"particular conduct to be beneficial to ourselves,

66

or obferved that it would be fo, a fentiment " of approbation rifes up in our minds, which "fentiment afterwards accompanies the idea or " mention of the fame conduct, although the private advantage which firft excited it no longer exist."

And this continuance of the paffion, after the reafon of it has ceased, is nothing more, say they, than what happens in other cases; especially in the love of money, which is in no perfon fo eager, as it is oftentimes found to be in a rich old mifer, without family to provide for, or friend to oblige by it, and to whom confequently it is no longer (and he may be fenfible of it too) of any real use or value: yet is this man as much overjoyed with gain, and mortified by loffes, as he was the first day he opened his shop, and when his very subsistence depended upon his fuccefs in it.

By these means the cuftom of approving certain actions commenced; and when once fuch a custom hath got footing in the world, it is no difficult thing to explain how it is tranfmitted and continued; for then the greatest part of thofe who approve of virtue, approve of it from au thority, by imitation, and from a habit of ap

proving

proving fuch and fuch actions, inculcated in early youth, and receiving, as men grow up, continual acceffions of ftrength and vigour, from cenfure and encouragement, from the books they read, the converfations they hear, the current application of epithets, the general turn of language, and the various other caufes, by which it univerfally comes to pass, that a fociety of men, touched in the feeblest degree with the fame paffion, foon communicate to one another a great degree of it*. This is the cafe with most of us at present; and is the cause also, that the procefs of affociation, described in the last paragraph but one, is little now either perceived or wanted.

Amongst the caufes affigned for the continuance and diffufion of the fame moral fentiments

"From inftances of popular tumults, feditions, factions, "panics, and of all paffions, which are fhared with a multi"tude, we may learn the influence of fociety, in exciting "and fupporting any emotion; while the most ungovernable "diforders are raised, we find, by that means, from the 66 flightest and most frivolous occafions.-He must be more or "less than man, who kindles not in the common blaze, "What wonder then, that moral fentiments are found of

fuch influence in life, though fpringing from principles, "which may appear, at first fight, fomewhat small and de"licate!"

Hume's Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,

Sect. IX. p. 326.

amongst

amongst mankind, we have mentioned imitation. The efficacy of this principle is most obfervable in children; indeed, if there be any thing in them, which deferves the name of an instinct, it is their propensity to imitation. Now there is nothing which children imitate or apply more readily than expreffions of affection and averfion, of approbation, hatred, refentment, and the like; and when these paffions and expreffions are once connected, which they foon will be by the fame affociation which unites words with their ideas, the paffion will follow the expreffion, and attach upon the object to which the child has been accustomed to apply the epithet. In a word, when almost every thing elfe is learned by imitation, can we wonder to find the fame cause concerned in the generation of our moral fentiments?

Another confiderable objection to the fyftem, of moral instincts is this, that there are no maxims in the science, which can well be deemed innate, as none perhaps can be affigned, which are abfolutely and univerfally true; in other, words, which do not bend to circumflances. Veracity, which feems, if any be, a natural duty, is excufed in many cafes towards an enemy, a, thief, or a madman. The obligation of promifes, which is a firft principle in morality, de

pends

pends upon the circumstances under which they were made: they may have been unlawful, or become fo fince, or inconfiftent with former promifes, or erroneous, or extorted; under all which cases, inftances may be fuggested, where the obligation to perform the promise would be very dubious, and fo of moft other general rules, when they come to be actually applied.

An argument has been also proposed on the fame fide of the queftion of this kind. Toge ther with the instinct, there must have been implanted, it is faid, a clear and pre cife idea of the object upon which it was to attach. The instinct and the idea of the object are infeparable even in imagination, and as neceffarily accompany each other as any correlative ideas whatever: that is, in plainer terms, if we be prompted by nature to the approbation of particular actions, we must have received alfo from nature a diftinct conception of the action we are thus prompted to approve; which we certainly have not received.

But as this argument bears alike against all instincts, and against their existence in brutes as well as in men, it will hardly, I fuppofe, produce conviction, though it may be difficult to find an answer to it.

VOL. I.

C

Upon

Upon the whole, it seems to me, either that there exift no fuch inftincts as compofe what is called the moral fenfe, or that they are not now to be distinguished from prejudices and habits; on which account they cannot be depended upon in moral reasoning: I mean that it is not a fafe way of arguing, to affume certain principles as fo many dictates, impulfes, and inftincts of nature, and then to draw conclufions from thefe principles, as to the rectitude or wrongness of actions, independent of the tendency of fuch actions, or of any other confideration whatever.

Ariftotle lays down, as a fundamental and felf-evident maxim, that nature intended barbarians to be flaves; and proceeds to deduce from this maxim a train of conclufions, calculated to juftify the policy which then prevailed. And I queftion whether the fame maxim be not ftill felf-evident to the company of merchants trading to the coaft of Africa.

Nothing is fo foon made as a maxim; and it appears from the example of Ariftotle, that authority and convenience, education, prejudice, and general practice, have no fmall fhare in the making of them; and that the laws of custom are very apt to be mistaken for the order of nature.

For