Avoiding Losses/taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict
This volume is a comprehensive examination of the benefits and potential pitfalls of employing prospect theory---a leading alternative to expected utility as a theory of decision under risk---to understand and explain political behavior. The collection brings together both theoretical and empirical studies, thus grounding the conclusions about prospect theory's potential for enriching political analyses in an assessment of its performance in explaining actual cases.
The theoretical chapters provide an overview of the main hypotheses of prospect theory: people frame risk-taking decisions around a reference point, they tend to accept greater risk to prevent losses than to make gains, and they often perceive the devastation of a loss as greater than the benefit of a gain. The three case studies---Roosevelt's decision-making during the Munich crisis of 1938, Carter's April 1980 decision to rescue the American hostages in Iran, and Soviet behavior toward Syria in 1966-67---generally support these hypotheses. Nevertheless, the authors are frank about potentially difficult conceptual and methodological problems, making explicit reference to alternative explanations, such as the rational actor model, which posits the maximization of expected value.
Contributors to the volume include Jack Levy, Robert Jervis, Barbara Farnham, Rose McDermott, Audrey McInerney, and Eldar Shafir.
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In a similar vein, see Carr to Hull, September 24, 1938, Ibid., pp. 643-644,
received 4:40 p.m.) Meanwhile, Ambassador Bullitt, certain that the American
people would desire "some effort by our Government . . . even though the effort
may prove ...
Henceforth he was completely focused on the imminence of war and the need to
end the crisis before it could occur (Hull informed Moffat on the night of the 25th
that Roosevelt had gotten such bad telephone reports from both Bullitt and ...
gave Ambassador St. Quentin to understand that "in his first message Roosevelt
aimed at bringing the weight of the United States to bear upon the European
crisis and at the same time to avoid stirring American isolationist feelings" (Hull, ...
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Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises: The Soviet-American, Egyptian ...
Russell J. Leng
Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 2000
Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-rational Debate
Nehemia Geva,Alex Mintz
Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 1997