support

may not the the agenda of State Department, in this case, ΟΙ some other agenda in other cases, can only get us in more and more difficulty, and serves the President very badly. I therefore ask that there be a meeting of the National Security Planning Group SO this matter can be discussed properly, and presented properly, to the President, and that Our so-called negotiators with the Iranian government, wherever they are, be brought home and instructed not to take any further action af any kind to meet with or discuss anything with Iranian government officials unless and until there is a Presidential decision growing out of an NSPG meeting to do so. And if there is such a decision, I would ask that the Defense Department and the NSC be kept fully informed and advised, and consulted as to what is happening or about to happen. N 45405

I am sorry to be so blunt about it, but it seems to me incredibly wrong that the precise mechanisms of secrecy and attempts to exclude advisors who, it is feared may have different views, which helped cause so many of our present difficulties, are apparently being pursued by the State Department at this

time.

I have now learned, thanks to your forthcomingness with me, and by reason of our investigations, that McFarlane had actually offered the Iranians sensitive intelligence information, passed by the U.S. as to Iraq, and that State plans another meeting with the Iranians on December 27 in Genena. I urgently urge that no such meetings be permitted until we have had the NSPG you very forthrightly offered.

I will urge, at that meeting that we tell all Iranians in whatever channel or channels there may be that we will discuss nothing with any of them until all American hostages are returned unharmed. The terms of reference you kindly showed me today seem to me to be wholly inadequate.

cc: Don Regan

UNCLASSIFIED

ENTIRE TEXT

received my copy of the attached memo from SecDef Weinberger to then-acting National Security Adviser Keel on December 24, 1986. I called Cap that day to tell him my reaction to his memo. I told him his assumptions were wrong,

that I was glad to let him know what is going on and if he wanted to know the facts he ought to cease firing off intemperate memos about the State Department and instead pick up the phone and call me. Cap said he would do that.

GPS-53

The State Department found out about continuing use of a channel to the Iranians after the fact. It is ironic that others would accuse us of perpetuating a tactic we found Outrageous. I specified for Cap some of the numerous occasions when we tried to shut this down and when we found out after the pct that the channel was still being kept open:

A week before John Poindexter resigned we tried to get decision on no more arms to Iran. We found out

Director Casey.

was communicating directly with CIA
We have not been a party to those contacts.

We found out the Iranians had been maintaining direct
contact with ex-CIA official George Cave and wanted to have
another meeting. When we found out the meeting was to take
place, we insisted on having one of our people there.
Charlie Dunbar, a Farsi-speaking Foreign Service officer
joined Cave. We saw this meeting as an opportunity to tell
the Iranians 1) we would provide no more arms, and 2) this
channel would no longer be used by the USG to convey policy
messages; we were there to listen. Casey subsequently made
an end run to Don Regan who went to the President who told
NSC director Keel to change the instructions for the
meeting and keep the channel open both for policy and
intelligence exchanges. When we found this out, I went
back to the President and got agreement that Mike Armacost
would be in charge of coordinating our policy on Iran,
including identifying and getting control of all the
various channels. The President said he wanted to pursue
contacts with the Iranians but no more arms would go to
them.

When the meeting took place, our representative Dunbar
found out that the Iranians didn't have the word that this
channel had changed, were operating on promises of arms and
trying to negotiate with us on the basis of a nine point
agenda which they claimed nad been agreed upon.

After Dunbar left Frankfurt, Cave met with his Iranian
contact the next day for a second time. The CIA contends
We did not
Iranian request.
this meeting took place ut
Buthorize this second numbing and we were not informed in
advance it was to take place.

UNCLASSIFIED

2226

Partially Declassified/Released on 20 July 1987
Under provisions of E.0. 12356
by B. Reger, National Security Council

L

S 08836

tace-to-face meetings about

Which de 356 awar? telephone contacts between cave .n Washington and an Tran: an interlocutor :n enran continued through mid-January. Beginning December 29, Charlie Dunca: was present for what the Agency said were all of the phone calls, but only heard the Cave end of the talks. During these conversations. the Iranian empnas.zed that they stl. expected arms to be delivered and expressed his displeasure Over State Department involvement the Issue, Since State was "seeking to spoil things".

Finally, On January 20.

ח !

of the Agency informed

Arnie Rapnel that the CIA nad decided to close down the

EXHIBIT GPS-54

Iran and Te:

The secretary of State
The Secrtary of Defense
The Director of Centra
The Attorney General

CLASSIFIED

EXHIBIT

GPS-54

The United States has a legitimite and continuing interest Its location, resources and in better relations with Iran. Size assure that Iran will be years to come.

a major regional actor

however,

in the

in Iran

We have begun a process of dialogue with elements who may also seek better relations with the United States. that dialogue will continue: the time has come to put these discussions into regular, though still quiet, diplomatic channels. I therefore direct the Secretary of State to assume these discussions. full responsibility for

Many of these

At the same time, it is clear that America has other important interests and friends in the region. are threatened by Iran today. They must be assured of continued American support.

Moreover, Iran continues to support terrorism, despite some America condemns terror improvement in the last two years. whether directed against Americans or against non-Americans. This principle has been, and remains, central to our efforts to encourage broader international cooperation in the fight So our concerns with Iranian backed against terrorism. terrorism cannot be assuaged until Iran ceases all terrorist acts, regardless of the targets.

These obstacles will necessarily limit the possibilities of better relations with Iran. Until Iran ceases to be a threat to her neighbors, ends the war with Iraq and stops supporting and using terrorism, the US Government will ship no more arms we will strive to Iran. And until these conditions are met, vigorously and through all available channels to discourage We will not condone any third country arms shipments to Iran. such shipments until our conditions are fulfilled.

We have always

This continues

give in to

Finally, we will not abandon our hostages. said that we are willing to talk to any one, to any group, any government about their safe release. our policy. But we have not, and will not, terrorist demands. We will pay no ransoms. policies as a result of terrorist demands. other government to give in to demands. CLSKS in such a policy. firm policy of refusing to give be safer for American Citizens and a better guarantog American interests.

We will change
Nor will we as<
There are clearly
But in the long run, continuing our
to terrorist blackmail

any

223

2_20 July 1987 TO G. 4.0. 12306

EXHIBIT GPS-55

UNUDASSIAED

AFFIDAVIT

COMES NOW AFFIANT ROBERT B. OAKLEY, who states as follows: 1. My name is Robert B. Oakley, and my current position is Senior Director of Middle Eastern, South Asian, and North African Affairs for the National Security Council.

2. From September of 1984 to September of 1986, I served as Director of the Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning, Department of State. My title was Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism. My responsibilities included coordination of activities regarding international terrorism and the United States response to terrorism.

3. I recall conversations in November 1985 with Lt. Col. Oliver North (North) regarding a problem with

flight clearances.

To the best of my recollection

and belief, these conversations included the following:

a. North stated that he was aware of Israeli arms shipments to Iran in exchange for certain intelligence

North indicated that he

had discovered this relationship when "one of his people"
went to an arms warehouse

to obtain arms for the

Nicaraguan Resistance, and learned that the Israelis had been
obtaining arms from the same source for shipment to Iran.

CLASSIFIED BY: WHC
DECLASSIFY ON: QADR

EXHIBIT

GPS-55