empire! These are the giddy dreams of the day. The martial spirit must have its employ. The people stand ready to hail to-morrow, with shouts and enthusiasm, a collision with the proudest and the mightiest empire upon earth. The valley of the Mississippi alone, will arm its half million, of stout woodsmen, hardy hunters, deadly rifles, for any field where the cause of liberty and glory shall call. Thus is it.

Have a care how we trifle with this tremendous power, or unduly excite it, and let us not cease to admire the foresight of that Spanish minister, the Count of Aranda, who said, in 1783, "the federal republic is a pigmy in its cradle; she has needed the support of two States, powerful like France and Spain, to obtain independence. The day will come when she will be a giant-a formidable colossus even in these parts. She will forget the services received from those countries, and will only think of her own aggrandizement."

These reflections, rather too much extended, perhaps, have been induced by the late attempt upon the island of Cuba, by a party of adventurers under our flag and embarking from our ports. We are willing, at the outset, to accord, to the leader of the expedition, the highest motives of patriotism and honor, and to the hundreds who flocked around his standard many generous, though, perhaps, misdirected impulses and sympathies, without questioning there were others, at the same time, moved by the most sordid considerations.

The signal failure of the enterprise and all the attendant circumstances of it, have been such as to provoke derision rather than admiration or respect; and the parties having themselves braved the ordeal, must be content with that obloquy which the want of success will ever inspire. The Abbe Raynal, long ago, laid down the principle with unerring precision: "I acknowledge that men accustomed to judge of things by the event, call great and perilous resolutions heroism or madness, according to the good or bad success which attends them." Accordingly, in every part of the Union, denunciation grows pregnant, despite the evidences that the cause of the Cuba invaders and patriots was a few weeks ago a highly popular one, receiving the sympathies of the multitude and attracting, in the highest quarters, the most favorable consideration.

The movers and instigators are brought before the tribunals of the country, for an infraction of its laws, and the statute of 1818 attempted to be enforced against them. Now, although it be true, as we think not improbable, that this offense does not come within the strict letter of the statute, however its spirit be clearly isolated, yet, why were the agents of the government so fast asleep, during the many weeks, when

it was notorious to the country that an armed expedition was in progress? Will it be maintained that the facilities of communication with Washington are less than with Cuba-the governor-general of which had timely notice of every movement, long even before the sailing of the expedition? Why not use the telegraph in arresting the parties, and preventing this great infraction, as it is alleged, of our neutral duties? The telegraph was not idle at another stage of the business.

It is difficult to distinguish this case, upon principle, from that of the Texan revolution, when men, and arms, and amunition were continually being thrown into that country, from our ports, notwithstanding the loud protests of Mexico, with whom we were at peace, and with whom we were bound by all the solemnities of treaty stipulations. The Cubans were not in arms-but revolution may begin long before a standard is erected or a sword drawn from its scabbard. Contributing money, conducting correspondence, are as much overt acts of rebellion or treason as open revolt, and do not distinguish the parties, in the eye of the law and government, from those that are actually in the field. Were the Cubans so far committed? The evidences are not wanting that they were, and that contributions of money and the warmest protestations of sympathy, and vows of hearty coöperation, did emanate from that quarter to encourage and cheer the movement. The rebutting circumstance is the cold reception which they gave to the men at Cardenas. We are bound, in our search after truth, to consider this of little weight. They must have been bold and hardy revolutionists, indeed-supposing that external aid was indispensable to their cause— to regard that which landed in the Creole as at all adequate to the exigence. A mere handful-where it it believed ten times the number had been expected—and a handful, too, whose movements had long before been known to the authorities of the island-who, with extraordinary vigilance, were thowing armies of disciplined soldiers upon every assailable point and scouring the Gulf with their fleets. The landing at Cardenas could only have been considered a piece of American Quixoticism, of which it seems we are capable when occasion requires.

It is not clear, at this moment, how far the interference of our government was in consonance with the letter and spirit of the treaty stipulations with Spain, or with the provisions of the act of 1818, intended to meet these cases. The instructions which were issued to the naval commanders dispatched in that quarter, have not been officially communicated, and no doubt are misrepresented. That the President may have interdicted the sailing of the expedition, is clear, and, in a high and liberal interpretation of our duties toward a friendly and weaker power, may have intercepted it afterward and prevented

a hostile landing, ought not, perhaps, to be questioned. Any other construction would evidence a sort of Carthagenian faith, and that paltering, in a double sense, which would be at war with all international comity. The power of the Executive should be coextensive with the evil intended to be remedied. Had the expedition landed, we may even go a step further, and admit that reinforcements from our country might have been cut off-but it is a high and delicate trust and likely to be abused. Here the duties of neutrality would have been religiously observed and accomplished, and any expression of sympathy or inçidental aid, even the slightest, extended toward the captain-general, in preventing or suppressing an intended revolt, or in making captives, would be a gross and arbitrary assumption of power, which could be tolerated in no administration a single hour. There are no proofs of anything like this against the federal authorities, and we are to presume they did their duty.

The United States and Spain have entered into three treaties, viz.: those of 1795, 1802 and 1819. By the first the parties mutually stipulate against their citizens taking commissions from any foreign prince or State, with whom the other party shall be at war, to privateer upon such other party. This treaty is in restriction of the international rights of the parties, which allowed neutrals to afford aid equally to belligerents. In this respect the stipulation must be construed strictly. In 1795, the European States were embroiled in wars seemingly interminable, and any treaties framed must have had direct reference to them. There were no wars upon our continent. The Spanish colonies had shown no sign of rebellion. Could these have been within the immediate contemplation of the treaty? It is clear they were not within its letter. The treaty cannot be applied to privateers in the service of the revolted colonists. These are not "States" and "princes." The terms imply organized sovereignties, and have a significance well defined and understood. It is too late to enter into their discussion. The Supreme Court, in the case of Gelston vs. Hoyt (3 Wheaton, 323), excludes their application to revolutionary governments not recognized by our own.

But if the late expedition against Cuba was not in violation of the treaty with Spain, are its projectors punishable under our own laws? There are various statutes providing for our neutral obligations. In 1790, some of the points were embraced. The act of 1794 included many particulars. It uses the words of the Spanish treaty, “foreign princes or States," in whose service only, expeditions against friendly powers are made unlawful. Foreigners, arriving in the country in armed ships, may enlist their own countrymen without violating the

act. Augmenting foreign ships of war in our ports, by adding additional guns, is prohibited. Armed expeditions from our ports are unlawful, and the President may use the land and naval forces to arrest, &c.

The act of 1794 was limited to two years, it being not thought necessary to extend it beyond the particular mischief experienced, especially as it was not likely to be a popular act, and tended tɔ increase, unduly, executive power. The European wars still existing, the act was, in 1797, prolonged for three years, and, in 1800, made perpetual so slowly did it grow into favor with the legislature. Another act, in 1797, prohibits citizens, in the service of others, from fitting out privateers abroad against friendly powers. Was this changed in 1817, and made less general? In 1817, the terms of the act of 1794 are enlarged by the introduction of "colony, district or people." The collector is authorized to seize vessels seeking an infraction, and hold them until he can communicate with the President of the United States, unless such vessels give bond they will not violate the laws. Therefore, under this act, as well as by the law of nations, the sailing of private armed vessels was not prohibited. We naturally ask why the statute adopted the enlarging terms "colony, district or people?" It is pretended they grew out of the decision in Gelston vs. Hoyt; but this decision was not made until the year after, though the subjectmatter had been under discussion in the State and Federal courts. Was it intended to include every possible case, and were the terms adopted adequate to that end? We are told, by Wheaton, page 476, the object was to reach the case of such unacknowledged States as the South American colonies of Spain, which had not been provided for in the original law. The British government adopted, the year after, in imitation of this statute, but evidently going much further, and to provide for similar cases, the words "colony or district assuming the powers of a government." Therefore, though the late Cuba expedition be considered within the intention of the statute, should the Supreme Court adhere to the principles of the Gelston decision, "colony, district or people" must be interpreted organized existences, having institutions and laws, though, as yet, unrecognized, and not mere individual factions or incoherent masses, and the men who fitted out the expedition and enlisted under the standard of Lopez, were not in the service of any of the parties within the statute. Strictness of interpretation, in penal matters, might very well go this length. The Engglish words "assuming the powers," &c., reach the whole case.

* See the cases under the act of 1794, in a note appended, by the editor, to the Statutes at Large of the United States, published, a few years ago, under the patronage of Congress.

Another question, under the act of 1718, is, whether, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, any person has begun, or set on foot, or provided the means for, any military expedition, or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against any foreign prince or State, colony, district, &c.? Legal ingenuity and subtilty may easily be exercised here. The military expedition, as such, was not begun in the United States, because no organization took place until the parties were beyond our jurisdiction; and it was not carried on from the United States, for a like reason. There is no law of Congress to prevent American citizens from emigrating to any foreign territory, and from there "setting on foot" an armed expedition, or privateering, against a nation with whom we are at peace-the statute of 1797 having been repealed by that of 1818, which last applies only to privateering against our own commerce. The Spanish treaty, referring only to "princes or States," cannot, under the rule of the Supreme Court, apply.

Again, it is not a violation of international comity for a neutral to export arms, ammunition and provisions, to the enemies of a belligerent friend, except so far as to subject them to confiscation by the neutral power. Their exportation is not forbid by our laws. Chief Justice Marshall admits that an American citizen may, according to the modern usage of nations, engage in foreign service without compromising the neutrality of his government.*

Upon the whole, we incline to the opinion, that neither the sixth section of the act of 1818, under which General Lopez is indicted, nor any other, will be found sufficient, supposing the facts established, to produce a conviction of the parties implicated; and it will be again incumbent upon Congress to provide for the new class of cases to which our complicated relations with neighboring powers are giving rise. It is ever for the interests of justice and sound government, though temporary mischief accrue, that penal statutes and laws, giving so much latitude to the executive branch of government, and of questioned constitutionality, to say the least, be interpreted with the utmost strict

ness.

That this, the second unsuccessful attempt upon Cuba within a few months, is but the beginning of the end which looks to the acquisition of that island, by the United States, can hardly be a subject of debate. American and Spanish blood has been shed, and the bitter feelings of consequence, engendered upon both sides, will long survive the occasion, indulging itself in petty acts of jealousy-in ill-concealed hostility—

* 1 Brock R., 486.