Avoiding Losses/taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict
University of Michigan Press, 1994 - 165 sidor
This volume is a comprehensive examination of the benefits and potential pitfalls of employing prospect theory---a leading alternative to expected utility as a theory of decision under risk---to understand and explain political behavior. The collection brings together both theoretical and empirical studies, thus grounding the conclusions about prospect theory's potential for enriching political analyses in an assessment of its performance in explaining actual cases.
The theoretical chapters provide an overview of the main hypotheses of prospect theory: people frame risk-taking decisions around a reference point, they tend to accept greater risk to prevent losses than to make gains, and they often perceive the devastation of a loss as greater than the benefit of a gain. The three case studies---Roosevelt's decision-making during the Munich crisis of 1938, Carter's April 1980 decision to rescue the American hostages in Iran, and Soviet behavior toward Syria in 1966-67---generally support these hypotheses. Nevertheless, the authors are frank about potentially difficult conceptual and methodological problems, making explicit reference to alternative explanations, such as the rational actor model, which posits the maximization of expected value.
Contributors to the volume include Jack Levy, Robert Jervis, Barbara Farnham, Rose McDermott, Audrey McInerney, and Eldar Shafir.
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Thus as the Munich crisis reached its peak , the proappeasement British
ambassador to Czechoslovakia stressed to the Czechs that they should not be
lured into believing that standing firm might succeed in avoiding all losses — “
refusal or ...
Ultimately , the Czechs , having received no support for their position , “ accepted
flatly and unconditionally the British - French proposal , ” acceding to virtually all
of Hitler ' s demands . Since Roosevelt ' s expectation of war had been based ...
... in the United States on the afternoon of September 26 , the Fuehrer was far
from conciliatory , declaring at one point that if the Czechs did not give the
Sudeten Germans immediate freedom , ' we will go and fetch this freedom for
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Political Implications of Loss Aversion
Prospect Theory and Soviet Policy Towards
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Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises: The Soviet-American, Egyptian ...
Russell J. Leng
Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 2000
Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-rational Debate
Nehemia Geva,Alex Mintz
Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 1997