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attempted-there might have been now as much of the appearance of 'uniform belief, as there was in Christendom during the darkest of the dark ages. But what is any mere creed worth, as a test of moral and religious character, which is merely hereditary, and remains undisturbed, not in consequence of conviction subsequent to examination, but simply from ignorant and indolent, or perhaps compulsory acquiescence ? That Christianity should have survived all controversies, is an incomparably greater test of its essential truth, than the dead calm of a whole millenium, such as causes of the kind just mentioned might produce. We confess that we are not among the number of those who anticipate any ultimate evil consequences from an increased attention to speculative philosophy among us, or from new attempts to apply its conclusions to the revision of our views of Christian belief. To attempt to repress such inquiries, we hold to be as idle as to forbid the wind to blow, or the tide to ebb and flow; but we do not apprehend the same results to our holy religion, which have, by a variety of conjunctures, attended free inquiry in matters of faith on the continent of Europe, more especially in Germany. We consider the English mind to be far less in danger, generally, of being carried away by talented speculation, than either the French or the German. The French intellect is characterised by great rapidity of conception. It begins to theorize almost before the facts of the case are laid before it. It has a singular power of analysis. Hence the temptation is to philosophize unduly by deduction. True to their great couniryman, Descartes, whom they think more of a philosopher than our Bacon, they better like the business of drawing effects from causes, than ascertaining causes from effects. Even in their mathematics, we may see the illustration of their characteristic tendency to development. They will, for instance, give endless deductions by way of applying an equation, while they neglect any other proof. In their speculative reasonings, they are especially apt to be misled by the predominant analytical tendency of their minds, because it causes them, often, to pursue one idea to excess, without sufficiently considering its bearing on and harmony with other ideas of equal importance. Hence they will sometimes pursue their favourite theory by a sort of steeple-chase road, not much concerning themselves at the impediments that may lie in their path. M. Cousin is a splendid type of this sort of mind; and he has achieved a brilliant reputation among his countrymen on this account. But, great as are his merits as an analyst of ideas, the very facility and smoothness with which he glides through all difficulties, is enough to make an Englishman pause ; for one striking idea is not enough to satisfy his calm and cautious love of truth. He is always stopping you in your easy
course, and asking with a modest scepticism-how you reconcile this and that? The Germans, again, are enormous theorizers. This is amply testified by their successive philosophical systems, of which one has always been in the ascendant, to the prejudice of the rest. Less analytical and accurate in detail than the French, the spirit of their speculations is equally deductive; and they have a vast passion for drawing out trains of abstract reasoning, undaunted by what, even to French Eclectics, as well as English Lockiaus or Reideans, would seem to involve most startling and extravagant, or even absurd results. With a love of science and philosophy (apart from any advantages that are to be got by them) probably greater than is found among any other people, the Germans do not appear much concerned about maintaining the dignity of consistency with themselves. It would not be very difficult to decide who would feel the most repugnance at coming down to his class every twelvemonth with a new theory, subversive of his old ones, an English or a German Professor. Nor is this to be put down merely to a readiness to follow truth, lead where it may. It is very much due to a sort of adventurous lore of theory, and a want of that jealous caution which an Englishman is wont to feel at publicly committing himself to an opinion. To say nothing of our orthodoxy, we are too soberminded, as a nation, to forsake our Theism, founded on the doctrine of causation and design, for either a material or an ideal Pantheism. We do not expect ever to see in this country a school of those who shall rejoice in the name of Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel. A few boys in their teens, who have been partly educated in Germany, may come back with their heads full of idealism-perhaps with some Pantheistic notions, or some modifications of the right,' 'left," or "centre ;' but it would surprise us much to find honest Englishmen of character and education, in any numbers, seriously avowing themselves Pantheists from conviction, Even Mr. Owen, with all the advantage of flattering his followers by the most alluring prospects of physical prosperity as the infallible result of his Socialism, has wholly failed in his attempt to found a species of Pantheism,-if his very contradictory and unintelligible homilies on the theological idea, deserve to be called any ism at all: though if any theory is expressed by them, it is that which denies a personal God. What half-dozen Englishmen, in their sober senses, would be found gravely maintaining, with Fichte, in any feasible meaning of his words, that the ego is the creator of the ideal non-egom that is, of the supposed universe of things; or, with Schelling, that the Deity did not attain to personality till he became developed into the existing universe, and that this all-one was, in its primitive form, not properly to be called God; or, with
Hegel, that God is simply identical with the process of thought and reason in human consciousness, and has no other existence than in its perpetual development !
While we freely admit that speculation has run wild among our neighbours, we are far from joining the hue-and-cry against Germany and everything German, in which some have of late indulged, from sheer unacquaintance with the object of their alarm. They seem to have reasoned thus:-Some things from Germany are bad; therefore all are bad. To forswear, as many well-meaning persons are inclined to do, everything German, without discrimination, is about as reasonable as to 'forswear all history. We doubt not that the increased study of German literature in this country, and of English literature in Germany, will be mutually beneficial to the philosophy and the denominational theology of both countries; for it will bring to the test of a foreign tribunal, national or sectional systems and modes of thinking, which, at home, are like objects that are too near to the eye to be most advantageously examined.
Mr. Blakey is evidently a hearty believer in the truths of our holy religion ; and his concern for the interests of morality and Christianity always deserves our respect. In a prime matter of philosophy, however, we cannot speak of him as holding doctrine quite to our mind. His heterodoxy here is, truly, on a most vital point-no other than the entire nature and character of Logic. From the time of Aristotle, at least, logic has been presupposed in all the branches of science (ride Met. iv. 3); it has been considered as lying tacitly at their basis, if not formally and openly. The first great master of reasoning laid down, more than two thousand years ago, the principle that we either learn the general from the individual and particular, or the individual and particular from the general. The first mode of procedure is inductive reasoning; the latter deductive, as found in the ordinary syllogism. It is true, no doubt, that Aristotle's was not a mere formal logic, like that of Kant, and many since his time. It did not content itself with merely analyzing the forms and functions of thought; it extended itself to the real, and sought the exemplification of the forms of thought in the investigation of the varied modes of being to which these forms correspond. But in so doing, Aristotle departed from the true scope of logic, and diverged into another branch of philosophy, namely, metaphysics. The more modern views of logic have tended, with propriety, to limit it to the formal science; but both Aristotle and his remotest followers have agreed in regarding it as embracing within its range all the subjects on which we can reason, or, in other words, as applicable to them all ; it has always been the science of proof in general. Not so our author. He asserts that logic is confined, by its very nature, to the following subjects :-Mental Philosophy; Moral Philosophy; the Science of Politics, in its widest sense, including jurisprudence and the art of government; finally, Religion, both natural and revealed.' We consider this view of the subject to be decidedly erroneous, and, as far as we know, quite novel.' It would, we think, be easy to convince any intelligent and candid person, that when a man concludes that if he wishes to reach Birmingham from London in four hours he must go by rail—he performs an act of reasoning or of logic, similar to those acts by which, knowing the previous propositions of Euclid, he might be assured that the angle at the centre of a circle is double the angle at the circumference, both angles standing on the same arc. On the contrary, our author would entirely exclude mathematical evidence from the province of logic, which he evidently understands to be a peculiar mode of reasoning, limited, as he expresses it, to 'subjects connected with human nature, or related to human nature,' But we must refer our readers who wish to hear Mr. Blakey speak for himself on this point (regarding which his theory is, as appears to us, so strange) to his . Essay on Logic.'
Our author states that the history of philosophy, in all ages and nations, shows the uniform prevalence of the theory that mind and matter are two distinct and separate things : Here there is a solemn unity of universal assent, which no hardihood of assertion can deny, no captious sophistry gainsay.' We should be sorry to subject ourselves, with justice, to the charge of either hardihood or sophistry, in venturing to comment on this sweeping statement; but the paragraph in which it occurs, in the Introduction, will surely strike the student of the history of philosophy as obviously too unqualified. The earliest speculations of which we have any account among the Greeks respecting the nature of soul or mind, appear to have been materialistic, Thus, among the Ionic physical or psychological philosophers, Thales held that water or moisture was the first principle of all things. So Aristotle informs us (ü?wp civai tùy apxiv. Met. i. 3). It is doubtful, in the opinion of Hegel and others, whether Thales did not maintain even the generation of the gods from the same element. The conception of deity as intelligence, appears hardly as yet developed. According to Diogenes Laertius, Thales said that the deity is the oldest thing, and 'time the wisest. He also said that 'mind is the swiftest thing;' and Aristotle, the highest authority for the doctrines of his predecessors, says that Thales' seems to have considered the soul as something moving; since he said that the magnet has a soul, for it attracts iron. (τον λίθον ψυχήν έχειν, ότι τον σίδηρον κινεί. De Anima, i. 2). Anaximenes maintained that the stars were
divine, immortal, and unchangeable beings, made from air; and that the human soul was also air; (i yuxn querépa áno ovoa. Stobæus, i.) This psychological theory, if it was an advance from Thales, was still materialistic—it was not spiritual or immaterial. Diogenes of Apollonia, again, went no farther beyond Anaximenes than to endow the air-soul with intelligence in the tenet that the soul was air he agreed, as Aristotle testifies, with the preceding school. The Epicureans, again, regarded the soul as subtile air, composed of atoms or primitive corpuscles; while among the Stoics it was held to be flame or light.
And here it is worth while to remark that, although we would be far from intimating that no importance is to be attached to the question-whether mind or soul be a separate being from the body, and capable of a separate existence - that is (as we suppose the question to be commonly understood) is the soul immaterial?_we do not hesitate to repeat that a system of psychology, both metaphysical and experiential, may be constructed independently of this question. Indeed, if psychology is to be a human science at all, we would go further, and maintain that it may be conducted in a manner more strictly scientific, by waiving the decision of this question altogether. At all events, the ontological speculations to which this inquiry would lead, may well be regarded but as forming a remote chapter in the philosophy of mind; and as comprising one topic only, among many others, which, though quite admissible, are not necessary to a sound science or philosophy of the mind. For we hold the idea of this science—that is, of psychologyto have been fairly fulfilled, when we have constructed a science of phenomena. In so saying, it is evident that we are only calling for a procedure similar to that which prevails in the natural sciences, which discuss phenomena, and not essences.
The account of the opinions of the ancients would have been the better, if the authorities had been uniformly quoted. Not that this important ingredient in the rehearsal of these opinions has been neglected. The authorities, however, are generally thrown more or less together in the mass ; and sometimes those of the most importance are wanting. At other times, testimonies are not brought forward which might, at least, have properly admitted of introduction. Thus, under Anaximander, we have no reference to Diogenes Laertius, to Stobaus, or to Schleiermacher's dissertation on Anaximander's philosophy, before the Royal Academy of Sciences at Berlin. Under Anaximenes, neither Cicero De Naturâ Deorum,' and ' Quæst. Acad.') nor Stobæus is named, nor Dan. Groth, author of a dissertation, 'De Vita et Physiologia Anaximenis,' published at Jena in 1689. Diógenes