eration towards him was still exercised, even after Tertullian had poured forth his invectives, must not be ascribed to the Montanism of Tertullian, which was afterward so much disliked at Rome. For at that time Montanism was so little disliked in that city, that, at least as Tertullian believed, nothing but the influence of Praxeas hindered its being approved and formally acknowledged.

Thus much may we admit respecting the historical connection of Praxeas with Theodotus. His doctrinal opinions, however, we can learn only from the attacks made upon him by • Tertullian. In representing these we may suppose that Tertullian takes as many liberties, as advocates for one side are wont to take in respect to their antagonist. Yet no one ought to conclude, that all is perverted which Tertullian alleges in order to put to shame the enemy of Montanism. Essentially the opinion of Praxeas appears to have been, that, in case one Idid not allow himself to detract from the divine nature of the Redeemer, nor deny nor abridge it, he could consistently maintain the unity of the Godhead, only by not separating the divine in the Redeemer from that of the Father, and by not representing it as subordinate, but by explaining it as one and the same. According to this view, we may regard the expression, duos unum volunt esse,* as an appropriate phrase of Praxeas and of his party. Yet one must be well on his guard, so as not to confound the expressions which Tertullian employs in describing the opinions of his antagonist, with the expressions of Praxeas himself. This applies to the first leading passage which is quoted as the sentiment of Praxeas;† for, as is elsewhere abundantly manifest, Praxeas did, in conformity no doubt with the usage of the New Testament, employ the term Son, not to designate the divine nature which dwelt in the Re

sentientes, abjecti sunt ab ecclesia catholica, this must be understood as only an expression of the later opinion that prevailed respecting the Praxeans.

* Tertull. adv. Praxeam, 5.

† Perversitas... quae se existimat meram veritatem possidere, deum unicum non alias putat credendum, quam si ipsum eundemque et Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum dicat ; adv. Prax. c. 2. ['Perverseness... which thinks itself to be in possession of simple truth, and supposes that God cannot be believed in as one God only, otherwise than by asserting Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to be one and the same.']

in its institutions. The extravagancies of double sense, allegories, and types, surely constitute no sufficient reason for the rejection or the concealment of a plain matter of fact. The best rule which I have seen for the interpretation of types is the following, selected from bishop Marsh's Theological Lectures. (Part III. pp. 113, 117.)

"To constitute one thing the type of another, as the term is generally understood in reference to Scripture, something more is wanted than mere resemblance. The former must not only resemble the latter, but must have been designed to resemble the latter. It must have been so designed in its original institution. It must have been designed as something preparatory to the latter; the type as well as the antitype must have been preordained and they must have been preordained as constituent parts of the same general sphere of divine providence. It is this previous design, and this preordained connection which constitute the relation of type and antitype. Where these qualities fail, where the previous design, and preordained connection are wanting, the relation between the two things, however similar in themselves, is not the relation of type and antitype."

"For example-cardinal Bellarmine supposes that the protestant secession under Luther was typified by the secession of the ten tribes under Jeroboam. While the Lutherans with equal reason retorted that Jeroboam was a type of the pope, and that the secession of Israel from Judah typified not the secession of the protestants under Luther, but the secession of the church of Rome from primitive Christianity. But to whichever of the two events the secession under Jeroboam may be supposed the most similar, (if similarity exist there at all beyond the mere act of secession,) we have no authority for pronouncing it a type of either. We have no proof of previous design, and preordained connection, between the subjects of comparison; we have no proof that the secession under Jeroboam was designed to prefigure any secession whatever."

The Old and New Testament both abound with historical illustrations which are often confounded with typical representation to the great hindrance of a right understanding of the Bible. To give a few examples:

1. Particular facts illustrate general principles-Deut. 25: 4. comp. 1 Cor. 9: 9, 10. Ps. xcv. comp. Heb. 3: 7-19. In way the whole Israelitish history may illustrate individual christian experience.

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2. Events illustrate events-Judges 7: 22. comp. Is. 9: 4. Num. 21: 9. comp. John 3: 14. Exod. xiv. comp. Is. 43: 16, 17.

3. Like circumstances are expressed in the same language. Is. 29: 13. comp. Matt. 15: 8. Jer. 31: 15. comp. Matt 2: 18. These and others of the same kind are neither types nor allegories, but simply historical illustrations, like that of Luther when he exclaimed to his despairing followers: "What! because you are embarked in the same ship with Christ, do you expect a fair wind and a smooth sea all the way? Nay, rather look out for storms and jeopardy, and that too while your master is asleep!" In all these cases the language is plainly to be interpreted by the common laws of language and the things only are typified or illustrated. There is in fact therefore, no case whatever in which the language of the Bible is not to be understood just like the language of all other books. It is the thoughts of the scriptures and not the words, that are impor

tant.

As regards types and allegories, we know of none except those which are explained as such by the Bible itself. All the rest are merely conjectural, and though often ingenious, are often worse than idle, leading the mind away from the truth, perverting it by false principles of interpretation and making it the mere sport of every wild fancy. Any one who wishes to see to what a pitch of extravagance this thing can be carried, will do well to consult "Swedenborg's true Christian Religion," particularly pp. 168, 172, 202, of the Boston edition. Many of the interpretations there remind us of the old commentator who thought that the lily-work around the bellies of the pillars in the temple (1 Kings 7: 22.) signified that if ministers would do their duty and be pillars in the church, the Lord would take care of their bellies.

I have thus endeavored to illustrate some of the more important principles which should guide us in the popular exposition of Scripture, and will conclude by remarking that if the ministers of Christ will diligently, perseveringly and honestly pursue this work, the time cannot be very distant when the dissensions of the Church shall cease, "the watchmen see eye to eye," and all who really love the kingdom of Christ will be diligently laboring to extend its boundaries to the uttermost parts of the earth. "The Lord hasten it in his time."Amen.

ARTICLE IV.

ON THE ADAPTATION OF CHRISTIANITY TO THE MORAL NATURE OF MAN.

By M. Hopkins, Prof. of Moral Phil. and Rhet. in Williams College.

CHRISTIANITY is a scheme which implies that supernatural aid is necessary for the renovation and spiritual perfection of man. Those who receive the doctrine of human depravity, recognize the necessity of such aid, and regard the fact that it is provided as evidence of a just knowledge of the wants of man, and of the divine wisdom by which Christianity is adapted to accomplish the glorious purposes which it proposes; while those who do not receive this fundamental doctrine on which the necessity of the gospel is based, see in its offer only a ground for rejecting the system. But, supposing such aid to be given, it is evident that the mode of its operation and the manner in which its workings harmonize with those of the spirit of man without contravening the laws of free agency, must be obscure, and, perhaps, beyond the reach of the human faculties. "The wind bloweth where it listeth." While, therefore, we believe that supernatural aid is offered, and that this fact is an evidence of the divinity of the gospel, we cannot adduce in favor of the gospel any argument that will be generally impressive, from the wisdom with which this aid is adapted, in the manner of its operation, to the faculties of man, and the mode of his agency. On this subject we fear that writers of the present day, in the ardor of controversy, and in the pride of metaphysical acumen, too often subject themselves to the rebuke, "Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge.

But between the mind of man and the gospel itself, its doctrines and its precepts, we can trace the relations, and discover the harmony. Here we stand on firm ground. We are familiar with the argument by which the course of nature is shown to be of God, and standing on this ground, our argument for the divine origin of Christianity is analogous to that, and it stops in the latter case precisely where we are compelled to stop in the former. In the organization of nature we see a wonderful adjustment of parts, but we feel the necessity of some power which

is above nature to operate in conformity with its laws, or perhaps we should rather say, to constitute by its operations those laws in conformity with which the whole is moved. Of the mode in which this power operates we are profoundly ignorant, and it is only in the adjustment of parts the relations of which we do understand, that we discover a skill which stamps upon the works which he has made, the signature of God.

Man has a determinate intellectual and moral constitution, and the relations of the gospel to these may be philosophically examined. On this ground we discuss the different theories of education; and could a mode be discovered which would, if followed, infallibly produce the highest intellectual culture, we should need no better evidence of the profound wisdom of him who projected it, and the theory of education would be complete. From our knowledge of the intellectual constitution we should be able to judge of the general tendencies and effects of such a system. So in our moral constitution, if a system is proposed the object of which is to bring that to the highest state of culture and perfection, we can judge beforehand of its adaptation to that purpose. We can see the adjustment and correspondency of parts, and tell how it would work if faithfully followed out. We believe the gospel to be such a system, and in examining it with reference to the moral condition of man, to which it must have a natural adaptation if it be from God, we think we can discover unequivocal traces of his hand who has made all things in nature by weight and measure. It is from a feeling of this adaptation, from a sense that it just meets the wants of man, rather than from an examination of external evidences, that the gospel is received by the most of those who embrace it, and by which, though they do not speculate on the subject, they obtain a conviction of its genuineness which nothing can shake.-They have the witness in themselves.

This subject has been dwelt upon by some master minds, and we would particularly acknowledge our obligations to Erskine for some valuable suggestions respecting it; but still we think it has not received the attention which it deserves. It may not be the best adapted to impress the vicious or the confirmed infidel; but for the conviction of him whose moral susceptibilities are still unimpaired by vice or the wilful perversion of evidence, for the confirmation of the wavering, for the revelation to the less thoughtful Christian of the hidden springs of his own peace and exceeding joyfulness, it would seem to be admirably fitted.