and JUDGMENT employed in the inveftigation of all Truth have, in the first place, to encounter with PARTICULARS. With these Reason begins, or fhould begin, its operations. It obferves, tries, canvaffes, examines, and compares them together, and judges of them by fome of those native Evidences and original lights, which, as they are the first and indispensable inlets of knowledge to the mind, have been called the PRIMARY PRINCIPLES of Truth."

By fuch acts of Obfervation and Judgment diligently practised and frequently repeated, exercifed on many particular or individual fubjects of the fame class and of a similar nature, noting their agreements and marking the differences however minute, and re

Homo naturæ minifter et interpres tantum facit et intelligit, quantum de ordine naturæ opere vel mente obfervaverit; nec amplius fcit, aut poteft. Bacon De Interp. Naturæ, et Nov. Orig. lib. i. aph. 1.

Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ, ὅτι, εἴ τις αἴσθησις ἐκλέλοιπεν, ἀνάγ κα καὶ ἐπισήμην τινὰ ἐκλελοιπέναι, ἣν ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἴσθησιν, ἀδύνατον. τῶν γὰρ καθ' έκασον ἡ αἴσθησις.

jecting all inftances which, however fimilar in appearance, are not in effect the fame, REASON, with much labour and attention, extracts fome general Laws refpecting the Powers, Properties, Qualities, Actions, Pasfions, Virtues and Relations of things, which are the Causes of Truth.

This is no hafty, premature, notional abftraction of the mind, by which images and ideas are formed that in nature have no existence. It is a rational, operative, experimental process, inftituted and executed upon the real nature and constitution of things. By this procefs REASON advances from Particulars to Generals, from lefs General to more General, till, by a series of flow progreffion, and by regular degrees, it arrive at the moft General, ideas, called

4 Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν αναι καῖον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἔτω τὸ καθόλυ ἐμποιεῖ. Ariftot. Analyt. Poft. lib. ii. cap. 19. See lib. ii. c. 13.

• Manus hominis nuda, quantumvis robufta et conftans, ad opera pauca et facile fequentia fufficit: eadem ope inftrumentorum multa et reluctantia vincit. Similis eft et mentis ratio. Baconi Nov. Org.

FORMS

And, by

FORMS OF FORMAL CAUSES. affirming or denying a Genus of a Species

*

or an Accident of a Subftance or of a class of Substances through all the stages of the gradation, we form Conclufions, which, if logically drawn, are AXIOMS,

Qui FORMAS novit, is, quæ adhuc non facta funt, qualia nec naturæ vicifitudines, nec experimentales induftriæ unquam in actum produxiffent, nec cogitationem humanam fubituræ fuiflent, detegit et educit. Ibid.

AXIOMS are the refult of the most laborious and recondite learning, and that they fhould be firmly established is an object of the first importance to the success of every branch of fcience, Lord Bacon, therefore, ftrenuously contends that they should never be taken upon conjecture, or even upon the authority of the learned, but that, as they are the general Principles and grounds of all learning, they are to be canvaffed and examined with the most scrupulous attention, ut Axiomatum corrigatur iniquitas, quæ plerumque in exemplis vulgatis fun'damentum habent." De Augm. Sc. lib. ii. cap. 2. * Atque illa ipfa putativa Principia ad rationes reddendas ' compellere decrevimus, quoufque plane conftent.' Diftrib. Operis.

That all Axioms are intuitive and felf-evident truths, is a fundamental mistake, into which Mr. Locke [Effay, B. iv. C. 7. §. 1.] and others [fee Ancient Metaphyfics, Vol. I. B. v. C.3. p. 389. and Vol. II. p. 335.] have been betrayed, to the great injury of science. This error has, I apprehend, been engrafted upon another equally prevalent, That mathematics is a system, or however a fpecimen, of univerfal reasoning: And, as mathematical

C 3

or GENERAL PROPOSITIONS ranged one

tical Axioms are prefumed to be intuitive, they haftily prefumed that all others are intuitive.

Mr. Locke was gifted with a strong mind, though not cultivated with much learning. In many parts of his Effay he has fhewn himself an able metaphysician in the most useful part of that difficult fcience. He has, however, no where fhewn himself an able logician. He judged of the School-logic from its weak and useless effect in promoting the real interefts of learning, and from its tendency to nothing but endless dispute and fruitless jargon. But, though from a view of the end, he juftly condemned the means, he did not understand them.

Surely he had neither read Ariftotle nor Bacon. If he had, he would not have discovered such a want of logical philofophy as this chapter of Maxims betrays : at the fame time that, in the midft of fo much darkness, like the fun from a cloud, his native ftrength of mind breaks out with this luminous fentence; In particulars our knowledge begins, and so spreads itself by degrees to generals; though afterwards the mind takes the quite contrary course, and having drawn its knowledge into general Propofitions as it can, makes thofe familiar to its thoughts, and accuftoms itself to have recourfe to them, as to the standards of truth and falfehood.'

He totally mistook the maxim of the Schools, That all reafoning is ex præcognitis et præconceffis, [Effay, B. IV. C. ii. §. 8. and C. 7.] He seems indeed to have been unacquainted with the true philosophy of Reasoning, and not to have understood the nature of those intermediate ideas to which he attributes the advancement of all knowledge, nor the true mode of their application; and he appears to have been mistaken in the nature of that Agreement

above another, till they terminate in those

that are UNIVERSAL.

AXIOMS fo investigated and established are applicable to all parts of Learning, and are the indispensable,' and, indeed, the won

Agreement and Difagreement of ideas, of which he has faid so very much as the fole criteria of truth.

In the twelfth chapter of this book, indeed, he expofes the abfurdity of taking Axioms upon credit; but fhews how little he understood of their use. His idea of the improvement of learning was very imperfect; for though he might understand the nature of Phyfics, he was unacquainted with the philofophy of Ethics and Mathe

matics.

b Duæ viæ funt atque effe poffunt ad inquirendam veritatem. Altera a fenfu et particularibus advolat ad axiomata maximè generalia, atque ex his principiis eorumque immotâ veritate judicat et invenit axiomata media : atque hæc via in ufu eft, Altera a fenfu et particularibus excitat axiomata afcendendo continenter et graduatim, ut ultimo loco perveniatur ad maxime generalia; quæ via vera eft et intentata. Baconi Nov. Org. 1. i. Aph.19. See also lib. i. Aph. 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107.

1 Τῶν ἀρχῶν δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωρῆνται, αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσει, αἱ δὲ ἐθισμῷ τινὶ, καὶ ἄλλαι δὲ ἄλλως. Μετ τιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἑκάσας ᾗ πεφύκασι, δὲ σπεδαςέον ὅπως ὁρισθῶσι καλῶς. Μεγάγην γὰρ ἔχεσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ επόμενα. Δοκεῖ ἦν πλεῖον ἢ τὸ ἥμισυ τε παντὸς εἶναι ἢ ἀρχὴ, καὶ πολλὰ ἐμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητε évwv. Ariftot. Eth. Nicom. lib. i. cap. 7.

ΤΟ

derful