many had simply surrendered their parishes and discontinued their ministry. The whole body, was therefore under suspicion. Also the infant state was exceedingly sensitive, and did not yet know whom to trust, and consequently the oath of allegiance continued for many years to be generally imposed. Also, various persons, a number from Maryland, were going abroad for ordination, and it was doubtful what they would have to submit to if they would succeed.

For these reasons this principle was enunciated; but as time has since gone on the postulate has been so far modified or ignored as that not only is such oath of allegiance no longer required, but citizens of a foreign state are found in some instances in possession of parishes. Even the vestry act of 1798 did not embody this principle though the oath was required of persons elected vestrymen.

And so in regard to the second proposition, that according to "true apostolic institution the duty and office of a bishop differ's in nothing from that of other priests except in the power of ordination and confirmation, and in the right of precedency in ecclesiastical meetings or synods, and shall accordingly be so exercised in this church." This was an overwhelming renunciation of that scheme of Episcopal prerogative which was such a bug-bear in the American mind. It is denied that they are a separate order, but are associated with other priests," to whom only certain additional functions have been assigned. There are no rights of their order that place them outside of or above the law. There are no fatherly prerogatives by which

either priests or people become to them as children. The right to ordain and confirm, and precedency in synods are theirs--nothing more. A wonderful contrast with the functions of their order as exercised by his Lordship, Archbishop Laud, who stood out in the American mind as the embodiment of ecclesiastical enormity, though only the strong representative of his class and order.

But a Bishop is a good deal more than such a functionary as our fathers would have made him. Americans are still right jealous of any "prerogatives" that a bishop may be disposed to assert, and our wisest bishops are very chary of asserting such, but he is the father among his people; his influence is powerful in his diocese; according as he expresses desires, preferences or intentions will the policy of his diocese become; while his animadversions and rebukes, whether against men or measures will be dreaded. The office has been found of too lofty an origin and its necessary functions too high and holy to allow our fathers' "fundamental principle" to place cramping limitations upon it.

The third principle was also an adaptation, though from a different stand point; for while the other principles were for the purpose, in large measure, of conciliating the people, this was for the purpose of defending the rights of the clergy in a point where those rights were threatened. And so its object as stated: "to define or discriminate some of the separate rights and powers of the clergy." Formerly under the establishment the laity had nothing to do but accept the rector appointed to their parish and

make the best of him. Afterwards, towards the close of the Revolution, as we have seen, the laity, as assembled in the state legislature, considered the proposition of appointing ordainers to the ministry. The clergy, therefore, in 1784 felt that right views concerning their prerogatives were in danger, and so this principle. They would discriminate or define their separate rights and powers. The rights of the laity were of course recognized, that it was for them to receive or not any minister into a parish. But the claimed as their own the right to determine upon the ministerial commission and authority which is necessary to the due administration of the ordinances of religion in their own church, and of the literary, moral, and religious qualities and abilities of persons fit to be nominated to the different orders of the ministry." They insisted that that power belonged to them, as being by divine right custodians of their own order. And the laity represented in the convention, recognized the principle as sound, and it is one that has controlled the church in Maryland. from that day to this; though for a while, in the enactment of canons at this time it would appear that this exclusive right of the clergy over their own order was allowed to fall into abeyance.

It will be remembered that in Connecticut, and particularly in the person of Bishop Seabury, there was an indisposition to admit the laity into church conventions, nor was it a thing which English clergymen were familiar with--the direct influence of the laity ceasing with their power in parliament. Such admission, however, was necesssary in America, and was very soon uni

versally recognized. But Maryland claims the principle and acts on it, that the clergy have entire right over their own order, and so she alone, with Connecticut, has a standing committee composed entirely of clergymen, because one of the chief functions of that standing committee is to pass upon "the literary, moral and religious qualities and abilities of persons to be nominated and appointed to the different orders of the ministry." Also although the laws under which that committee are to act, are passed by a convention composed of both clergy and laity, yet the principle is saved and exemplified by the large discretion that is placed in the hands of the members of that committee. And churchmen are fighting against their true principles when they attempt to limit the freedom of that discretion. Such a committee should have "power" entrusted to it outside and above all conventions, vestries and all other bodies wherein laymen may sit. So only can we be true to this fundamental principle.

But Maryland shows her consistency with this principle in another of her acts, her ecclesiastical court. She was not always consistent, as we shall see presently, but right thinking attained its end. when that court was instituted and made to consist only of clergymen. This was a point that Bishop Seabury was earnest for, that the right of trial of clergymen should be only in the hands of the clergy, the power of deprival where the power of ordination rests, and Maryland reached it after a while; because true church principles as such have been at the root of Maryland action. It is observable that the two dioceses that have

been strictest in their adherence to this "fundamental principle" are the two whose ratio of communicants to the population today stands the highest.

Another point insisted on at this time was that there should be annual meetings of the convention, a symbol and manifestation of power that must have, to the clergy of that convention in 1784, contrasted most agreeably with the time when the word of a dissolute lordling could forbid their meeting together for God's work. And yet only eight years had intervened! Truly it was freedom!

One of the first thoughts of the church in Maryland after the enunciation of her rights and principles, was the question of discipline, the power to administer which having been the great demand from the beginning. The many attempts that had been made to secure some effective agency for this purpose will here be remembered, attempts that on account of the jealousy of one or other party, had always proven abortive, the church rejecting the mixed court that the state would erect, and the state and the people refusing to allow a Bishop or the delegation of sufficient power to a commissary. Now the church had the power herself, and by a marvelous inconsistency she embodied the principle in her legislalion that she had always contended against, and which was in direct contravention of her own above recorded principles. For as Bishop Seabury stated, the power of deprival can only be lodged legitimately in the hands that have the power of ordination, which is what the church. in Maryland had always said, when contending