On comparing this with the former part of the organon and fome of his other works, were it not written in the manner and language of Ariftotle and authenticated by the fame proofs, one could hardly believe that this book came from the pen of that deep philofopher. The general Propofitions which form the bafis of a Logic which the Schools have so exclusively espoused, are, by the method which it prescribes, moft fuperficially and illogically formed; and the Syllogifms which are constructed from them, instead of advancing or even communicating truth, either conclude in falfehood, or only ferve, as they have too long ferved, to protract an useless Disputation in noise and nonsense.

The Cause of this great defect in the organon of Aristotle may be traced to his blind and extravagant love of Syllogifm, that favourrite child which he begot in the Analytics, and which he was refolved to enlarge in its poffeffions, and to qualify with every accomplishment as the Inftrument of all kinds of

See the 9th and 10th books in which the method is delivered of forming dialectical propofitions.

truth;

truth; and to his ignorance, or perhaps neglect, of Indu&tion, that found and fundamental logic by which alone those Principles and general Propofitions, which are the only fupport of useful Syllogifm in probable Reafoning, can be firmly and philofophically eftablithed.

He mentions Induction, indeed, in different parts of his works, and gives a just though general defcription of its office ; and he acknowledges the immenfe importance of Principles, by which he always means general Propofitions, in the invention of truth:' but to the investigation of these Principles or general Laws, by which the maker of the world governs the world he has made, both

* ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗ, ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν καθέκαςα ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλο ἔφοδος. Top. lib. i. cap. 12. See Analyt. Prior. lib. xi. cap. 23. et Poft. lib. ii. cap. 19.

* Τῶν ἀρχῶν δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωρῶνται, αἱ δὲ αἰσθέσει, αἱ δὲ ἐθισμῷ τινὶ, καὶ ἄλλαι δὲ ἄλλως. Μετιέναι δε πειρατέον ἑκάσας ᾖ πεφύκασι, καὶ σπεδαςέον ὅπως ὁρισε θῶσι καλῶς. Μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχεσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἑπόμενα. Δοκεῖ ἦν πλεῖον ἢ τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχὴ, καὶ πολλὰ ἐμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δὲ αὐτῆς τῶν ζητεμένων. Εth. Nicom. lib. i. cap. 7.

Υ 2

in

in his natural and moral difpenfations, it was by no means fufficient to mention, in a general and incidental way, the only Inftrument by which the latent feeds of truth of every kind, which lie scattered or dispersed through all the individuals in nature, can be collected and arranged. Had fo complete a master of the philosophy of Demonstration pursued the right method of forming by Induction the Principles of probable and contingent truths, according to the nature and genius of every fubject which conftitute the circle of human learning, he would have taken a more honourable and successful road to the temple of knowledge; and his LOGIC, instead of bewildering and entangling Reafon in the tramels of partial and imperfect rules, would have afforded her a fair and liberal, though more laborious, exercife, in the promotion and advancement of univerfal truth.

From this great imperfection of his Dialectic, as the inftrument of knowledge, confirmed by the ill fuccefs of many of his own philofophical investigations for want of found and legitimate Inductions, we may venture to conclude

conclude, if the master of the Lyceum knew their particular use and operation in forming the Principles of good reasoning, that either his time was too much employed in collecting and arranging all the learning of his age, or that his enlarged and scientific mind was too deeply immersed in mataphyfical and general speculations, to cultivate a mode of reafoning which is so active and experimental, and fo converfant in particular operations.

Instead of descending to the canvass and examination of those Individuals which constitute each branch of Science, and instead of rifing from them to Generals by fucceffive and labourious steps, he purfued and dictated a more easy but a more fallacious method of raifing Topics or common Axioms, as the foundation of dialectic reafoning. He applied immediately to the CATAGORIES,' those great and illuftrious families poffeffed of all prerogative, and invested with all power to decide upon the truth and falfehood of things. From these he drew Definitions and

• See Top. Ift book and 9th chapter.

Sunt Categoriæ quædam familiæ, claffes, et ordines entis, feu compendia rerum omnium certa ratione difpofi

Y 3

tarum

Propofitions as from a mine unexhausted and inexhaustible; but which, being mere affumptions unfounded in the real nature and qualities of things, had their refource only in imagination and the ingenuity of invention; which became prolific of a verbose and artificial but inefficient Logic, and productive of a pompous and formal, but useless and phlegmatic, difcipline: a difcipline which, instead of the advancement, has proved the obstacle and impediment, of all good learning."

The Categories are certainly univerfal Forms: but between them and the individual and particular cafes which folicit our immediate attention, there exifts a number and fubordination of Generals, through every one

tarum, unde differendi ampliffima materies petitur, et ipfa fcientiarum objecta tanquam e locupletiffima penu depromuntur. Du Val. Synopf. Doct. Peripat.

'Decem Prædicamenta principia funt et omnis Scientiæ et omnis Rationationis. Ibid.

Ad principia fcientiarum conftituenda præpropere feftinarunt, circa quæ omnis difputationum varietas verteretur: nefcientes profectum eum, qui certa nimis propere captaverit, in dubiis finiturum: qui autem judicium tempestive cohibuerit, ad certa perventurum. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. v. cap. 4.

of