1

if you give into my Sentiment, and declare your felf on my fide of the question? You muft expect neither Mercy nor Manners if you dare to contradict or differ in the leaft from this great Oracle Mr. Locke. To fay the truth, the honeft Man without Tafte or Ge-, nius fets up for a Philofopher upon the fole Credit of having read his Book, and submitting more implicitly to his Authority than to his Bible, tho' he understands them both alike. He will certainly tell you as he often has me, that neither he nor Mr. Locke denies their having Souls, but improperly fo calied; not fpiritual immaterial Subftances, but Matter fo fublimated and refined, of fuch an exquifite Frame and Texture, as to be capable of Thought and fpontaneous Motion, and all the other Qualities and Properties which in a more exalted and proper Senfe are truly attributed to incorporeal and spiritual Beings.

The Poffibility of a material Animal, of felf-moving thinking Matter, has at firft fight fuch a glaring Appearance of Contradiction, that it is amazing how any Man of Senfe, but especially of fuperiour Parts and distinguished Abilities, could ever seriously maintain it; and it will puzzle the wifeft Man to fhew what real Purposes of Philofophy or Religion can be promoted by it. The moft material (pardon me, Madam, I did not intend it for a, Pun) I fay, the most material Argument that has been brought to fapport it, is the fuppofing and calling the accidental Affections of

Matter,

Matter, fuch as Gravitation, Attraction, Electricity, Fermentation, and Rarefaction, the effential Properties of Matter, with which it has really no natural Connection, or neceffary relation to it. The Cobefion of the several parts of Matter, i. e. the Power by which they are united and cemented together; The Gravitation, Attraction, or Power by which the feveral parts of the System gravitate or are attracted to each other, is intirely and effentially distinct from the Matter it felf.

The great Sir Ifaac Newton, as quoted by Mr. Locke, p. 149. who adopts his Sentiment in confirmation of his own, feems in his younger Days to have been in the fame way of thinking. I fhall give it you in Mr.Locke's own Words, in his Answer to the Bishop of Worcester. You ask (fays he) how can my Idea of Liberty agree with the Idea that Bodies can operate only by Motion and Impulse? Anfw. By the Omnipotency of God, who can make all things agree that involve not a Contradiction. He goes on, 'Tis true, I fay, that Bodies operate by Impulse, and nothing else, and fo I thought when I writ it, and yet can conceive no other way of their Operation; but I am fince convinced by the judicious Mr. Newton's incomparable Book, that 'tis too bold a Prefumption to limit God's Power in this point by my narrow Conceptions. The Gravitation of Matter towards Matter by ways inconceivable to me, is not only a Demonftration that God can, if he pleafes, put into Bodies Pawers and Ways of Operation,

above what can be derived from our Idea of Body, or can be explained by what we know of Matter, but also an unquestionable and everywhere visible Inftance that he has done fo. Now with all due Submiffion to the Judgment of both these excellent Writers, I cannot help thinking this to be a very crude and uricorrect manner of expreffing a very unphilofophical Thought. That God can, if he pleases, put into Bodies, Powers and Ways of Operation, above what can be derived from our Idea of Body; That God can either immediately by his own Power, or mediately by the Operation of inferiour Intelligences,communicate what kind or degree of Motion he pleafes to any part or portion of Matter; that he can exalt, refine, tranfmute, and model it into what Form or Shape he pleafes; that he can make even the vileft part of Matter a proper Vehicle, Habitation, or Body for the maft glorious Angel, who can deny? But what then? What will this prove? Will this juftify our confounding two diftinct Ideas? Muft we confound Matter with Motion, Body with Soul, because we find them exifting or united together? Does not the very Expreffion of putting Powers and Ways of Operation into Bodies, imply that thofe Powers are diftinct from Bodies, fomething fuperadded to them by the omnipotent Power of God? Something not included in the Idea of Body, not effential to it; Why then must they be confounded together? When we read, Gen. ii. 7: That the E 2 Lord

Lord God formed Man of the Duft of the Ground, and breathed into his Noftrils the Breath of Life, and Man became a living Soul; Would it not be a ftrange Conclufion to infer from thence, that that very Duft of the Earth out of which his Body was formed, was that very Breath of Life which was breathed into him, by which he became a living Soul? Yet would there be quite as much Reafon and Truth in the one Conclufion as in the other. In the Cafe of Gravitation of Matter towards Matter, is it fuppofed to be an effential Quality inherent in the very Brute-Matter of which the feveral Orbs are compofed, or is it conceived to be a Power or Direction fuperadded to it, by an immediate Impreffion communicated from God? I affure you, Madam, there are Difficulties in either Suppofition not cafily furmounted. Would there be any Abfurdity in fuppofing, that as the whole Syftem is under the Protection, Direction, and Guidance of God's univerfal Providence, without which not the vileft Infect, no, nor even a Hair of our Heads, could fall to the ground; fo every particular Orb, every Branch of the Syftem might be under the Direction of fome fupefiour Intelligence, who might be confidered as the Angel, the Spirit, or Soul of that particular Orb, whofe whole Province might be the Guidance and Direction of its Motions. I am fure, is more agreeable to the Philofophy of Scripture, and the Sentiments of that Oracle from whom Sir Ifaac is fuppofed to

This,

have borrowed. his Principles, or at least fa much Light as to enable him to improve and compleat his System.

That Matter cannot move itself, that Rest or Resistance are its effential Qualities; that Motion, or the Power by which any Portion of Matter is moved, is diftinct from the Matter fo moved; that every kind or degree of Motion fuppofes a moving Power or Principle, which must be immaterial; that the Matter moved, and the Power moving, are intirely diftinct, are Principles fo plain and obvious as not to admit of a Debate, or a Ques tion. Every degree of Motion, therefore, impreffed upon Matter, neceffarily fuppofes an immaterial Principle by whom the Impreffion is made. And notwithstanding all this, to imagine, that Creatures endued with the Powers of fpontaneous Motion, Thinking, and Volition, as the Brutes are acknowledged to be, fhould have no fpiritual or immaterial Principle in them, fhould be nothing but meer Matter, is to me an inconceivable Point of Philofophy. Sure I am that Mr. Locke's first and coolest Thoughts before he was whetted by Oppofition, and warmed by Controversy, were different from what he afterwards advan÷ ced in the Course of his Difpute with the Bishop. He feems to express himself very clearly upon this Point, page 159. Edit. 8vo. The primary Ideas (fays he) we have peculiar to Body as contradiftinguifh'd to Spirit, are the Cobefion of folid, and confequently feparable Parts,

very

and