UNGLASHED U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Comment_on Draft NSCO The strategic sportance of Iran and the value c reassessing our policy toward it are clear. The draf: SSCD constructively and perceptively addresses a number of the key. disagree. However, with one point in the analysis and one spec:fic recommendation. The political dynamics in Iran are in flux and poorly understood, but the draft NSDD appears to exaggerate current anti-regine sentiment and Soviet advantages over us in gaining influence. Most importantly, its proposal that we permit or encourage a flow of western arms to Iran is contrary to our interest both in containing Khomeinisa and in ending the excesses of this regine. We should not alter this aspect of our policy when groups with ties to Iran are holding US nostayes in Lebanon. 1. therefore, disagree with the suggestion that our efforts to reduce arms flows to Iran should be ended. If the NSD is revised to reflect this concern, I would like to see the draft again before it is put in final form. If it would be helpful, I could ask ong of our senior officers familiar with this issue to work directly with the NSC staff on the saygested revisions. The steady Jecline of Iran's military capability is in our interest. and we should not facilitate the supply of weapons from Western Europe that would revive that military capacity. A.tit suppi.es from the West are not likely to retard Iranian overtures to the Soviets but could ironically prolong the Iran-bing mat. Given the disparity in size between Iran and Iraq, this could ultimately mean an Iranian victory, and a fies. burst of energy for anti-Americanism throughout the region. Also, in light of our experience with restraining arms flows, it is unlikely that we could loosen the restrictions wit.out the flow becoming uncontrolled. If other Western countries sell arms they will do so primarily for commercial Botives and with little ability or inclination to regulate their sales or to use then for carefully developed political purposes. For us to be seen as bolstering the Iranian ability to continue the war would be a shock to Saudi Arabia, the GCC UNCLASSIFIED states. and Iraq. It is Iran's refusal to end the war with Iraq which barn keeps alive the threat of a victory over req and is driving the Iranian regine to sake overtures to the USSE. We need the war wound down, if not forsally ended. The inherent limits on the Iranian-Soviet relationship are underplayed in the NSDD draft. Iranians have a deep historical Bistrust of the USSR. The Iranian feelere to the Soviets are for arms and for limitations on Soviet arms supplies to Iraq: the Iranians do not seek a close relationship. Even if sore Soviet arms were available, translating that relationship into substantial political influence would not be automatic, and would be resisted by powerful elements within Iran. There is nothing wrong with coarunicating our continued willingness to have correct relations, but it is izperative that they understand that such improvements are 1possible so long as they lend support to terrorist activities in Lebanon and elsewhere. Hints of possible improvements in Iranian-Soviet relations are worrisome, and should give added impetus to our fundamental policy goal: seeing the Iran-Iraq war wind down. Maintaining international pressure on Iran to change its war policy is the key to reducing the incentives for an Iranian rapprochement with the Soviete. Nevertheless, we should not leave Iran with only a Soviet option. Therefore, we should follow a two track policy: continue to restrain arms flows and to support efforts to Bediate, as and the fighting, while also encouraging the to broaden their Commercial contacto to reduce Iran's isolation and to offer an alternative to Soviets. UNGLASSIFIED 2. THE TALLOWING INORBATION BAY BE USED TO UPDATE CONSULTED WITH FRICBOLY SERVICES TO GET ADDITIOSAL ن 2240 |