Endless War

gran-Iraq war began September 1980, nas produced well over a million casualties, with c. 100,000 Iranian deaths and c. 65,000 raqi deaths

Mid-March southern offensive ended with Iranians
gaining swampland in exchange for up to 20,000 killed.

In March, Iraq repeated its earlier use of chemical
weapons; Iran has not used its nascent CW capability.
Iraq began daily bombing of iranian cities, including
Tenran, in March, noping to force negotiations.

can, at great disadvantage in airpower, responded with occasional Scud missile strikes against Bagndad. No formal limited ceasefire exists, but attacks on cities nave been suspended since June 15.

In June, Iran announced shift to "defensive holy war': frequent small-scale attacks to inflict casualties and Keep Iraqis off-balance, but no more big offensives.

Settlement Prospects

Iraq wants comprehensive ceasefire and negotiated
settlement of the war.

Iran refuses to halt fighting unless Iraq condemned as aggressor and Iraqi regime removed; meanwhile seeks to pressure Iraq on CW use, bombing, and shipping attacks. Mediation efforts by

US Policy

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etc. all led nownere and are now dormant.

USG seeks negotiated settlement preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity of both sides.

US coes not supply arms to either side and actively discourages sales to Iran by US friends and allies.

USG nas publicly condemned Iraqi CW use and opposes bombing of cities.

We continue to strengthen security cooperation with
Gulf states.

You will

As you take up your responsibilities as Chief of Mission in San Jose, I want to discuss our objectives in Costa Rica and Uline ese specific areas for priority attention. receive specific issue-related instructions as needed. I hope AP (ra) you will find this guidance upaful in directing the offerta of 81 0.8. Government elements in Costa Rica.

Relations between the United States and Costa Rica are excellent. The GOCR generally supporte our goals in Central America. U.S. obitives in Costa Aice are: (1) to greaseve Costa Rica's democratie institutions; (2) to encourage Costa Rica's continued strong support for a multilateral and comprehensive solution to the Central Aneri configet (3) assist Costa Rica to overcome its economie quities, (4) to continue to assiet in the professionalisati Costa Rica's security forces.