be given for that purpose. But Nicias conducted his design with so much prudence, expedition, and secrecy, that they had not time to do this. He sailed from Catana with all his fleet, without the enemy's having the least suspicion of his design. Being arrived at the port of Trogilus near Leontium, which is but a quarter of a league (six or seven furlongs) from Epipolæ, he put his land-forces on shore, after which he retired with his fleet to Thapsus, a small peninsula of Syracuse, the entrance to which he shut up with a staccado.

The land-forces marched with the utmost expedition to seize on Epipolæ, by the pass of Euryelus, before the enemy, who were in the plains of Anapis, at above a league's distance, had the least notice of their arrival. At the first news of this, the 700 soldiers, under the command of Diomilus, advanced forward in confusion, but were easily defeated, and 300 of them, with their leader, left dead in the field. The Athenians, after setting up a trophy, built a fort in Labdalon, on the summit of Epipola, in order to secure their baggage and most valuable effects in it, whenever they should be forced to fight, or work at the contravallation.

Soon after the inhabitants of Egesta sent the Athenians 300 horse, to which some of their Sicilian allies added 100 more; that with the 250 sent before by the Athenians, and who had furnished themselves with horses in Sicily, made a body of 650 horse.

The plan laid down by Nicias, in order for taking Syracuse, was, to surround all the city on the land-side with a strong contravallation, in order to cut off all communication with the place from without, in hopes, no doubt, that his fleet would afterwards enable him to prevent the Syracusans from receiving any succours or provisions by sea.

Having left a garrison in Labdalon, he came down from the hill, advanced towards the northern extremity of Tyche, and halting there, he employed the whole army in throwing up a line of contravallation, to shut up their city northward from Tyche as far as Trogilus, situated on the sea-side. This work was carried on with such a rapidity as terrified the Syracusans. They thought it absolutely neccessary to prevent the carrying on of this work, and accordingly made some sallies and attacks, but always with disadvantage, and even their cavalry was routed. The day after the action, the contravallation, northward, was continued by part of the army, during which the rest carried stones and other materials towards Trogilus, in order to finish it.

The besieged, by the advice of Hermocrates, thought it advisable not to venture a second battle with the Athenians; and only endeavoured to put a stop to their works, at least to render them useless, by running a line to cut that carried on by the Athenians. They imagined, that in case they should be suffered to complete their wall, it would be impossible for the Athenians to make any further progress in their work; or that, should they endeavour to prevent it, it would suffice for the Syracusans to oppose them with a part of their forces, after having shut up such avenues as were most accessible with strong palisades; and that the Athenians, on the contrawould be obliged to send for all their forces, and entirely abandon their works.

ry,

Accordingly they came out of their city, and working with inexpressible ardour, they began to raise a wall; and in order to carry it on with less molestation, they covered it with strong palisades, and flanked it with wooden towers, at proper distances, to defend it. The Athenians suffered the Syracusans to carry on their works undisturbed, because had they marched only part of their troops against them, they would have been too weak; and if they had brought them all, they then must have been obliged to discontinue their works, which they were resolved not to do. The work being completed, the Syracusans left a body of troops to defend the palisade, and guard the wall, and then returned into the city.

In the mean time the Athenians cut off the canals by which water was conveyed into the city; and observing the Syracu san soldiers, who had been left to guard the wall, very negligent in their duty, some returning at noon either into the city or their tents, and the rest not keeping a proper guard; they detached 300 chosen soldiers, and some light infantry, to attack this post; during which the rest of the army marched towards the city, to prevent any succours from coming out of it. Accordingly the 300 soldiers having forced the palisade, pursued those who guarded it as far as that part of the city wall which covered Temenos; where, pouring in indiscrimi nately with them, they were repulsed by the inhabitants with loss. The whole army afterwards demolished the wall, and pulled up the palisades of the intrenchment, and carried them off.

After this success, whereby the Athenians were masters of the northern parts, they began the very next day a still more important work, and which would quite finish their inclosure of the city, viz. to carry a wall from the hills of Epipolæ, westward, through the plain and the fens as far as the great

harbour. To prevent this, the besieged beginning the same kind of work as they had carried on on the other side, ran a trench, lined with palisades, from the city through the fens, to prevent the Athenians from carrying their contravallations as far as the sea. But the latter, after finishing the first part of the wall on the hills of Epipolæ, resolved to attack this new work. For this purpose, they ordered their fleet to sail from Thapsus to the great harbour of Syracuse, it having continued in that road hitherto; and the besieged had always the sea open to them, by which the besiegers were obliged to get their provisions from Thapsus by land. The Athenians came down therefore from Epipolæ into the plain before day-break; when throwing planks and beams in that part where the fen was only slimy and more firm than in other places, they im mediately carried the greatest part of the fosse lined with palisades, and then the rest, after having beaten the Syracusans, who gave way and retired; such as were on the right towards the city, and the rest towards the river. Three hundred chosen Athenians having attempted to cut off the pas sage of the latter, flew towards the bridge; but the enemy's cavalry, the greatest part of which were drawn up in battle, repulsed them; and afterwards charged the right wing of the Athenians, and put the first battalions into disorder. Lamachus perceiving this from the left wing, where he com manded, ran thither with the Argives and some archers; but having passed a trench, and being abandoned by his soldiers, he was killed with five or six who followed him. The enemy immediately passed the river, and seeing the rest of the army come up, they retired.

At the same time the right wing, which had returned towards the city, resumed courage from this success, and drew up in order of battle before the Athenians; after having de tached some troops to attack the fort on the hills of Epipola, which served as a magazine to the enemy, and was thought to be unguarded. They forced an intrenchment that covered the fort, but Nicias saved it, He was sick in this fort, and at that time in his bed, with only his domestics about him. Ani mated by the danger, and the presence of the enemy, he strug gles with his indisposition, rises up, and commands his servants to set fire immediately to all the timber lying between the in trenchment and the fort for the military engines, and to the engines themselves. This unexpected conflagration stopped the Syracusans, saved Nicias, the fort, and all the rich effects of the Athenians, who made haste to the relief of that ge neral. At the same time the fleet was seen sailing into the

great harbour, according to the orders given for that purpose. The Syracusans having perceived this from the hill, and fearing they should be attacked from behind, and overpowered by the land-forces, they retired, and returned to the city with all their forces; now no longer expecting, after having lost their fosse lined with palisades, that it would be possible for them to prevent the enemy from carrying on their contravallation as far as the sea.

In the mean time the Athenians, who had contented themselves with building a single wall on the hills of Epipolæ, and through such places as were craggy and of difficult access, being come down into the plain, began to build, at the foot of the hills, a double wall, intending to carry it as far as the sea, viz. a wall of contravallation against the besieged, and ano ther of circumvallation against those Syracusan troops which were out of the city, and such allies as might come to its aid.

From thenceforth Nicias, who now was sole general, conceived great hopes; for several cities of Sicily, which hitherto had not declared for either side, came and joined him ; and there arrived from all quarters vessels laden with provisions for his army, all parties being eager to go over to him, because he had acquired the superiority, and been exceedingly successful in all his undertakings. The Syracusans, seeing themselves blocked up both by sea and land, and losing all hopes of being able to defend their city any longer, already proposed an accommodation. Gylippus, who was coming from Lacedæmon to their assistance, having heard in his pas sage the extremity to which they were reduced, and looking upon the whole island as lost, sailed forward nevertheless; not in the view of defending Sicily, but only to preserve to the nations of Italy such cities as were subject to them in that island, if it were not too late, and if this could be done. For fame had declared in all places that the Athenians had already possessed themselves of the whole island;, and were headed by a general, whose wisdom and good fortun: rendered him invincible. Nicias himself, now, contrary to his natural disposition, confiding in his own strength, and elate from his success; persuaded also by the secret advices which were brought him daily from Syracuse, and the messengers who were sent to him, that the city would immediately capitulate; did not regard Gylippus's approach, and in consequence took no precautions to prevent his landing, especially when he heard that he brought but very few vessels; terming him a trifling pirate, not worthy in any manner his notice. But a general ought to be extremely careful not to abate his cares and vigi

lance upon account of success, because the least negligence may ruin every thing. Had Nicias sent the smallest detachment to oppose Gylippus's landing, he would have taken Sy. racuse, and the whole affair had been ended.,

SECTION XIII.

THE SYRACUSANS RESOLVE TO CAPITULATE, BUT GY. LIPPUS'S ARRIVAL CHANGES THE FACE OF AFFAIRS, &c.

NINETEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE fortifications of the Athenians were now almost com pleted*; and they had drawn a double wall, near half a league in length, along the plain and the fens towards the great port, and had almost reached it. There now remained, on the side towards Trogilus, only a small part of the wall to be finished. The Syracusans were therefore on the brink of ruin, and had no hopes left, as they were no longer able to defend them. selves, and did not expect any succours. For this reason they resolved to surrender. Accordingly a council was held to settle articles of capitulation, in order to present them to Nicias; and several were of opinion that it would be proper to capitulate soon, before the city should be entirely invested.

It was at that very instant, and at the most critical juncture, that an officer, Gongyles by name, arrived from Corinth on board a ship with three benches of oars. At his arrival, all the citizens flocked around him. He informed them, that Gylippus would be with them immediately, and was followed by a great many other galleys, which came to their aid. The Syracusans, astonished, or rather stupified, as it were, with this news, could scarce believe what they heard. Whilst they were thus fluctuating and in doubt, a courier arrived from Gy lippus to inform them. of his approach, and order them to march out all their troops to meet him. He himself, after having taken a fort (Jeges) in his way, marched in battle directly for Epipola; and ascending by Euryelus, as the Athe nians had done, he prepared to attack them from without, whilst the Syracusans should charge them, on their side, with the forces of Syracuse and his. The Athenians, exceedingly surprised by his arrival, drew up hastily, and without order, under the walls. With regard to himself, laying down his arms when he approached, he sent word by a herald, that he

* A. M. 359. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. I. vii. p. 485–489. Plut in Nic. p. 535, 536, Diod, I. xiii. p. 138, 139.