obtained a considerable victory. The news of this, with what had just before happened at the passage of the defile, raised complaints and murmurs against the slow and timorous circumspection of Fabius. In a word, matters were carried so far, that the Roman people gave his general of horse an equal authority with him; a thing unheard of before. The dictator was upon the road when he received advice of this: for he had left Rome, in order that he might not be an eye-witness of what was contriving against him. His constancy, however, was not shaken. He was very sensible, that though his authority in the command was divided, yet his skill in the art of war was not so.* This soon became manifest.

Minucius, grown arrogant at the advantage he had gained over his colleague, proposed that each should command a day alternately, or even a longer time. But Fabius rejected this proposal, as it would have exposed the whole army to danger whilst under the command of Minucius. He therefore chose to divide the troops, in order that it might be in his power to preserve, at least, that part which should fall to his share.

Hannibal, fully informed of all that passed in the Roman camp, was overjoyed to hear of this dissension between the two commanders. He therefore laid a snare for the rash Minucius, who accordingly plunged headlong into it; and engaged the enemy on an eminence, in which an ambuscade was concealed. But his troops being soon put into disorder, were just upon the point of being cut to pieces, when Fabius, alarmed by the sudden outcries of the wounded, called aloud to his soldiers : "Let us hasten to the assistance of Minucius : "let us fly and snatch the victory from the enemy, "and extort from our fellow-citizens a confession

* Satis fidens haudquaquam cum imperii jure artem imperandi equatam. Liv. 1. xxii, n. 26.

"of their fault." This succour was very seasonable, and compelled Hannibal to sound a retreat. The latter, as he was retiring, said, "That the "cloud which had been long hovering on the sum"mit of the mountain, had at last burst with a "loud crack, and caused a mighty storm." So important and seasonable a service done by the dictator, opened the eyes of Minucius. He accordingly acknowledged his error, returned immediately to his duty and obedience, and shewed, that it is sometimes more glorious to know how to atone for a fault, than not to have committed it.

The State of AFFAIRS in SPAIN.

In the beginning of this campaign, Cn. Scipio, having suddenly attacked the Carthaginian fleet, commanded by Hamilcar, defeated it, and took twenty-five ships, with a great quantity of rich spoils. This victory made the Romans sensible, that they ought to be particularly attentive to the affairs of Spain, because Hannibal could draw considerable supplies both of men and money from that country. Accordingly, they sent a fleet thither, the command whereof was given to P. Scipio, who, after his arrival in Spain, having joined his brother, did the commonwealth very great service. Till that time the Romans had never ventured beyond the Ebro. They had been satisfied with having gained the friendship of the nations situated between that river and Italy, and confirming it by alliances: but under Publius, they crossed the Ebro, and carried their arms much further up into the country.

The circumstance which contributed most to promote their affairs, was, the treachery of a Spaniard in Saguntum. Hannibal had left there the children

d Polyb. l. iii. p. 245-250. Liv. 1. xxii. n. 19-22.

of the most distinguished families in Spain, whom he had taken as hostages. Abelox, for so this Spaniard was called, persuaded Bostar, the governor of the city, to send back these young men into their country, in order, by that means, to attach the inhabitants more firmly to the Carthaginian interest. He himself was charged with this commission. But he carried them to the Romans, who afterwards delivered them to their relations, and, by so acceptable a present, acquired their amity.

The BATTLE of CANNE.

The next spring, C. Terentius Varro and L. Emilius Paulus were chosen consuls at Rome. In this campaign, which was the third of the second Punic war, the Romans did what had never been practised before, that is, they composed the army of eight legions, each consisting of five thousand men, exclusive of the allies. For, as we have already observed, the Romans never raised but four legions, each of which consisted of about four thousand foot, and three hundred horse.* They never, except on the most important occasions, made them consist of five thousand of the one, and four hundred of the other. As for the troops of the allies, their infantry was equal to that of the legions, but they had three times as many horse. Each of the consuls had commonly half the troops of the allies, with two legions, in order for them to act separately; and it was very seldom that all these forces were used at the same time, and in the same expedition. Here the Romans had not only four, but eight legions, so important did the affair appear to them. The senate even thought fit, that the two

e Polyb. l. iii. p. 255-268. Liv. 1. xxii. n. 34—54.

* Polybius supposes only two hundred horse in each legion : but J. Lipsius thinks that this is a mistake either of the author or transcriber.

A. M.

3789. A. Rom.

533.

consuls of the foregoing year, Servilius and Attilius, should serve in the army as proconsuls; but the latter could not go into the field, by reason of his great age.

Varro, at his setting out from Rome, had declared openly, that he would fall upon the enemy the very first opportunity, and put an end to the war; adding, that it would never be terminated, so long as men such as Fabius should be at the head of the Roman armies. An advantage which he gained over the Carthaginians, of whom near seventeen hundred were killed, greatly increased his boldness and arrogance. As for Hannibal, he considered this loss as a real advantage; being persuaded that it would serve as a bait to the consul's rashness, and prompt him on to a battle, which he wanted extremely. It was afterwards known, that Hannibal was reduced to such a scarcity of provisions, that he could not possibly have subsisted ten days longer. The Spaniards were already meditating to leave him. So that there would have been an end of Hannibal and his army, if his good fortune had not thrown a Varro in his

way.

Both armies, having often removed from place to place, came in sight of each other near Cannæ, a little town in Apulia, situated on the river Aufidus. As Hannibal was encamped in a level open country, and his cavalry much superior to that of the Romans, Æmilius did not think proper to engage in such a place. He wished to draw the enemy into a spot, where the infantry might have the greatest share in the action. But his colleague, who was unexperienced, was of a contrary opinion. Such is the inconveniency of a divided command; jealousy, a disparity of tempers, or a diversity of views, seldom failing to create a dissension between the two generals.

The troops on each side were, for some time, contented with slight skirmishes. But, at last, one

day, when Varro had the command (for the two consuls took it by turns) preparations were made on both sides for battle. Æmilius had not been consulted; yet, though he extremely disapproved the conduct of his colleague, as it was not in his power to prevent it, he seconded him to the ut

most.

Hannibal, after having made his soldiers observe, that, being superior in cavalry, they could not possibly have pitched upon a better spot for fighting, had it been left to their choice: "Return, "then (says he), thanks to the gods for having "brought the enemy hither, that you may triumph "over them; and thank me also, for having re"duced the Romans to a necessity of coming to 66 an engagement. After three great successive "victories, is not the remembrance of your own "actions sufficient to inspire you with courage?

66

By the former battles, you are become masters "of the open country; but this will put you in "possession of all the cities, and (I presume to say it) of all the riches and power of the Romans. It is not words that we want, but action. "I trust in the gods, that you shall soon see my "promises verified."

66

The two armies were very unequal in number. That of the Romans, including the allies, amounted to fourscore thousand foot, and a little above six thousand horse; and that of the Carthaginians consisted but of forty thousand foot, all well disciplined, and of ten thousand horse. Æmilius conmanded the right wing of the Romans, Varro the left, and Servilius, one of the consuls of the last year, was posted in the centre. Hannibal, who had the art of turning every incident to advantage, had posted himself, so as that the wind Vulturnus,* which

* A violent burning wind, blowing south-south-east, which in this flat and sandy country, raised clouds of hot dust, and blinded and choked the Romans.