Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of ScienceDeborah G. Mayo, Aris Spanos Cambridge University Press, 26 okt. 2009 Although both philosophers and scientists are interested in how to obtain reliable knowledge in the face of error, there is a gap between their perspectives that has been an obstacle to progress. By means of a series of exchanges between the editors and leaders from the philosophy of science, statistics and economics, this volume offers a cumulative introduction connecting problems of traditional philosophy of science to problems of inference in statistical and empirical modelling practice. Philosophers of science and scientific practitioners are challenged to reevaluate the assumptions of their own theories - philosophical or methodological. Practitioners may better appreciate the foundational issues around which their questions revolve and thereby become better 'applied philosophers'. Conversely, new avenues emerge for finally solving recalcitrant philosophical problems of induction, explanation and theory testing. |
Innehåll
withJohn Worrall Deborah G Mayo 5 Induction andSevere Testing Mills Sins or Mayos Errors? Peter Achinstein | |
Aris Spanos 7 New Perspectives on Some Old Problemsof | |
Causal ModelingExplanation and Severe Testing | |
Graphical CausalModeling andErrorStatistics Exchangeswith Clark Glymour Aris Spanos 9 Error and Legal Epistemology | |
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Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability ... Deborah G. Mayo,Aris Spanos Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 2011 |
Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability ... Deborah G. Mayo,Aris Spanos Ingen förhandsgranskning - 2009 |
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