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cannot afford room for the passage entire, which occurs in the Prolegomena.* Kant says, that Hume's remarks on causation in which he reduced cause and effect to a mere imaginary eonnexion, formed in the mind by association--did not by any means satisfy him, though he admitted that reason cannot discover-why, because something is, something else must necessarily be: in this he agreed that Hume triumphed over some of his opponents. Here, then, was one instance in which the mind is compelled, some how or other, to think necessary and universal, what cannot be proved so: e.g.—the position, that every change must have a cause. Now Kant complained of Hume that, acutely as he had introduced to the notice of philosophers this problem, which so obviously presents itself in the phenomena of naturehe had failed to state it in all its generality; as there were other conceptions besides that of causation, and other relations besides that of cause and effect, which stood precisely in the same predicament with regard to the human reason. Kant himself undertakes to inquire into these other conceptions and relations -nay, he professes, in the categories, to give a perfect enumeration of them, in general, as Hume had not done; and instead of resolving them, as he thought Hume's principles erroneously tended to do, into association or habit, he refers them to the subjective constitution of the human mind itself. This whole inquiry he designates by the question - how is knowledge from pure reason possible.' + We do not apprehend that in setting forth this view, he had any particular or immediate reference to the question of liberty and necessity,' as our author supposes. It is very true that in an advanced part of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, and also in the Prolegomena', he discourses on liberty and necessity, under the antinomies of reason ;' in which he endeavours to show that speculative reason can solve the question, without falling into contradictions in attempting so to do—and that practical reason (moral conviction) is also adequate to set at rest scepticism on the head of human freedom. The particular and immediate object of Kant in his statement respecting Hume was to show, we repeat, that Hume had only taken a very partial view of the problem, and had also given to it a wrong solution. The whole question respecting these truths, which present themselves to reason as necessary and universal, he regarded as solved by the principle that our subject is capable of synthetic judgments à priori.

Again, we believe that Kant has nowhere said that space and time are involved in all sensations, however minutely



analyzed." Kant distinguishes between anschauung, or the

cognizance we take of phenomena, objectively, and empfindung, or our subjective sensation. To the former, he attributes extensive; to the latter, intensive magnitude. The tooth-ache, from a slight hint to the torture which it would be well if metaphysics or any other study could banish, is what he would call an intensive magnitude—but these sensations, however minute or however great, and all others of a like kind, do not, in themselves considered, involve space, though they involve time. We regret, too, that we cannot say that the doctrine of the categories, or that of analytical and synthetical judgments, as given in this work, is made intelligible to the student who, for the first time, looks into the Kantian philosophy, it may be with a deep and almost awful sense of mystery on his mind. It is of little use to give a mere dry table, or an abstract statement of a few lines, without any illustrations and explanations, even on these fundamental elements of the critical philosophywe may add, too, elements that are certainly among the most intelligible in the whole system; nor need the examples have taken


much room. Our limits will not allow of our pursuing the author through the list of names which includes almost all that is really original in the metaphysical speculations of the Germans. These names are Kant, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Herbart. In a work of such extent, one volume might well have been devoted to the most original writers on German philosophy, which is so marvellous a phenomenon in the history of the human mind. All, however, that is devoted to the above celebrated names, does not amount, when summed up, to more than some seventy-five pages; of which about forty are distributed among the last five names, the rest being given to Kant. The consequence is, that the account of these writers, not excluding even Kant, will be found scanty, confused, and unsatisfactory to the student. This part of the work will not bear comparison with Morell's recent work on

Speculative Philosophy, the German portion of which is done with considerable spirit and fidelity; though it also much suffers by the want of space; for it is almost hopeless to make German philosophy intelligible, so far as it can be intelligible to English thinkers, without entering into considerable detail and well-constructed illustrations.

We have not space for Mr. Blakey's criticism of Cousin's
philosophical system; but we should not greatly differ from his
estimate. It appears to us, in one word, to be an' unsuccessful'
attempt to combine into one system heterogeneous elements
the ontological hypothesis of Hegel, with the cautious induc-
tions and the psychological observations of the Reidean school. It


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is no wonder that such an attempt should be repudiated as it has been by Germans; and that, on the other hand, it should be far enough from coalescing, naturally, with the spirit of the Scottish philosophy,

Cousin, however, will always be the historical head of the new Eclectic school. Never, perhaps, before, was a professor of philosophy so popular as Cousin was, at one time, in Paris. He, rivalled, at least, the most popular of preachers, in the audiences he drew to hear him lecture on a theme proverbially dry and abstract; but which he adorned with the greatest "felicity of language. Some two thousand students hung on his lips; and so intense was the curiosity, throughout France, to know what he said, that the political journals found it more profitable, for a season, to leave politics to swell and ferment, like the sea itself

, without any attempt to control them ; and rather to publish, at full length, the certainly very eloquent periods of the fortunate student, whom philosophy made a Peer of France; and who, for once, reversed the words of Petrarch:

• Povera e nuda vai filosofia;

Pochi compagni avrai per la tua via.' No instance of such popular devotion to such a subject could have taken place, probably, in any country but France; nor even there, but under the peculiar moral and educational struggles which have characterised academical education in that country. We quote for our readers a very short specimen of the kind of eloquence which brought together such large Parisian audiences. An improvement in the public taste would, at least, appear to have been effected since the Atheistic times of the great Revolution; though the language has a Pantheistic sense, which, bow, ever, it is but fair to say, M. Cousin himself repudiates. But what would any English audience have thought of the following passage

· The God of consciousness is not an abstract being, a solitary king, reigning beyond the bounds of creation, upon a desert throne of eternal silence, and passing an absolute existence amidst surrounding nothingness. He is a God at once true and real, at once substance and cause; always substance and always! cause, and cause only as a substance; that is to say, being absolute cause, one and many, time and eternity, space and number, essence and life, individuality and totality; in fine, at once God, Nature, and Humanity. Indeed, if the Deity be not all, he is nothing; if he be absolutely indivisible in himself

, he must be inaccessible, and consequently incomprehensible.'*

* Fragments, I. 76.

The work is dedicated, by permission, to Prince Albert. It appears to have cost the author little less than twenty years of intermitted labour; and is, with becoming modesty, sent forth to the public. It contains an immense mass of information; and there is nothing comparable to it, for extent, to be found in our literature.

We cannot pronounce the work to be characterised by that high analytical power which marks many of our modern authors on psychology, both originally and as historians: witness Dr. Thomas Brown, and Cousin, for instance. Indeed, Mr. Blakey, unfortunately, as we think, for a metaphysician, appears repeatedly rather to depreciate the talent for acute analysis, than to cultivate it or to admire it. But, on the whole, the work is a valuable contribution to our literature; and perhaps it is more calculated to excite a taste for the subject among certain classes of readers, than one of profounder analysis and of a more rigidly scientific character. One strong recommendation of it we must not omit: it is evidently the work of one who is a cordial believer in Christianity, and who is always prominently on the side of piety, humanity, and the real advancement of mankind in every thing that is great and good.

ART. IV.-An Easter Offering. By Fredrika Bremer. Translated

from the Swedish, by Mary Howitt. London: Colburn. In this little volume Miss Bremer has combined one of her cheerful and humanizing stories, and a sketch of life in Denmark, where, shortly before her voyage to America, she made a considerable sojourn. It is principally for the sake of the latter article that we bring the volume under the notice of : our readers. The story, which occupies only about one-third of the volume, is of the simplest kind. It is intended to show the effect of an isolated place of abode on the human mind; and this effect is tested by the insensible, but melancholy change which has stolen over an attached and virtuous couple whose lot has been cast in such a spot.

Axel Örn, a young man appointed to a government post on the wild western coast of Sweden, has brought his young bride thither. She is from the city-young, gay, accustomed to society; yet amiable, affectionate, and imaginative. She is at first delighted with her wild and picturesque home, and the brilliant splendours of the lonely light-house on the cliffs near it, whence the story derives its name.

It was among the cliffs beside the sea. It was on the western coast of Sweden, among the sea-rocks of Bohuslän. I do not say exactly where it stood, because that is unnecessary. But it was a long way from the home of Ellina's childhood, and very unlike its beautiful dales. There were orchards and nightingales ; here, merely an archipelago of naked, grey cliffs, and around them that restless sea, that roaring Cattegat. Such, for the greater part, is the rocky shore of Bohuslän. Many people think scenery of this kind unpleasing, horrible, repulsive. "I love it; and it is to me more attractive, more agreeable, than scenery of real softness and verdure—than that of a cultivated and fertile character, which may be found everywhere.'-P. 13.

And so it at first delighted the young bride; and truly the place had its wild charms

• The wild sea-rocks of Bohuslän have their mysteries. They resemble those human characters which are outwardly hard and rough, but within them lie hidden valleys, lovely and fruitful. Make a closer acquaintance with the granite islands, and thou wilt scarcely find one amongst them which does not possess its grassy spots—its beautiful, flowery fields. These grey cliffs draw in the beams of the sun, and long retain their warmth within their granite breasts. They communicate them to the earth which lies at their feet, and within their embrace, and the organic life blooms luxuriantly thereupon. In wild abundance springs up the honeysuckle from every cleft of the rocks, and flings, with the shoots of the blackberry, its delicate blossoming arms around the mossy blocks of stone, converting them into beautiful monuments on the graves of the Vikings. Beds of irises and wild roses bloom beautifully in the bosom of the granite rocks; and up aloft, on the cool height of the hills, where only the wild goat and the sea-bird set their feet, small white and yellow flowers nod in the wind, above the breakers of the Cattegat, which foam at their feet. Upon the smallest of these cliffs the sheep find wholesome herbage, and thrive upon it; and upon the largest, in the midst of the granite fastnesses, may be seen an Eden, planted with *roses and lilies, where a son of Adam, with his Eve, live, separated from the world, silently and–happily. We will believe so. But things go on queerly in these quiet, secluded Edens. It did not go on very well in the oldest, that we know; and in those of later days, but very little better-as far, at least, as the human beings are concerned. Generally speaking, life upon a solitary island is not very beneficial. The uniformity in the surrounding circumstances; the monotony of the days, in which ever recur the same impressions, the same occupations; the want of employment, of active thought, and of living diversions ; cause the soul, as it were, to grow inward, and the feelings and the thoughts to collect themselves around certain circumscribed points, and to grow firmly to them. We see this in Iceland,

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