Avoiding Losses/taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict
University of Michigan Press, 1994 - 165 sidor
This volume is a comprehensive examination of the benefits and potential pitfalls of employing prospect theory---a leading alternative to expected utility as a theory of decision under risk---to understand and explain political behavior. The collection brings together both theoretical and empirical studies, thus grounding the conclusions about prospect theory's potential for enriching political analyses in an assessment of its performance in explaining actual cases.
The theoretical chapters provide an overview of the main hypotheses of prospect theory: people frame risk-taking decisions around a reference point, they tend to accept greater risk to prevent losses than to make gains, and they often perceive the devastation of a loss as greater than the benefit of a gain. The three case studies---Roosevelt's decision-making during the Munich crisis of 1938, Carter's April 1980 decision to rescue the American hostages in Iran, and Soviet behavior toward Syria in 1966-67---generally support these hypotheses. Nevertheless, the authors are frank about potentially difficult conceptual and methodological problems, making explicit reference to alternative explanations, such as the rational actor model, which posits the maximization of expected value.
Contributors to the volume include Jack Levy, Robert Jervis, Barbara Farnham, Rose McDermott, Audrey McInerney, and Eldar Shafir.
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An actor ' s attitude toward risk is conventionally defined in terms of marginal
utility or the shape of the utility function . An actor is risk - averse if the utility
function is concave , risk - neutral if the utility function is linear , and risk -
acceptant if the ...
First , individuals tend to be risk - averse with respect to gains and risk - acceptant
with respect to losses . In a typical experiment ( Kahneman & Tversky , 1979 ) , 80
% of respondents preferred a certain outcome of $ 3000 to an 80 % chance of ...
It would suggest that the risks of delay are greater than the risks of war now , for
the number and magnitude of negative outcomes presumably increases as one '
s relative power declines . This would create an incentive for a risk - acceptant ...
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Political Implications of Loss Aversion
Prospect Theory and Soviet Policy Towards
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Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises: The Soviet-American, Egyptian ...
Russell J. Leng
Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 2000
Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-rational Debate
Nehemia Geva,Alex Mintz
Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 1997