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ed by the event, resolved to declare against them. The allies of the Lacedæmonians believed that the time was come to deliver them for ever from the expences of a war which lay very heavy upon them, by the speedy and final ruin of Athens. Those of Athens, who followed them only out of constraint, seeing no appearance of any future resource for that republic, after the dreadful blow it had received, thought it best to take the advantage of so favourable a conjuncture for throwing off the yoke of dependence, and resuming their liberty. Dispositions of this kind inspired the Lacedæmonians with great views, which were supported by the hopes they had conceived, that their Sicilian allies would join them in the spring with a naval army, augmented by the ruins of the Athenian fleet.

*In effect, the people of Euboea, Chio, and Lesbos, with several others, gave the Lacedæmonians to understand that they were ready to quit the party of the Athenians, if they would take them under their protection. At the same time came deputies from Tissaphernes and Pharnabasus. The first was governor of Lydia and Ionia, the other of the Hellespont. These viceroys of Darius wanted neither appli cation nor zeal for the interest of their master. Tissaphernes, promising the Lacedæmonians all the necessary expen ces for their troops, pressed them to arm directly, and to join him; because the Athenian fleet prevented him from levying the usual contributions in his province, and had put it out of his power to remit those of preceding years to the king. He hoped besides with that powerful aid to get into his hands with more ease a certain nobleman who had revolted, and. whom he had the king's orders to send to him dead or alive. This was Armorges the bastard of Pissuthna. Pharnabasus at the same time demanded ships to reduce the cities of the Hellespont from their subjection to the Athenians, who also prevented him from levying the tributes of his govern-

ment.

The Lacedaemonians thought it proper to begin by satisfying Tissaphernes; and the credit of Alcibiades contributed very much to the taking that resolution. He embarked with Calcidæus for Chio, which took arms upon their arrival, and de-. clared for the Lacedæmonians. Upon the news of this revolt,, the Athenians resolved to take the † 1000 talents out of the treasury, which had been deposited there from the beginning of the war, after having repealed the decree which prohibited. it. Miletus also revolted soon after. Tissaphernes, having t3,000,000 livres.

Thucyd. 1. viii. p. 555-558.

ned his troops with those of Sparta, attacked and took the of Iasus, in which Armorges had shut himself up, who s taken alive and sent into Persia. That governor gave a enth's pay to the whole army, at a drachm or tenpence a y to each soldier, observing that he had orders to give them ly half that sum for the future.

+Calcidæus then made a treaty with Tissaphernes, in the me of the Lacedæmonians, of which one of the principal ticles was, that all the country which had been subject to e king or his predecessors should remain in his hands. It as renewed some time after by Theramenes, another general the Lacedæmonians, with some small alterations. But when is treaty came to be examined at Sparta, it was found that o great concessions had been made to the king of Persia, in iving up all the places held by himself or his ancestors, which as to make him master of the greatest part of Greece, Thessaly, Locris, and the whole country as far as Boeotia, ithout mentioning the islands; from whence the Lacedæmoians would appear rather to have enslaved Greece, than restablished its liberty. It was therefore necessary to make arther alterations in it, with which Tissaphernes and the other governors made great difficulties to comply. A new treaty was however concluded, as we shall see in the sequel.

In the mean time, several cities of Ionia declared for Lacedæmon, to which Alcibiades contributed very much. Agis, who was already his enemy in effect of the injury he had done him, could not suffer the glory he acquired; for nothing was done without the advice of Alcibiades, and it was generally said that the success of all enterprises was owing to him. The most powerful and ambitious of the Spartans, from the same sentiments of jealousy, looked upon him with an evil eye, and at length by their intrigues obliged the principal magistrates to send orders into Ionia for putting him to death. Alcibiades being secretly apprised of this order, did not discontinue his services to the Lacedæmonians, but kept himself so well upon; his guard that he avoided all the snares, which were laid for him.

For his better security he threw himself into the protection of Tissaphernes, the great king's governor at Sardis, and was not long without seeing himself in the highest degree of

* Thucyd. I. viii. p. 568. † Idem. p. 561-571, 572–576. › Ibid. p. 577-579. Plut. in Alcib. p. 164, 165.

A. M. 3593. Ant. J. C. 411.

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credit and authority in the court of the barbarians; for the Persian, who was full of fraud and artifice, a great friend to knaves and bad men, and set no value upon simplicity and integrity, infinitely admired the smooth address of Alcibiades, the ease with which he assumed all kinds of manners and characters, and his great ability in the conduct of affairs; and indeed there was no heart so hard, or temper so untractable, as to hold out against the graces and charms of his conversation and intimacy. Even those who feared and envied him most, enchanted in a manner by his affable air and engaging beha viour, could not dissemble the infinite satisfaction they felt in seeing and conversing with him. ́

Tissaphernes therefore, though otherwise very haughty and brutal, and who of all the Persians hated the Greeks most, was so much taken with the complacency and insinuation of Alcibiades, that he gave himself wholly up to him, and flattered him more than he was flattered by him; insomuch that he gave the name of Alcibiades to the finest and most delight. ful of his gardens, as well from the abundance of its fountains and canals, and the verdure of its groves, as the surprising beauty of its retreats and solitudes, which art and nature seemed to vie in embellishing, and wherein a more than royal magnificence was displayed.

Alcibiades, who found there was no longer any safety for him in the party of the Spartans, and who always apprehended the resentment of Agis, began to do them ill offices with Tissaphernes, to prevent his aiding them with all his forces, and ruining the Athenians entirely. He had no difficulty in bringing the Persian into his views, which were conformable to his master's interests, and to the orders he had received from him. For after the famous treaty concluded under Cimon, the kings of Persia, not daring to attack the Greeks with open force, took other measures to ruin them. They endeavoured underhand to excite divisions among them, and to foment troubles by considerable sums of money, which they found means to convey sometimes to Athens and sometimes to Sparta. They applied themselves so successfully to keep up a balance of power between these two republics, that the one could never entirely reduce the other. They granted them only slight aids, that could effect nothing decisive, in order to undermine them insensibly, and exhaust both parties gradually, by weakening them upon one another.

It is in this kind of conduct that policy makes the ability of ministers consist, who, from the recess of their cabinets,

without noise or emotion, without any great expences, or setting numerous armies on foot, effect the reduction of the tates whose power gives them umbrage, either by sowing donestic divisions among them, or by promoting the jealousy of their neighbours, in order to set them at variance with each other.

We must confess, however, that this kind of policy gives is no very favourable idea of the kings of Persia. To reduce themselves, powerful as they were, to such mean, obscure, and indirect measures, was to confess their weakness, and how unable they believed themselves to attack their enemies with open force, and to reduce them by honourable means. Besides, does it consist with justice to employ such methods in regard to people against whom there is no foundation of complaint, who live in peace under the faith of treaties, and whose sole crime is the apprehension of their being one day in a condition to do hurt? And is it lawful, by secret corrup tions, to ensnare the fidelity of subjects, and to be the accomplice of their treasons, by putting arms into their hands, against their native country?

What glory and renown would not the kings of Persia have acquired, if, content with the vast and rich dominions which providence had given them, they had applied their good of fices, power, and even treasures, to conciliate the neighbouring people with each other, to remove their jealousies, to prevent injustice and oppression; and if, feared and honoured by them all, they had made themselves the mediators of their differences, the security of their peace, and the guarantee of their treaties? Can any conquest, however great, be compared with such glory?

Tissaphernes acted upon other principles, and had no thought but of preventing the Greeks from being in a condition to attack the Persians, their common enemy. He entered freely therefore into the views of Alcibiades, and at the same time that he declared himself openly for the Lacedæmonians, did not fail to assist the Athenians underhand, and by a thousand secret methods; deferring the payment of the Lacedæmonian fleet, and retarding the arrival of the Phoenician ships, of which he had long kept them in hopes. He omitted no occasion of giving Alcibiades new marks of his friendship and esteem, which rendered that general equally considerable to both parties. The Athenians, who had sadly experienced the effects of having drawn his anger upon them, were not now to repent their passing sentence of condemnation upon

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him. Alcibiades also on his side, who was extremely sorry to see the Athenians in so mournful a situation, began to fear, that the city of Athens being entirely ruined, he might fall into the hands of the Spartans who murtally hated him.

SECTION II.

ALCIBIADES RETURNS TO ATHENS.

TISSAPHERNES CON

CLUDES A NEW TREATY WITH THE LACEDÆMONIANS.

THE Athenians were intent upon nothing so much as Samos*, where they had all their forces. From thence with their fleet they reduced all the cities that had abandoned them under their obedience, kept the rest in their duty†, and found themselves still in a condition to make head against their enemies over whom they had obtained several advantages. But they were afraid of Tissaphernes, and the 150 Phoenician ships which he hourly expected; and rightly perceived, that if so powerful a fleet should join the enemy, there was no longer any safety for their city. Alcibiades who was well informed of all that passed among the Athenians, sent secretly to the prin cipal of them at Samos, to sound their sentiments, and to let them know that he was not averse to returning to Athens, provided the administration of the republic were put into the hands of the great and powerful, and not left to the populace, who had expelled him. Some of the principal officers went from Samos, with design to concert with him the proper measures for the success of that undertaking. He promised to procure the Athenians not only the favour of Tissaphernes, but of the king himself upon condition they would abolish the democracy or popular government; because the king would place more confidence in the engagements of the nobility than upon those of the inconstant and capricious multitude.

The deputies lent a willing ear to these proposals, and con ceived great hopes of discharging themselves from part of the public impositions, because, being the richest of the people, the burthen lay heaviest upon them, and of making their coun try triumph after having possessed themselves of the govern ment. At their return, they began by bringing over such as were rost proper to share in their design; after which they caused a report to be spread amongst the troops that the king was inclined to declare in favour of the Athenians, upon conPlut. in Alcib. p. 204, 206.

Thucyd. 1. viii. p. 579-587.

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