Avoiding Losses/taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict
University of Michigan Press, 1994 - 165 sidor
This volume is a comprehensive examination of the benefits and potential pitfalls of employing prospect theory---a leading alternative to expected utility as a theory of decision under risk---to understand and explain political behavior. The collection brings together both theoretical and empirical studies, thus grounding the conclusions about prospect theory's potential for enriching political analyses in an assessment of its performance in explaining actual cases.
The theoretical chapters provide an overview of the main hypotheses of prospect theory: people frame risk-taking decisions around a reference point, they tend to accept greater risk to prevent losses than to make gains, and they often perceive the devastation of a loss as greater than the benefit of a gain. The three case studies---Roosevelt's decision-making during the Munich crisis of 1938, Carter's April 1980 decision to rescue the American hostages in Iran, and Soviet behavior toward Syria in 1966-67---generally support these hypotheses. Nevertheless, the authors are frank about potentially difficult conceptual and methodological problems, making explicit reference to alternative explanations, such as the rational actor model, which posits the maximization of expected value.
Contributors to the volume include Jack Levy, Robert Jervis, Barbara Farnham, Rose McDermott, Audrey McInerney, and Eldar Shafir.
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THE FRAMING OF OPTIONS In seeking to apply prospect theory to the Iranian
hostage crisis , it is necessary to analyze the options that were considered by the
relevant players , in order to determine the perceived relative riskiness of each .
Although expected utility requires information on the actor ' s perception of
available options , the possible outcomes associated with each option and the
subjective probability attached to each , and assessment of relative value , it
requires no ...
Assessment all depends on the criterion decision - makers use to compare
relative risks . If decision - makers adopt a minimax criteria , they might prefer to
delay and avoid the worst possible outcome , defeat in a preventive war .
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Political Implications of Loss Aversion
Prospect Theory and Soviet Policy Towards
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Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises: The Soviet-American, Egyptian ...
Russell J. Leng
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