Nov. 13 / Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1986 Some progress has already been made. Since U.S. Government contact began with Iran, there's been no evidence of Iranian Government complicity in acts of terrorism against the United States. Hostages have come home, and we welcome the efforts that the Government of Iran has taken in the past and is currently undertaking. But why, you might ask, is any relation. ship with Iran important to the United States? Iran encompasses some of the most critical geography in the world. It lies between the Soviet Union and access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. Geography explains why the Soviet Union has sent an army into Afghanistan to dominate that country and, if they could, Iran and Pakistan. Iran's geography gives it a critical position from which adversaries could interfere with oil flows from the Arab States that border the Persian Gulf. Apart from geography, Iran's oil deposits are important to the long-term health of the world economy. For these reasons, it is in our national interest to watch for changes within Iran that might offer hope for an improved relationship. Until last year there was little to justify that hope. Indeed, we have bitter and enduring disagreements that persist today. At the heart of our quarrel has been Iran's past sponsorship of international terrorism. Iranian policy has been devoted to expelling all Western influence from the Middle East. We cannot abide that because our interests in the Middle East are vital. At the same time, we seek no territory or special position in Iran. The Iranian revolution is a fact of history, but between American and Irani. an basic national interests there need be no permanent conflict. Since 1983 various countries have made overtures to stimulate direct contact between the United States and Iran; European, Near East, and Far East countries have attempted to serve as intermediaries. Despite a U.S. willingness to proceed, none of these overtures bore fruit. With this history in mind, we were receptive last year when we were alerted to the possibility of establishing a direct dialog with Iranian officials. Now, let me repeat: America's longstanding goals in the region have been to help preserve Iran's independence from Soviet domination; to bring an honorable end to the bloody Iran-Iraq war; to halt the export of subversion and terrorism in the region. A major impediment to those goals has been an absence of dialog, a cutoff in communication between us. It's because of Iran's strategic importance and its influence in the Islamic world that we chose to probe for a better relationship between our countries. Our discussions continued into the spring of this year. Based upon the progress we felt we had made, we sought to raise the diplomatic level of contacts. A meeting was arranged in Tehran. I then asked my former national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, to undertake a secret mission and gave him explicit instructions. I asked him to go to Iran to open a dialog, making stark and clear our basic objectives and disagreements. The 4 days of talks were conducted in a civil fashion, and American personnel were not mistreated. Since then, the dialog has continued and step-by-step progress continues to be made. Let me repeat: Our interests are clearly served by opening a dialog with Iran and thereby helping to end the Iran-Iraq war. That war has dragged on for more than 6 years, with no prospect of a negotiated settlement. The slaughter on both sides has been enormous, and the adverse economic and political consequences for that vital region of the world have been growing. We sought to establish communication with both sides in that senseless struggle, so that we could assist in bringing about a ceasefire and, eventually, a settlement. We have sought to be evenhanded by working with both sides and with other interested nations to prevent a widening of the war. This sensitive undertaking has entailed great risk for those involved. There is no question but that we could never have begun or continued this dialog had the initiative been disclosed earlier. Due to the publicity of the past week, the entire initiative is very much at risk today. There is ample precedent in our history for this kind of secret diplomacy. In 1971 then-President Nixon sent his national security adviser on a secret mission to China. In that case, as today, there was a basic requirement for discretion and for a sensi Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1986 / Nov. 14 tivity to the situation in the nation we were attempting to engage. Since the welcome return of former hostage David Jacobsen, there has been unprecedented speculation and countless reports that have not only been wrong but have been potentially dangerous to the hostages and destructive of the opportunity before us. The efforts of courageous people like Terry Waite have been jeopardized. So extensive have been the false rumors and erroneous reports that the risks of remaining silent now exceed the risks of speaking out. And that's why I decided to address you tonight. It's been widely reported, for example, that the Congress, as well as top executive branch officials, were circumvented. Although the efforts we undertook were highly sensitive and involvement of government officials was limited to those with a strict need to know, all appropriate Cabinet officers were fully consulted. The actions I authorized were, and continue to be, in full compliance with Federal law. And the relevant committees of Congress are being, and will be, fully informed. Another charge is that we have tilted toward Iran in the Gulf war. This, too, is unfounded. We have consistently condemned the violence on both sides. We have consistently sought a negotiated settlement that preserves the territorial integrity of both nations. The overtures we've made to the Government of Iran have not been a shift to supporting one side over the other, rather, it has been a diplomatic initiative to gain some degree of access and influence We have not, nor will we capitulate to terrorists. We will, however, get on with advancing the vital interests of our great nation-in spite of terrorists and radicals who seek to sabotage our efforts and immobilize the United States. Our goals have been, and remain, to restore a relationship with Iran; to bring an honorable end to the war in the Gulf; to bring a halt to statesupported terror in the Middle East; and finally, to effect the safe return of all hostages from Lebanon. As President, I've always operated on the belief that, given the facts, the American people will make the right decision. I believe that to be true now. I cannot guaran tee the outcome. But as in the past, I ask for your support because I believe you share the hope for peace in the Middle East, for freedom for all hostages, and for a world free of terrorism. Certainly there are risks in this pursuit, but there are greater risks if we do not persevere. It will take patience and understanding; it will take continued resistance to those who commit terrorist acts; and it will take cooperation with all who seek to rid the world of this scourge. Thank you, and God bless you. Note: The President spoke at 8:01 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White House. The address was broadcast live on nationwide radio and television. within Iran-as well as Iraq-and to bring National Philanthropy Day, 1986 To summarize: Our government has a firm policy not to capitulate to terrorist demands. That no consiensions policy remains in force, in spite of the wildly speculative and false stories about arms for hostages and alleged ransom payments. We did not-repeat-did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages nor will we. Those who think that we have gone soft on terrorism should take up the question with Colonel Qadhafi. Remarks at a White House Briefing for Thank you very much. I have just read a clipping this morning from the United Press that shows how the private sector is spreading and things of this kind in philanthropy, that the First Lady of the Soviet Union has been named to the board of directors of a private, and privately financed, group in the Soviet Union. But I appreciate this op portunity to be with you today in recogni tion of one of America's greatest national The statutes most directly bearing on the legality of the recent missions to and transactions with Iran are the following: the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, the congressional reporting provisions of the National Security Act, and the Arms Export Control pct. Based on our understanding of the facts, we believe that the recent actions with respect to Iran, including the transfer of arms to Iran by the CIA, do not violate the Hughes-Ryan Amendment or the National Security Act. Moreover, under the the executive branch's prior interpretation of the Arms Export Control Act, this Act is inapplicable to the arms transfers to Iran. (S) Hughes-Ryan Amendment. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the legislation authorizing the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency was passed in 1974 in response to revelations of covert CIA operations. The Amendment, as amended in 1980, provides (22 U.S.C. 2422): No funds appropriated under the authority of this 50. Because the President made the appropriate finding, the HughesRyan Amendment does not prohibit the use of CIA funds for the transfer of arms to Iran. (s) Congressional Oversight Provisions of the National Security Act. In 1980 the National Security Act of 1947 was amended to provide for congressional oversight of "significant anticipated intelligence activities." This section now provides (section 501 of the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. 413(a)) (emphasis added): TINIOL ACCIPIEN -14 T3166AJUVIU UNCEREGRET To the extent consistent with all applicable (1) keep the Select Committee on Intelligence Section 501(b) of the National Security Act applies to those The President shall fully inform the intelligence Section 501 of the National Security Act does not contemplate that prior notice of "intelligence activities will be given in all instances. Subsection (b) of section 413 makes specific provision for situations in which "prior notice vas not given under subsection (a). Because subsection (a) includes situations in which the President provides notice to the full intelligence committees under subsection (a)(1)(A) and, situations in which he provides prior notice restricted to designated INCLASSIFIED UNCLASSE HET members of Congress, including the chairmen and ranking members of the House and Senate intelligence committees under subsection (a)(1)(B), it seems clear that subsection (b) contemplates situations in which no prior notice has been given under either of these provisions. This interpretation is confirmed by a colloquy between Senators Javits and Huddleston, who were on the committee that drafted this provision. Senator Javits asked: " information has been withheld from both the select committee and the leadership group (as section 501(b) envisages), can it be withheld on any grounds other than 'independent constitutional authority' and, if so, on what grounds?" Senator Huddleston answered: "Section 501(b) recognizes that the President may assert constitutional authority to withhold prior notice of covert operations, but would not be able to claim identical authority to withhold timely notice under section 501(b). A claim of constitutional authority is the sole grounds that may be asserted for withholding prior notice of a covert operation. 126 Cong. Rec. 17693 (June 28, 1980) (emphasis added). Moreover, the preamble to the provision makes clear that disclosure is required only when such disclosure is consistent with the President's constitutional duties. Accordingly, the President is not required to make disclosures when he is acting in a situation in which he is employing his inherent foreign affairs powers. As the President made clear in his televised address to the Nation this evening, the primary purpose of the recent actions with respect to Iran was diplomatic. The "intelligence activities" involved in the Iran matters consisted of, inter alia, negotiations with a foreign sovereign, of which the arms transfers were an integral part, and attempts to gain information relating to Americans captured abroad. These intelligence matters were inextricably intertwined with and essential to the President's foreign policy goals. We therefore believe that the President was acting at the height of his inherent power in foreign affairs. In United States v. CurtissWright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936), the Court made clear that the President has plenary power over negotiations with foreign powers: In this vast external reala [of foreign affairs] The Court in Curtiss-Wright also quoted approvingly George UNCLASSIFIED |