Ambassador to Israel SAMUEL LEWIS reports that
MICHAEL LEDEEN is in Israel talking to Israeli
officials to obtain intelligence about Iran,
without notice to the U.S. Embassy.
McFarlane reports to GPS, who is in Lisbon, on meeting with RABIN; does not mention LEDEEN visit to Israel.
GPS cables MCFARLANE objecting to LEDEEN visit to
Israel, to an intelligence relationship with
Israel concerning Iran, and to bypass of State
and Embassy.
MCFARLANE cables response to GPS insisting that
LEDEEN had been in Israel on his own hook," and
that MCFARLANE was "turning it off entirely."
MCFARLANE circulates draft NSDD proposing change
in U.S. policy toward Iran, including the
"provision of selected military equipment as
determined on a case-by-case basis."
GPS submits comments to MCFARLANE on the draft
NSDD, opposing the proposal regarding arms
transfers and stating "I cannot agree that the
NSDD as drafted should be signed by the
President."
MCFARLANE cables GPS discussing Israeli contacts with Iranians and Israeli/Iranian interest in U.S.-Iranian dialogue, commencing with Israeli delivery of TOWS and Iranian attempts to release hostages. MCFARLANE offers analysis, favors U.S. expressing interest.
GPS cables MCFARLANE proposing positive but
passive reply," involving U.S. willingness to
listen to Iranians, without commitment, on
opening a dialogue and reinforcing MCFARLANE'S
expressed cautions against being drawn into arms
transfers. GPS tells McFarlane to manage the
issue personally and inform Israeli emissary that
GPS and MCFARLANE are in close contact and full
agreement every step of the way."
GPS sees intelligence report calling GHORBANIFAR a "talented fabricator."
GPS visits the PRESIDENT in the hospital upon
return from ASEAN meeting. MCFARLANE present.
No discussion of the proposed Iran initiative.
GPS is reminded by his Executive Assistant,
CHARLES HILL, to ask MCFARLANE for a status
report on Iran proposal.
At GPS' regularly scheduled meeting with the
PRESIDENT, MCFARLANE states that three meetings
between Israel and the Iranians have occurred,
and that MCFARLANE'S contact is DAVID KIMCHE.
The Iranians want a dialogue with the United
States, want arms from the U.S. and 100 TOWS from
Israel, in exchange for four hostages. MCFARLANE
says that the deal will be totally deniable,
and that he is pursuing the contact. GPS argues
that any policy of selling arms to Iran or
loosening arms flow restrictions is wrong, and
could not be kept deniable or secret.
GPS learns that NORTH is expecting seven hostages to be released on a beach near Tripoli.
MCFARLANE tells GPS that the Israel/Iran dealings are not moving."
U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon BARTHOLOMEW tells HILL that WEIR said he was released to bring pressure for release of Dawa prisoners. BARTHOLOMEW states that he knows "precious little about origins of this or who is involved." Lunch meeting among GPS, CASEY, MCFARLANE, and WEINBERGER. MCFARLANE debriefs group on
hostages, noting that the hostage release is "not going anywhere.
At the Geneva Summit, MCFARLANE tells GPS that
four hostages will be released in a few days, and
that Israel is sending an airplane to a European
city with 100 HAWKS, which will be shipped to
Iran if the hostages are released. MCFARLANE
says he has cleared this with the PRESIDENT. GPS
objects, both to the plan and to being notified
too late to be able to stop it.
GPS is advised by OAKLEY of information from various sources that the hostages will be released for 120 HAWKS at $250,000 apiece. GPS learns also that the proposed release date has slipped in order to get flight clearance from a European country.
GPS learns that no hostages have been released and the deal has therefore collapsed. He tells HILL: "It's over."
POINDEXTER calls GPS to inform him of a White
House meeting on 12/7 because Iran initiative had
reached a decision point. Later, GPS tells
POINDEXTER that he is "basically uninformed
[about the proposed Iran initiative], although
BUD told me about it at the start and I said
no." GPS asks about congressional notification,
says that the U.S. is breaking with its hostage
policy, and states that "this thing has got to be
stopped." GPS also tells POINDEXTER that he is
upset that State has been cut out of cable
traffic.
GPS meets with ARMACOST and PLATT to prepare for White House meeting on Iran initiative the following day. GPS learns from POINDEXTER that HAWK shipment was sent even though no hostages were released, but that it "misfired" because Iran rejected the shipment as "too old."
Meeting at White House. GPS, WEINBERGER, and
DONALD REGAN argue against arms for Iran.
WEINBERGER expresses view that it is illegal.
MCFARLANE, POINDEXTER, and the PRESIDENT speak in
favor of the policy. The PRESIDENT supports
going ahead, emphasizing importance of obtaining
release of the hostages.
POINDEXTER proposes that MCFARLANE tell Iranians
that, if they release hostages without any arms,
the U.S. will then work towards a better
relationship. If MCFARLANE is turned down, he
would be authorized to ask Britain to 'pick up
the sale." GPS objects to the latter aspect of
POINDEXTER's proposal, says this would be the
same misguided policy. Meeting concludes with
decision that MCFARLANE meet Iranians to seek
hostage release without arms dimension. In aside
after the meeting, POINDEXTER tells GPS that the
deal had fallen apart around Thanksgiving, and he
advised the PRESIDENT to disengage, but the
PRESIDENT said no.
GPS (in London) is informed by staff that Iranians have rejected MCFARLANE approach and that at a White House meeting that morning, the Iran initiative had been turned off. NORTH reportedly had prepared a paper stating the hostages would die as a result.
ARMACOST cables GPS that MCFARLANE has
recommended dropping the entire enterprise, but
the PRESIDENT wants all other avenues
"energetically pursued."
POINDEXTER advises GPS that AMIRAN NIR had come
to see him to revive the hostage deal. NIR
presented a proposal involving the release of
certain Hizbollah prisoners, and the sale of
3,000 TOWS to Iran, in exchange for the
hostages. GPS states that this suffers from all
the same problems as the previous proposals,
calling it a "payment" for hostages. GPS thinks
POINDEXTER is negative toward proposal.
Meeting at the White House among PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, WEINBERGER, MEESE, CASEY, REGAN, POINDEXTER, and GPS. GPS and WEINBERGER argue strongly against the Iran proposal, but everyone else favors going forward.
GPS attends a Cabinet meeting at the White House, from 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. but is not present at 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. discussion of the Iran initiative.
GPS attends "Family Group Lunch
at the White House at which Iran initiative is discussed. argues that the policy is both unwise and illegal."
GPS has long talk with POINDEXTER concerning the
hostage situation. POINDEXTER tells GPS that
hostages will be released the following week.
Nothing is said about any arms transactions.
POINDEXTER advises that the Iranians want a
higher level meeting, and the White House has
picked MCFARLANE. GPS recommends that MCFARLANE
be given written instructions. GPS is
subsequently shown the Terms of Reference for
MCFARLANE's mission which are consistent with GPS
views. GPS approves Terms of Reference. (Terms
of Reference, used by MCFARLANE in May 1986,,
speak of arms sales as only a future prospect.)
Late May or Early June 86
POINDEXTER informs GPS that MCFARLANE objected to going ahead with the meeting and that the initiative is "all off" again.
POINDEXTER tells GPS that the Iranians have
complained, and the PRESIDENT said they could
"take it or leave it." GPS asks if this means
that PRESIDENT is prepared to leave it," and
POINDEXTER says, "I think so."
ARMACOST cables GPS in Tokyo that Ambassador PRICE in London has learned from a staff member that TINY ROWLANDS was approached by NIR to take part in arms transactions with Iran which had White House approval and which involved GHORBANIFAR and KHASHOGGI. POINDEXTER was allegedly the point man and the State Deparmtent was cut out.
GPS advises DONALD REGAN of PRICE/ROWLANDS
contact. He expresses his opposition to dealing
with persons mentioned in ARMACOST cable, and
argues that if a low level official such as the
Embassy staffer knows about this it will become
public and leave the PRESIDENT exposed. GPS says
REGAN must go to PRESIDENT and get him to "cut
your losses and call it off." REGAN expresses
alarm and agrees to talk to the PRESIDENT.
GPS alerts POINDEXTER to the PRICE/ROWLANDS
contact and makes the same points as with REGAN.
POINDEXTER states that he told PRICE there was
only a smidgen of reality to the allegations
and tells GPS "we are not dealing with these
people." GPS voices his strong objections to any
such proposed transaction. POINDEXTER says he
does not share GPS' view. GPS argues that the
PRESIDENT is very exposed.
OAKLEY tells PLATT that the NORTH operation has
"fizzled, negotiations have broken down, and
that MCFARLANE was involved and may have been in
Tehran. PLATT advises HILL, who informs GPS.
After GPS returns from trip to Philippines, he
is told by both POINDEXTER and CASEY that the
Iran-hostage operation has ended and the people
associated with it have been told to stand down."
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