In Regula ad Servos am Proud of my Goodness or Vertue, my. Goodness fuffers by my Pride, and is ever loft in my Vanity. For let me have never so many Vertues, 'tis all nothing, nay, I am ftill a bad Man if I am Proud of them. And what does it profit, as St. Auftin obferves, for a Man to Impoverish himself by giving to the Poor, if he is more Proud of his contempt of Riches, than he was of the poffeflion of them. Quid prodeft difpergere dando pauperibus, & pauperem fieri, cum anima mifera fuperbior efficitur, divitias contemnendo, quam fuerat poffidendo. And accordingly he fays again in the fame place, that Pride lies in wait to destroy our good works, fuperbia bonis operibus infidiatur ut pereant. 13. And thus having fhewn the Reafonableness of Humility by thefe Four Confiderations, it may now perhaps be expected, that I fhould alfo reprefent the unreasonableness of Pride. But befides what has been here Incidentally and Occafionally let fall concerning that matter, 'tis to be confidered, that the unreasonableness of Pride is fufficiently feen in the reasonableness of Humility, fince whatever is a Reafon for the one, is at the fame time an Argument against the other, as being the contrary Vice. I fhall therefore content my felf with having fhewn the reafonableness of Humility, to which all that ree remains as further neceffary, is feriously to confider what a great Obligation there lies upon us all, to apply our felves to the practice and exercife of a Vertue which appears to be every way fo highly reafonable, as alfo actually and effectually to fet about the practice of it. And may God Almighty dif pofe and affift us by his Grace for the doing of both. CHAP. CHA P. IV. Of the Excellency of Humility. SECT. I. The Excellency of Humility argued from the Reasonableness of it. Y the Excellency of a thing, we understand something more than the bare Goodness of it, though that be also included. 'Tis the Goodness of it in a very great degree, whereby it exceeds the common proportion of things that are faid to be Good. 'Tis the excefs of a thing is Goodnefs, not that whereby it exceeds any certain particular, (for fo a great many things. may exceed, and yet not be what we call excellent) but that whereby it exceeds the common Measure or Standard. Now fuch things there are in common Morality, which has its cardinal Vertues. Such there were in Mofes's Law which had the first and great Commandment, befides thofe more weighty things of the Law which our Saviour speaks of. And fuch there are alfo in Christianity, wherein though all be great and good, yet there there are things that are more excellent; and though the whole conftellation of its Vertues be Bright and Shining, yet one Star differs from another Star in Glory. And accordingly fays St. Paul, the greatest of these is Charity, 1 Cor. 13. 13. 2. Now that Humility is a very excellent Vertue in this fenfe, appears first from what has hitherto been Difcours'd concerning the great reasonableness of it. For that's the first thing that makes any Vertue to be excellent, and by that we measure its excellence. For as in matters of Speculation, we call that a good Conclufion which depends upon strong and demonftrative Principles or Premises, and which by the strength or light of them appears moft fit to be affented to by us; fo in matters of Practice or things to be done, (which are as fo many practical Conclufions) thofe things we may juftly esteem, and properly call excellent, for the doing of which there is a great deal of Reafon. For the more of that there is in the Premises, the ftronger is the Conclufion, or which is the fame in effect, the better is the Vertue. 3. 'Tis by the reason for which it is to be done, that one Vertue exceeds or outfhines another. For it must be either the Reason of the thing, or the Authority of the Lawgiver. As for the Authority of the LawK 3 giver, giver, that's equal on all fides; the leaft Vertue, or the leaft of God's Commands having as much of that as the greatest. That therefore which is not different can make no difference. And therefore if there be any, it must be from the reafon of the thing it felf. Which by the way proves Morality, or that Natural Intrinfic Goodnefs of fome Actions which is Antecedent to, and Independent on the Law of God. For instance, God fays that he will have Mercy and not Sacrifice which implies, that Mercy is the better of the two, or as St. Paul fpeaks of Charity, the more excellent way. But why the better? They were both Commanded, and by the fame Authority, and in that respect one was as good as the other. That therefore which was prefer'd must be prefer'd upon the account of its Natural and Intrinfic Goodness. And therefore there are fome Actions that are good in themselves, or that are Morally good, or else there was no reason why Mercy fhould be prefer'd before Sacrifice. Nor can they give any account of this matter, who refolve the goodness of Actions into the Will of God, and fo make it merely pofitive. For how ever in this way they might hope to render a Reason of their fimple Goodness, yet the comparative Goodnefs or Betternefs whereby one Action excells another, when they are |