THE

ECLECTIC REVIEW.

NOVEMBER, 1850.

ART. I.-The History of the Romans under the Empire. By Charles Merivale, B.D. 8vo. Vols. I. and II. London: Longman & Co. 1850.

IN bestowing a second notice on this book, we deviate from our usual practice. We are moved to this, not so much by the merit of the work, as by the importance of the undertaking, the literary claims of the writer, and our own intense dissent from his principles, representations, and judgments. The two volumes before us profess to be but an introduction to a very ample subject, and we regard it as the duty of reviewers faithfully to confess their convictions, when a historian seems to them to violate truth and to propagate error.

In our former notice of the work, we purposely reserved all consideration of its real hero, Caius Julius Cæsar, of whom, in fact, the two volumes before us might almost be called the biography. Concerning the balance of good and evil done by this distinguished man, as in the case of every one who overturns existing institutions, plenty of theories will always exist, which cannot be proved, nor yet disproved; but for this very reason they should have no place in history. When speaking of masses of men, we are totally ignorant as to what might and could have been; therefore, we do not know between what alternatives we are called to choose. What else might have happened, if Cæsar had not run his career,-if, for instance, he had been slain by

Sulla, no human acuteness can tolerably guess. But we know very well, that his selfish ambition inflicted pangs of misery on millions of innocent bosoms, and destroyed for ever all germs of freedom in Rome. We insist on judging of men by their personal characters and direct aims, not by a theory concerning fate and might.

In all ancient history there is no man whose aims are so clearly marked and so undeniable, as those of Caius Cæsar. According to Mr. Merivale, indeed, he formed his schemes from an earlier age than we can admit; but at any rate from his ædileship in B.C. 65, to his death in 44, we see him for twenty-one years aiming directly to embroil the state, to insult the senate, and to raise himself above law. No one can prove that any good came from his course, which would not have better come without him; but we disclaim all attempts to reason pro or con on such topics. They are not to the purpose, unless any one alleges that Cæsar was moved to his course by philanthropy, or at least by some unselfish and abstract ideal, as by an admiration of monarchy. But, in fact, he had no idealism and no enthusiasm in him, but was essentially prosaic, materialistic, and utilitarian; an unbeliever in every thing spiritual and every thing unappreciable by the hard and worldly politician. He believed in gold and steel. He had no love for monarchy, except on the condition that he was himself to be monarch. He did not affect to think that the end of conquest was the welfare of the conquered, or that there was any better or higher end of Cæsar's battles, than that Cæsar might be great. He knew that Greece and Rome had owed all their greatness to their institutions, and that the despotism which ruined freedom in Greece had sunk her into weakness and degradation; yet he deliberately planned to inflict the same degradation on Rome, and deprive all his equals of that birthright, which he himself valued far above life, and which he knew to be equally dear to them all. He was fully aware, that the supremacy which he coveted could only be attained by slaughtering on the field of battle (if not by proscription) all Roman nobles who had spirit akin to his own; yet he did not shrink from his career on that account. So far was he from desiring good government (until he himself should be acknowledged as the sole and supreme governor), that he purposely aided the disorganizing violences, first of Catilina, next of Clodius; as we shall presently point out more distinctly. The great practical accomplishments of Cæsar, his talents in administration, his active thirst for knowledge, his amiable and engaging address, so far from being reasons for honouring, are precisely the grounds of abhorring his character and his course. Propped by these plausibilities, he counterfeited the part of a popular

man; declaimed against the oligarchs,' talked about freedom, and the rights of citizens, and rose by false pretences. He was no man of impulse and violence, like Catilina, or Clodius, or Antonius, but like Hannibal, was the most cool-headed man of his day, and even in his debauchery and lawlessness, never forgot to calculate how far he could safely indulge himself. His successes are notoriously due to the steadiness of his schemes, and the abnegation of all scruples concerning means and tools. If any character in political history deserves to be cursed, it is the treacherous demagogue, who fights a false battle for freedom, and by this hypocrisy throws suspicion on all true professions of public spirit. Such most eminently was Caius Cæsar.

When he entered public life he found Rome recovering from the dreadful feud of Sulla and Marius, and might have given valuable aid to heal its wounds. Catulus, the chief of the senate and of Sulla's aristocracy, was a mild, blameless, and universally respected man. Pompeius, by far the greatest of Sulla's generals, was popular in temperament, the darling of the soldiers and of the people; and while commanding the high respect of the aristocracy, nevertheless endeavoured to raise the depressed faction. Cæsar's three uncles, Caius, Marcus, and Lucius Cotta, had all belonged to Sulla's party; yet two of them at least were now inclining to the Marians, and they were all eminently moderate men. Crassus, the richest of the Romans, had more influence in the senate than any man but Catulus; but Crassus was not wedded to any exclusive aristocracy. He was the head of the monied interest, that is, of the knights, who had originally been the nucleus of the Marians. Nothing but the slaughter of his kinsmen had attached Crassus so intimately to Sulla; and now that an extravagant vengeance had more than quelled all harsh remembrances, Crassus was the natural leader of the middle classes. Young Cato, as quæstor, presently took the bold step of forcing Sulla's ruffians to refund monies paid to them for assassinations, and his proceeding was greatly praised. Cicero, already recognised as the ablest orator in Rome, was rising on the popular wave, yet was cautious and aristocratic in temperament, and was likely to be as efficient a helper in all moderate reforms and healing measures, as he would be averse to all violent ones. The Luculli and Hortensius, the Octavii, and Metellus Pius, the head of the Metelli, were all moderate and mild tempered men. In short, the old partisans of Sulla had split into two parts. Those who were honourable, humane, or respectable in character, alone retained any great public power; and so many of these were moving towards the Marians, that a recall of the exiles was to be hoped ere long; in fact, L. Cinna (a most offensive name) and the partisans of Sertorius, were soon

restored.* The fierce and unprincipled part of the Sullans found no place for themselves in the state, longed for new revolution, and already looked to Catilina as their leader. Such was the state of things at Rome when Cæsar began to show himself as an active politician. If he had desired the welfare of his country, no high genius was needed to tell him that he ought to join the party of pacification and progress. This he apparently did for a few years, so far as to derive credit with the people as Pompeius's supporter, and some aid from Pompeius himself; but as soon as this great man was withdrawn by the Mithridatic war, Cæsar during his ædileship flamed out as an avowed Marian. But as Catilina was now the leader of the only real Sullans, Cæsar was no Marian while playing into their hands by his unprincipled attack on C. Rabirius.

What moral theory Mr. Merivale holds concerning Cæsar's conduct we cannot positively assert; but apparently it is,—that in the public life of Rome, all were such scoundrels that it is absurd to criticise Cæsar, who was far better than the rest in his political administration. On this last point he tries to concentrate attention. We cannot admit that there was any depravity in the ascendant nobles to compare to that of Cæsar; but if in this respect they had been equal, it would not palliate his treacherous turning of the public forces against the state, and subjecting to his own arbitrary will the life, estate, and honour, of his countrymen and his equals. It is absurd to point to the fierce outcries of the enraged aristocracy against the partisans of the usurper as in the slightest degree aiding to justify the usurpation. Cæsar, no doubt, is fond of pretending that he is not a usurper; indeed, his whole history of the civil war is an elaborate attempt to make out that he was always most anxious to observe the constitution and to maintain peace. We do not think Mr. Merivale is simpleton enough to believe him, yet he often falls into language which is absurd from one who does not believe him, as if the whole controversy were between Cæsar and Pompeius, not between Cæsar and the constitution. If the senate and Pompeius take an unusual step in order to uphold Law and the State, this cannot justify Cæsar in some parallel step in order to overthrow Law and the State. Because Pompeius is to be at the head of a great army to defend the senate, may therefore Cæsar march into Italy to attack the senate? Such is

Perhaps this was a general act, concerning all the polititical exiles. It is stated in Suetonius (Cæsar, 5), but the words are obscure: L. Cinnæ... reditum in civitatem rogatione Plotia confecit.' The connexion implies that this rogatio Plotia was a tribunician law, carried perhaps B.C. 69; but we do not find any notice of it in books of reference. The exiles thus restored were forbidden to hold office; a very mild restriction.

Cæsar's logic, and such, as far as we can make out, is Mr. Merivale's. He again and again makes the extravagant assumption, that Cæsar was the bona fide leader of the popular party,'' the middle classes,' and credulously receives Cæsar's own gratuitous assertions, that all Italy longed for his presence.

A few lines of quotation will show Mr. Merivale's sympathies. 'Cæsar watched the tide of events for many anxious years, and threw himself upon it at the moment when its current was most irresistible. Favoured on numerous occasions by the most brilliant good fortune, he never lost the opportunities which were thus placed within his grasp. He neither indulged himself in sloth like Lucullus, nor wavered like Pompeius, nor shifted like Cicero, nor, like Cato, wrapped himself in impracticable pride; but, equally capable of commanding men and of courting them, of yielding to events and of moulding them, he maintained his course firmly and fearlessly, without a single false step, till he attained the topmost summit of human power.' Vol. i. p. 105.

He foresaw that the genuine Roman race would be overwhelmed by the pressure of its alien subjects; but he conceived the magnificent idea, far beyond the ordinary comprehension of his time, of reducing the whole of this mighty mass, in its utmost confusion, to that obedience to the rule of a single chieftain, which it scorned to render to an exhausted nation. He felt, from the first, the proud conviction, that his was the genius which could fuse all its elements into a new universal people; and the more he learnt to appreciate his contemporaries, the more was he persuaded that none among them was similarly endowed. He aimed at destroying the moral ties, the principles or prejudices, by which the existing system of society was still imperfectly held together. But he did. so from no love of destruction or pride of power, but because he felt how obsolete and insecure they had become; and because he trusted in his own resources to create new ideas in harmony with his new institutions.'-Ib. p. 107.

We must solemnly protest against such admiration as revolutionary trash, worthy only of a Parisian Socialist. Some Caussidière or Ledru Rollin considers the moral ties of Louis Philippe's or of Louis Napoleon's government to be obsolete and insecure, and aims to destroy them, not through love of destruction, but from a trust in his own genius to create new ideas with new institutions!' And what was this magnificent idea which only Cæsar was large-hearted enough to conceive? It was to cast the state under the foot of a military chief, and of a soldiery attached to him by pay and plunder. As the various nations of the Persian or Parthian empire, so should those of Rome become a new universal people, all equally subject to the rule of the great king, all equally certain to suffer decay and ruin from the caprices and insults of power. Such had been hitherto the uniform history of all military despotisms; such