6

06/12/86

07/02/86

09/16/86

10/21/86

10/26/86

10/31/86

GPS advises PLATT that he told Attorney General
MEESE that, while the United States is

prosecuting Israelis for arms sales to Iran,
Israel could point a finger back at the United
States. MEESE was not deterred" by GPS'
comments.

ARMACOST writes GPS
about arms sales to
policy.

concerning renewed conjecture Iran; he argues against the

LEDEEN asks HILL to arrange a meeting with GPS to discuss the Iran matter. HILL takes no action.

LEDEEN calls HILL again about meeting with GPS. He states that a "grand strategy" involving a strategic relationship with Iran had gone off track with regard to hostages.

HILL advises LEDEEN that GPS will not see him.

POINDEXTER advises GPS that release of DAVID
JACOBSEN is imminent.

11/4/86

11/6/86

11/10/86

11/12/86

Lebanese press discloses U.S. arms sales to Iran. GPS cables POINDEXTER advising that all the key facts be promptly disclosed.

POINDEXTER responds that now is not the time to
go public because it would complicate efforts to
secure the release of other hostages."

POINDEXTER tells GPS that while GHORBANIFAR
channel shut down, new channel is open.
we should shut it all down."

GPS says

Meeting at the White House among PRESIDENT, VICE
PRESIDENT, POINDEXTER, REGAN, KEEL, CASEY,
WEINBERGER, MEESE, SHULTZ. POINDEXTER briefs
group on operation, mentions January 1986

Finding. GPS says this is the first he has heard
of it; WEINBERGER says the same. POINDEXTER says
a total of 1000 TOWS and 240 Hawk spare parts
were sold to Iran. GPS criticizes the operation,
says it sounds like arms for hostages.
PRESIDENT disagrees. POINDEXTER says, "How else
will we get hostages out?" GPS argues that
operation should be shut down.

Later in the day, en route to Guatemala for OAS meeting, GPS receives draft press guidance from White House describing as unanimous the current and past support for the Iran arms shipments by the PRESIDENT'S senior advisers. GPS tells POINDEXTER to delete the claim of unanimity, since not accurate. GPS supports the PRESIDENT, but not the shipments. POINDEXTER agrees to the deletion.

GPS tells HILL that he (GPS) must tell the
PRESIDENT that his advisers are distorting
the record.

GPS urges REGAN to assist him in persuading the PRESIDENT to turn Iran policy over to State and end arms sales to Iran. GPS gives REGAN draft statements for PRESIDENT's use announcing end of arms sales.

EXHIBIT
GPS-

Chronology-C

11/13/86 11/14/86

11/15/86

11/16/86

11/17/86

11/18/86

11/19/86

At his regularly scheduled meeting with
PRESIDENT, GPS makes arguments against arms for
Iran.

GPS at Camp David gives draft paper to REGAN that
would return control of Iran policy to State and
end arms sales to Iran. (REGAN tells him (GPS)
he understands State's position, but White House
is not in a position to adopt it.

GPS appears on "Face the Nation. Says that he
believes there should be no more arms sales to
Iran, but also states he does not speak for the
Administration.

SPEAKES announces that the White House has no further plans for arms shipments to Iran. He also confirms that the SECRETARY OF STATE is Administration's chief foreign policy spokesman.

GPS tells ARMACOST and HILL that State must have access to all the facts concerning the Iran initiative.

State LEGAL ADVISER SOFAER attends General Counsels' meeting at White House. Reports back that NSC Counsel THOMPSON declined, under instructions, to give full story.

GPS directs that HILL brief ARMACOST and SOFAER
on GPS' knowledge concerning arms sale to Iran.
GPS tells PRESIDENT that PRESIDENT is not fully
informed. GPS says "we have been deceived and
lied to. . . And you have to watch out about
saying no arms for hostages." GPS says MCFARLANE
once told him that planeload of arms would go to
Iran if hostages released. PRESIDENT says he
knew of this. GPS says he had been told in Tokyo
(6/86) that it had all stopped. PRESIDENT says
that GPS is "telling me things I don't know."
GPS says, "Mr. President, if I'm telling you
something you don't know I don't know very
much so something is wrong here."

-

GPS then calls REGAN and expresses concern about PRESIDENTIAL press conference scheduled for that night. He says PRESIDENT has been misled on the facts.

PRESIDENT's Press Conference.

11/20/86

11/22/86

11/24/86

11/25/86

11/26/86

12/8/86

GPS calls PRESIDENT. Tells him of factual errors in the press conference. Reiterates that PRESIDENT is not getting the full story.

PRESIDENT asks GPS to identify the factual errors.

GPS reviews list of factual errors with REGAN. Learns that PRESIDENT, with VICE PRESIDENT, had told POINDEXTER of GPS' assertions that PRESIDENT not getting the facts.

GPS asks REGAN to attend when GPS sees the
PRESIDENT that evening.

GPS meets with PRESIDENT and REGAN at the White House. PRESIDENT does not accept GPS' thesis. PRESIDENT says he knew about November 1985 shipment, but disputes that it was arms for hostages. GPS says that no one looking at the record will agree.

GPS is interviewed by MEESE and ASSISTANT
ATTORNEY GENERAL COOPER. Among other things, GPS
tells MEESE that PRESIDENT told GPS earlier in
week that PRESIDENT knew of November 1985
shipment.

NSPG on Iran. GPS criticizes policy and argues for its cessation. PRESIDENT does not agree.

Later that day, during WHITEHEAD meeting with GPS, POINDEXTER returns call from WHITEHEAD. POINDEXTER says State must get involved and can take lead if it wants. POINDEXTER says "I want to get out of it."

GPS learns at NSPG that POINDEXTER has resigned, NORTH has been relieved, and a diversion of funds has occurred.

GPS meets with PRESIDENT to discuss State's
administration of Iran policy.

GPS testifies before HFAC.

GPS informed that CASEY questions GPS assertion that he and POINDEXTER had told GPS that Iran initiative had been stood down."

12/12/86

12/13/86

12/13/86

12/14/86

12/16/86

12/18/86

4

ARMACOST and CASEY agree on ground rules for
upcoming meeting with second channel. The
channel will be used for intelligence only.
CASEY later calls REGAN and persuades White House
to continue to authorize policy discussions in
the channel, notwithstanding CASEY's agreement to
the contrary with ARMACOST.

Meeting in Frankfurt among Iranian, State
representative DUNBAR, and CIA representative
CAVE. DUNBAR delivers message that no more arms
will be sold. Iranian reveals the existence of
previous agreement with NORTH and HAKIM which
contained nine points. DUNBAR reports existence
of the "Nine Point Agenda" back to Department.
DUNBAR returns to Washington, CAVE remains in
Europe and holds second meeting with the Iranian,
contrary to agreement by CIA that no more
meetings in this channel would take place without
State representative present.

On receiving first DUNBAR report (by secure
telephone), GPS asks to see PRESIDENT.

GPS meets with PRESIDENT. Informs him of DUNBAR'S meeting with second channel, including DUNBAR'S discovery of previous agreement re release of Dawa prisoners. PRESIDENT expresses shock, tells GPS that we never agreed to pressure Kuwait.

GPS testifies before SSCI.

GPS sends message to KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTER reaffirming that "the President and I' remain committed to the policy that "the U.S. Government will never ask Kuwait to release the Da'wa prisoners in order to get freedom for the American hostages."