Avoiding Losses/taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International ConflictUniversity of Michigan Press, 1994 - 165 sidor This volume is a comprehensive examination of the benefits and potential pitfalls of employing prospect theory---a leading alternative to expected utility as a theory of decision under risk---to understand and explain political behavior. The collection brings together both theoretical and empirical studies, thus grounding the conclusions about prospect theory's potential for enriching political analyses in an assessment of its performance in explaining actual cases. The theoretical chapters provide an overview of the main hypotheses of prospect theory: people frame risk-taking decisions around a reference point, they tend to accept greater risk to prevent losses than to make gains, and they often perceive the devastation of a loss as greater than the benefit of a gain. The three case studies---Roosevelt's decision-making during the Munich crisis of 1938, Carter's April 1980 decision to rescue the American hostages in Iran, and Soviet behavior toward Syria in 1966-67---generally support these hypotheses. Nevertheless, the authors are frank about potentially difficult conceptual and methodological problems, making explicit reference to alternative explanations, such as the rational actor model, which posits the maximization of expected value. Contributors to the volume include Jack Levy, Robert Jervis, Barbara Farnham, Rose McDermott, Audrey McInerney, and Eldar Shafir. |
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... actor will prefer the certain outcome to the gamble , a risk - acceptant actor will prefer the gamble , and a risk- neutral actor will be indifferent between the two . Most people are risk averse with respect to monetary outcomes and ...
... actor . This is a complex and demanding task , but it is made somewhat easier by the fact that political leaders ... actor in question to understand how he / she frames a particular choice problem . Because of the importance of fram- ing ...
... actor to delay but for a risk - averse actor to prefer preventive action now . This tendency for risk - acceptant dominant states to prefer inaction , but for risk - averse states to prefer war now , is precisely what Kim and Morrow ...
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Contents | 1 |
Political Implications of Loss Aversion | 19 |
Insights | 39 |
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Avoiding Losses/taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict Barbara Farnham Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 1994 |
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