The most important circumstances connected with the recent Ministerial crisis at Quebec having been, it is believed, impartially narrated, it may be proper to offer some brief remarks on what has been generally termed the Constitutional Question.' It will scarcely be denied that the very essence of our system of constitutional government is that there should be a cordial union between the monarchical element, whether represented by the Sovereign in person or by her representative, or, as in the case of the Canadian Provinces, by those entrusted with their government by such representative, and the respective ministers of the Crown, whether Imperial, Dominion, or Provincial. To insure such union there must be perfect confidence on both sides. It has been correctly observed by Mr. Todd, in his work on Parliamentary Government in England, that from the secrecy which properly enshrines the intercourse between the Crown and its advisers, it rarely happens that the opinions or conduct of the Sovereign in governmental matters become known to the public at large.' The theory, that it is the right and duty of the Sovereign to deliberate and determine upon every recommendation tendered for the royal sanction by the Ministers, cannot be disputed. The contention is that, with regard to bills submitted to Parliament, the practice is at variance with the theory, and there is no precise information as to what the practice really is. Lord Grey, in his essay on Parliamentary Government, defines the rule to be that the Ministers of the Crown should obtain its direct sanction for all their most important measures.' This definition is clearly too vague, as there might easily be a difference of opinion as to what is an important measure. The late Lord Derby in his place in Parliament stated that 'it is the duty of the Minister for the time being, on submitting any proposition for the assent of her Majesty, to give satisfactory reasons that such proposition is called for by public policy and justified by the public interests.' It can hardly be supposed that the Sovereign takes cognisance of every act of administration or of every bill introduced into Parliament. It seems probable that the Ministers of the Crown exercise their discretion on the subject, necessarily taking the risk of assuming that any bill the introduction of which they permit is one not likely to be objected to by the Sovereign.

In defending the course pursued by the Quebec Ministers of introducing the railway bill without the sanction of the LieutenantGovernor, Sir John A. Macdonald said :-The Queen, if she chooses, can send for the Minister and say, "I do not like that bill, and I would like to discuss it with you. I think you must modify it or hold it over." The Sovereign can thus interfere if he chooses, but practically he leaves all legislation to the country.' The possibility of the Sovereign having to take such a step with reference to a bill already introduced by the Ministers of the Crown would go far to prove the inconvenience of the practice. In England it has long been the

usage to notice all important measures which the Ministers intend to bring forward in the speech delivered at the opening of Parliament, so that, with regard to those measures, it is clear that the sanction of the Crown must have been obtained. A similar practice has prevailed in Canada with reference to measures submitted to the Dominion Parliament. It happened unfortunately that no reference was made to the railway bill or to the new taxes in the speech delivered at the opening of the Quebec Legislature, although these were the measures of the Session in which the public took the greatest interest. It is not unimportant, in considering the Quebec case, to bear in mind that it was admitted by Sir John Macdonald to be governed by English practice. No English minister would venture to introduce a bill, no matter how unimportant, if he knew, or had good reason to believe, that it contained provisions which would be disapproved by the Sovereign. The objection which the LieutenantGovernor entertained to the railway bill was one which he had occasion to urge many months previously in a case in which Executive action alone was required. It may be briefly stated, as an opinion, that the Executive should not assume the functions of the judicial tribunals. In the case of the municipal subscriptions to the railroads, the Lieutenant-Governor held a strong opinion that it was improper for the Legislature to constitute a political body like the Governor in council a tribunal to decide the question of the liability of the corporations, thus superseding the ordinary tribunals. He was, moreover, of opinion that his Ministers knew, or ought to have known, his views on this point. The bill having been introduced without his sanction, an opportunity occurred during its progress for discussing it with the Premier, who thus became aware of the strong objections entertained by the Lieutenant-Governor to some of its provisions. It was not amended so as to overcome those objections, although it might have been without impairing its efficiency.

any

Under the circumstances it was hardly possible for the LieutenantGovernor to avoid a rupture with his Ministers, but it has been contended by some that he ought to have endeavoured to form a new Ministry from the ranks of the majority. This he doubtless would have attempted, had M. de Boucherville indicated any one of sufficient influence to make the attempt. Failing to do so, there was hardly other course open but the one adopted, viz. the selection of the recognised leader of the Opposition. The adoption of the address in answer to the opening speech in the form in which it was finally agreed to will probably result in the continuance of the present Ministry in power for some time, although it is far from improbable that changes may be made, after the irritation on the constitutional question shall have subsided, that will insure for it a greater measure of legislative support.

It seems to be a fitting conclusion to this article to remark that,

after a Session of several weeks' duration, the Quebec Legislature has been prorogued, an amendment to the Supply Bill having been rejected by the casting vote of the Speaker a couple of days previously. On some of their measures the Ministry had majorities that may be deemed sufficient, but in the Legislative Council they were in a small minority. Before another meeting of the Legislature can take place the Dominion Parliament will have been dissolved, and the same constituencies will have been appealed to. Pending the result of that appeal, matters seem likely to remain in statu quo in Quebec.

F. HINCKS.

ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY AND EVOLUTION1

DISCIPLINE in philosophy is at once a great inheritance of academic life in Scotland, and a permanent necessity of the human intellect. We are here to pursue research within a province which has drawn towards it, with a singular magnetic spell, the devotion of successive generations. To solve the problems of philosophy, or to discover the limit of all possible solutions, has been the ambition of the Scottish student from medieval times. It has been said that in the North we all inherit the speculative craving, and that metaphysics are indigenous to our soil. This is but a slight exaggeration of the fact that philosophy has for centuries formed the centre of our academic discipline, and that we have clothed the venerable word with a meaning which gives it indisputable pre-eminence in the curriculum of liberal education.

It is a prevalent fashion, however, to describe the present age as predominantly scientific, to affirm that the intellectual interest of the hour has drifted away from speculation, and that the surmises of philosophy have been abandoned for the more sober teachings of experience. In this opinion I am unable to concur. Were it correct, I would characterise it rather as a temporary aberration of the human intellect, deserting the philosophia perennis' in behalf of an empiricism, which, in the sphere of half-truths, is as easily demonstrable, as it is commonplace and crude. But such an interpretation of the spirit of our age is altogether superficial. Far and wide throughout the republic of letters, in Britain, on the Continent, and in America, there are authentic signs of a general renaissance of philosophy. Within the present generation, and especially during the last ten years, those speculative problems, which form the themes of perennial debate in the metaphysical schools, have awakened an interest, prophetic of a new future for philosophy. There has been a remarkable quickening of the spirit of inquiry into all radical questions, and a far clearer understanding of their issues; while the general

The greater part of this essay was given as an inaugural lecture to the Moral Philosophy class in the University of St. Andrews, in November 1876.

mind may be said to be face to face with problems which in the last generation were confined to a few scholars, or recluse speculative

men.

I do not attempt to trace the causes, European or insular, which have led to this result. It is enough to note it as one of the characteristics of our age. Instead of philosophy being superseded, or submerged in science, there are indications of a notable reaction in its favour, and of its vigorous pursuit in unexpected quarters. The splendour and rapid march of the physical sciences, which threatened for a time to eclipse, if not to extinguish interest in, the older problems which lie behind them, has merely opened up fresh pathways converging as before on philosophy as the scientia scientiarum; and in the chief tendencies at work, at the great educational centres of the three kingdoms, every one may see the reawakening of speculative thought. The whole literary atmosphere is charged with philosophy. The leaders of physical research are dealing with metaphysical questions. The topics with which modern science is most engrossed are speculative ones. In the doctrines of evolution and transformation of energy we not only find the revival of old metaphysical theories under a new scientific dress; but, apart from philosophy, these questions are still, as formerly, incapable of solution. The recent literature of philosophy is also rich in treatises which are greatly in advance of the contributions of the previous age. Without naming any particular work or writer, I may further refer to such phenomena as these: The encounters between the most accomplished physicists and metaphysicians on ground common to both (the same problem being approached by the one from beneath, and by the other from above); the interest awakened in the problems of sociology; the light which has been cast by philosophic criticism on much that was deemed inexplicable in the records of the past; the remarkable development of the historical and comparative methods of research, as well as of those purely critical and analytic; the attention given to the great masters of ancient wisdom, especially to the leaders of the Greek schools; the opening up of fresh sources of information as to Indian and Oriental thought; the establishment of new journals and societies especially devoted to psychological, metaphysical, and ethical study; these are only a few of the signs of the working of the philosophic spirit, and the revival of speculation in our time. I may add that our higher poetry and religious literature are saturated with philosophy as perhaps at no previous period in our national history. Everywhere inquity converges on first principles. Even those who abjure metaphysic, unconsciously philosophise in their rejection of it; while the subdivision of intellectual labour-due to the growing complexity of culture, and the increasing number of those who devote their lives to research-has widened the area, as well as deepened the lines of investigation.