, you were in charge of attempting to persuade our allies and other nations throughout the world not to sell arms to Iran, did you need to know that the United States itself was selling arms to Iran, that the President had signed Covert Action Findings authorizing those sales and that the President's former National Security Adviser was in Tehran on a diplomatic mission, bringing with him the first installment on a delivery of U.S. HAWK parts? Did you need to know those facts?

Secretary SHULTZ. Certainly.

One of the many arguments that I used, and Secretary Weinberger used, in opposing having an arms sale dimension to the Iran initiative one of the arguments-was that we felt that one way of getting the Iran-Iraq war to come to an end was to do everything we could to deny weapons to the country that was refusing to come to an end, and so we had a rather vigorous program called Operation Staunch.

Ambassador Fairbanks was in charge of it for a while and when he left Ed Derwinski, now Under Secretary of State, then counselor, was put in charge of it, and we made a very considerable effort to persuade people, and with some success.

Mr. BELNICK. Were there any facts, Mr. Secretary, concerning the Iran initiative that you chose not to know and wanted not to know?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I chose not to know the operational details of how they were arranging meetings and so on, and I think

Admiral Poindexter, if he understood that he didn't need to tell me about that, was perfectly proper.

On the other hand, when you go beyond that into these more substantive matters, that's a different matter altogether.

Mr. BELNICK. Mr. Secretary

Secretary SHULTZ. At least that's the way I saw it. He obviously saw it a different way.

Mr. BELNICK. Mr. Secretary, now I would like to turn in greater detail to your recollection of the key events, some of which we have summarized, involving U.S. policy toward the Nicaraguan opposition and the Iran initiative in the period 1984 through 1986.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to start with events involving support for the Nicaraguan opposition, and specifically non-U.S. Government support for the Contras. And, again, these events are summarized in the chronology which is GPS exhibit A.

Mr. Secretary, you recall discussions in the spring of 1984, in our government in which you participated, concerning seeking support for the Contras from certain third countries, correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes.

Mr. BELNICK. And one of those countries, as the chronology indicates, is the country we have given the number one to, and you opposed going to Country One for Contra assistance, am I correct, as well?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, I did.

Mr. BELNICK. And by April 18th of 1984, according to the chronology, you had made clear to Bud McFarlane, who was then the National Security Adviser, that you were opposed to approaching Country One for Contra assistance, correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes.

Mr. BELNICK. You had also said and expressed your position that in no event would you agree to the U.S. Government serving as an intermediary or a conduit for aid to the Contras from any thirdcountry source; is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. That's correct, and I questioned without being a lawyer, I questioned the legality of any such arrangement. Mr. BELNICK. Now, after expressing that position-those positions, rather-did you then learn in May 1984, from our Embassy in Country Number One that Mr. Teicher of the National Security Council staff had, in fact, approached Country Number One for a contribution to the Nicaraguan opposition and had said that the U.S. Government would serve as a conduit for any such contribution?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. We had that from the Ambassador, Ambassador Sam Lewis.

Mr. BELNICK. Prior to that, did you have any information from the National Security Adviser or staff that a member of that staff was going to make this approach, the same approach that you had expressed opposition to?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, I didn't.

Mr. BELNICK. I understand that after you learned from our Embassy of the information, that you saw Mr. McFarlane at the White House at the beginning of May and confronted him with what you had learned, correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. That's right. I objected to it.

Mr. BELNICK. And what did Mr. McFarlane tell you regarding what you had learned of Mr. Teicher's approach and suggestion that the U.S. Government serve as a conduit for any contribution from Country One?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, as I recall, and I think my notes to this effect are that he said that Mr. Teicher was there, was not operating on instructions, he was there on his own hook.

Mr. BELNICK. Subsequently, did you hear otherwise as to whether Mr. Teicher was there on his own hook?

Secretary SHULTZ. Mr. Teicher, as I am remembering it, this is all something that can be looked up in these records, but as I remember, Mr. Teicher went to Ambassador Lewis and said that he wanted Ambassador Lewis to know that he was there under instructions.

Mr. BELNICK. And that what he had said was the result of strict instructions he had received?

Secretary SHULTZ. Right. That is what Teicher told Ambassador Lewis.

Mr. BELNICK. I gather, then, Mr. McFarlane did not tell you at the time, after he told you that Teicher was there on his own hook, that he had both asked Mr. Teicher to make the approach to Country Number One and that after you had expressed opposition to any such approach by April 18, Mr. McFarlane had sent Mr. Teicher back to the official of Country Number One. with further instructions to make another approach. I take it you were not informed of that?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, I wasn't.

Mr. BELNICK. In that connection, sir, would you please look at exhibit no. 58 in your book, which is a redacted version of a memorandum from Mr. McFarlane to Mr. Teicher dated April 20, 1984, and I can represent to you that the country name, which is blocked out, is the name of Country Number One.

Mr. McFarlane, under the heading "Help with the Contras," said to Mr. Teicher on April 20, "As we discussed, please reaffirm to the official of Country Number One as he has already heard, one, we will not press them on the question of assistance to the Contras; two, it is an important matter to us, and we face a temporary shortfall in goods; three, we are of course very conscious of the vulnerability it would create for the Government of Country Number One; four, if they should decide that they could help, it ought to be done bilaterally although we would be pleased to provide a point of contact," which is blacked out, "five, please also let it be known that in your view I am a little bit disappointed in the outcome, but we will not raise it further.”

Was that an approach which you had authorized, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary SHULTZ. No.

Mr. BELNICK. Was that an approach you were informed of?
Secretary SHULTZ. No.

Mr. BELNICK. Have you ever learned of it before now?
Secretary SHULTZ. No. This is just stuff coming out here.

Mr. BELNICK. I would like to turn your attention now, Mr. Secretary, to an NSPG, National Security Planning Group, meeting, which took place on June 25, 1984. You have in one of the books, I

hope before you, excerpts of the minutes of that meeting which are still-it is one of the thin ones. That is too thick.

Secretary SHULTZ. These are your books.
Mr. BELNICK. I take no responsibility.

Secretary SHULTZ. Tell me where to look.

Mr. BELNICK. I will inform you that I didn't put those books together. These are excerpts of the minutes of the NSPG of June 25, 1984. They are still classified, but they can be referred to for purposes of refreshing recollection. The subject of that meeting was the situation in Central America and specifically, insofar as we have excerpted the discussion, whether to obtain third-country support for the Contras. Am I correct that your position at that meeting on June 25, 1984, was that you did not believe it would be lawful at that time to seek third-country assistance for the Nicaraguan opposition?

Secretary SHULTZ. That is correct. What I must have had in mind is that there would be ways of doing it that would be unlawful, and I perhaps had-I am not sure about this-but in my mind, the proposal that I had seen was for us to be essentially a conduit. Mr. BELNICK. Did you have a view then as to the wisdom of the policy of approaching third countries for assistance at that time, June, 1984?

Secretary SHULTZ. I am a very strong supporter of the idea of helping those people in Nicaragua who are ready to fight for the freedom and independence of their country to do so. And I am convinced that it is very much in the interest of the United States and of the new democracies in Central America to provide that kind of help, and I hope and pray that when we come to act on this matter, we will continue to do what was put into place last year. So I have always been a very strong supporter.

My feeling always has been that in the end, to provide that kind of support that really will do the job, it will be necessary to do it with the support of the Congress. I felt, and feel today, that the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance is a genuine force and that somehow they would hold themselves together, and as Tony Motley put it, they could rustle up their own money somehow, at least enough to keep going.

But our major concern should be to conduct ourselves so that we maximize the chance of persuading the Congress to come back on board and give support. And I felt that if we, if we actively solicited third countries, we would be cutting against those objectives in our arguments with the Congress, and beyond that it seemed to me that since this is a matter of vital interest to the United States, we couldn't, we didn't want to get ourselves in the position where we have to rely on what we can persuade other people to do to serve our vital interests. We have to step up to those ourselves. That was my thinking.

Mr. BELNICK. On the legal side, did you conclude and express the view at the NSPG meeting that you ought to get an opinion from the Attorney General as to whether the United States could help the Contras with assistance from third countries?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. There was a back-and-forth argument about the subject of legality, and I am always a little hesitant to