The Soul

admit of a

care of the

from harm

this Difpofition is faulty, or quite fails, the Operations of the Soul must be impeded, or entirely cease; nor can it poffibly be otherwise while the Soul and Body are of fuch a Nature as they really

are.

II. Since therefore it is no diminution of the and Body Divine Goodness to have affign'd fuch a Nature mutual to them, as was fhewn before; we must also adSympathy: mit of a mutual Sympathy between them. Now, hence it is if they mutually affect each other, the confequence the first will be that it is the principal business of the Soul Soul to to preferve the Body from harm. In order to keep the this, 'tis neceffary that the Soul fhould have a Body free perception of what is good for, or prejudicial to the Body; and this could not be more effectually procured, than by providing that those things which tend to its prefervation fhould communicate an agreeable fenfation to the Soul, and what is pernicious, a difagreeable one. For otherwise, the first thing we met with might destroy us, while we were unaware or regardless of it; nor fhould we be follicitous to avoid a River or a Precipice.

The fene of Pain 15

alio the

Death.

HIL 'Tis neceffary therefore that the Soul and neceffary Body fhould affect each other mutually, that the preferve Impairing or Diffolution of the Body fhould creIite, as ate uneafinefs, which, by its importunity, might dread of recall the Soul that was indifpofed or otherwise engaged, to take care of the whole; nor ought it to ceafe urging, till what was hurtful be removed: without this Importunity perhaps the strongest Animal would not laft even a Day. The Senfe then of Pain or Uneafiness produced in the Soul upon the Mutilation or Diffolution of the Body. is neceffary for the prefervation of Life in the prefent State of Things. It may be proved from the fame Principles, that the averfion to, or dread of Death, is not in vain, fince it cannot

even be conceived how a frail and mortal Body, toffed by continual Motions, and tumbled among other hard Bodies, fhould efcape Diffolution, if the Soul which moves that Body were not forewarn'd to avoid Death by the natural horror of its approach. (M.)

NOTES.

IV. Now

(M.) Here the Enemies of the Unity of God allege that they are fatisfy'd, that Matter must be moveable, that a Body compofed of folid and heavy Parts, as ours are, environ'd with other Bodies in continual Agitation and perpe... tually liable to their Shock, must be alfo fubject to be broken and diffolved, but then why fhould fuch Separation aud Dif folution cause uneafy Sentiments in us? 'Tis true, if a Man be benighted in a Wilderness and deprived of Light, he may fall into a Pit and break his Bones; if he fall asleep, the Wind may blow down a Tree on him and crush his Body, or cut off a Leg or an Arm; these are by the very Nature of Matter eafily feparable; but our Mifery doth not confift in lofing these, but in the Trouble and Concern we have for the Lofs of them. If the lofing them caufed no Pain or Vexation to us, we were as happy without as with them. Now they suppose that the Soul is united to the Body on what Terms God pleafes, and that he could as eafily have joined the Senfations of Pleafure, with thefe Impreffions on our Bodies, as that of Pain, and that an infinitely good God wou'd have done fo, if a contrary Power had not hindered him.

For ought I find the whole Difficulty concerning natural Evils is reduced to this Point, and methinks 'tis ftrange that any Strefs fhould be laid on it; which will appear if we confider, ift. that the Argument is drawn from a Matter concerning the Nature of which we have no Knowledge, I mean from the Union of the Soul and Body, and from the Manner in which the one affects and operates on the other. We can give no account how one Part of Matter acts on another, how they are united, or what it is that makes them stick together. Much lefs do we know how a Soul and Body are united to one another, or how it is poffible that there should. be a mutual Action and Re-action between them, and therefore to fay that this proceeds from an Arbritary Power, or that it might have been otherwife, is to affirm what Nobody either doth or can know. We fee the Action of one part of Mat

ter

Chap. IV. The rest of IV. Now the reft of the Paffions are Confethe Paffions are quences of Pain, Uneafinefs, and dread of Death; connected viz. Anger, Love, Hatred, &c. An Animal in with thefe, the prefent State of things, mutt therefore either

be obnoxious to thefe, or quickly perifh. For 'tis impoffible that the Soul fhould have a disagreeable Senfation, and not be angry at the Cause which produces it: and fo of the reft.

NOTES.

V. God

ter on another is neceflary, and arifes from the Nature of it: If it had been otherwife, it had not been Matter but fomething else, and he that would not have it so, would not have God to have created any Matter at all; which, as the Author fhews, had been to leffen God's Goodness, and to hinder him from doing a thing which was better done than let alone. And how doth the Objector know, but 'tis the Nature of Souls, and as neceffary to them to be affected thus with certain Motions of Matter, as for one Part of Matter to be moved by the Impulfe of another? If then our Souls did not receive thefe Impreffions from the Motions caufed in our Bodies by external force, they would not be human Souls, but fome other Creatures, of which fort, I fuppofe there were as many created as the Syftem wou'd allow, and therefore there muft either be wanting in the World this Species of Beings, or they must be fubject to fuch Impreffions. If therefore it be better for Men to be as they are, than not to be at all, God has chofen the better Part in giving them a Being, and acted according to his Infinite Goodness.

But 2dly, If all the uneafy Senfations caused in us by the Incurfions of external Bodies tend to our Preservation, and without them we could neither live nor enjoy ourselves for any time; then they do more good than hurt, and confeNow quently are, a Prefent, worthy God to beftow on us. this is demonstrated by the Author in his Book, and 'tis confefs'd that as things are now ordered, the Senfe of Pain is neceffary to oblige us to avoid many Perils.

But then again 'tis urg'd, that this doth not remove the Difficulty, because it is alledged by the Followers of Manes, that these Pains are from the evil Principle, and as the good caufes the Taste of Meat on the Tongue to please, so the Evil caufes the Fire to create Pain in us when it burns us.

adly, They allege that there was no Neceffity for these

fions could

ordering

that the

V. God could have avoided all this by ordering The Pafthat the Soul fhould not be affected by the Mo- not be ations of the Body; or at least, that every thing voided odone therein fhould be agreeable: But how dan- therwife, gerous this would be to Animals, any one may than by understand, who recollects how very fhort their Lives must be, if they died with the fame Plea- Soul fure that they eat or drink or propagate their should not Species. If upon tearing the Body the Soul had be affected either no Senfation at all, or a pleafant one, we Motions of fhould be no more aware of Death than of Sleep, the Body: nor would it be any greater injury to kill a Man By thefe than to fcratch him. And thus Mankind would means quickly fail. We must then either have been world be arm'd with thefe Paffions against Death, or foon very shorthave perish'd: But the Divine Goodness chofe liv'd. that Animals fhould be fubject to these, rather than the Earth fhould be entirely deftitute of Inhabitants.

with the

Animals

VI. Behold

NOTES.

Pains, because Adam was without them in Paradife. 3dly, We might have been fufficiently, obliged to avoid what could hurt us, if we had a perfect Knowledge of its approach, and had been warned to avoid the Danger, not by the Pain or Fear which we now feel, but by withdrawing of the Senfe of Pleasure on the Approach of what might hurt or destroy us. Laftly, that these Warnings are often in vain.

To give this Argument its full Confideration, I will examine it by Parts. And firft, as to what is alleged that the prefent Senfations produced in us by external Motions on the Organs of our Senfes are from God, and the Painful from the evil Principle. I defire it may be confider'd, ift. whether any Motion caufes Pain in us that doth not tend to our Destruction, and whether the Pain do not ferve as a Means to prevent it. And if the Preferving our Being be a greater Good to us than these Pains are a Mischief, then it is plain 'tis better we should have than want them. But 2dly, Pain feems to be nothing else but a Senfe that our Being is impairing, and if fo, it feems impoffible whilft we love Being and are

pleased

vine

these In

conveni

It is not VI. Behold now how Evils fpring from and contrary, to the Di- multiply upon each other, while infinite Goodness ftill urges the Deity to do the very beft. This Goodness moved him to give Existence to Creatures, which to permit cannot exist without Imperfections and Inequality. This excited him to create Matter, and to put it in Motion, which is neceffarily attended with Sefince they paration and Diffolution, Generation and Corrupcould not tion. This perfuaded him to couple Souls with Bodies, and to give them mutual Affections, whence proceeded Pain and Sorrow, Hatred and Fear, with the reft of the Paffions, yet all of them, as we have feen, are necessary.

ences,

be avoided

without

greater.

VII. For

NOTES.

pleafed with it, that we should perceive it to decay, and not be difpleafed with the Senfe of it, and the Senfe of a thing difpleafing to us is Pain. Either therefore in the present Cafe our Sense must be taken away or Pain feems unavoid able. For that a certain Motion caused in our Organs fhou'd please us, because it contributes to fupport our Being, and the contrary which tends to destroy us, should not displease us when we feel it, feems a Contradiction. God therefore in making us feel the Senfe of Pleasure by the First, has likewife made us of fuch a Nature, that we must either not feel the Second at all (i. e. the Motion that hurts us) or be uneafy at it and let any one judge which of thefe two is moft for the Advantage of Animals.

There needs not therefore, any ill Principle to introduce a Senfe of Pain at the Prefence of what tends to deftroy us, for giving us the Senfe of Pleasure at the Prefence of what fupports us of Neceffity infers the other.

And 'tis remarkable as the Author of the Book obferves, that when the Pain exceeds, the Pleasure of Being, the Senfe of both ceafe, that is when our Being ceafes to be a Benefit God takes it from us.

As to the 2d Objection, that these Pains on the Presence of deftructive Motions attacking us are unneceffary; be caufe Adam in Paradife was without them, I have already ac counted for it, and fhewed that it doth not appear that he was altogether without Pain or Paffion; and that he was on

ly