derful, expedients by which REASON pushes on its enquiries in the particular pursuit of Truth, in every branch of knowledge: and the METHOD of Reasoning, by which they are formed, is that of true and legitimate INDUCTION, * k which is therefore called, by the beft and foundest of logi cians, the Key of Interpretation.'

Instead of taking his Axioms out of the great families of the Catagories by an immediate and indolent extraction, and erecting them by his own fophiftical invention into the Principles upon which his difputation was to be employed," had the analytical

Inductionem cenfemus eam effe demonftrandi formam quæ fenfum tuetur et naturam premit, et operibus imminet ac fere immifcetur. Baconi Diftrib. Operis.

1 Ibid. Nov. Org. Lib. ii. Aph. 10.

Ex experientia arripiunt varia et vulgaria, eaque neque certo comperta, nec diligenter examinata et penfitata; reliqua in meditatione atque ingenii agitatione ponunt.Hujus generis exemplum in Ariftotele maxime confpicuum eft, qui philofophiam dialecticâ fuâ corrupit, quum mundum ex Categoriis effecerit, et inumera pro arbitrio suo naturæ rerum impofuerit, magis ubique folicitus quomodo quis refpondendo fe explicet, et aliquid reddatur in verbis pofitivum, quam de interna rerum veritate.-Ille enim prius decreverat ; neque experientiam ad conftituenda axiomatą

genius of Ariftotle prefented us with the Laws of the true INDUCTIVE LOGIC by which Axioms are philofophically formed, and given us an example of it in a single branch of science with his ufual fagacity,"

axiomata rite confuluit; fed, poftquam pro arbitrio fuo decreviffet, experientiam ad fua placita tortam circumducit et captivam. Ibid. Lib. i. Aph. 62 & 63.

EX

Though in different parts of his works he gives a general idea of INDUCTION; [Ομοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς λάσ γες, οἵ τε διὰ συλλογισμῶν, καὶ οἱ δι ̓ ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗΣ ἀμφό τεροι γὰρ διὰ προγινωσκομένων ποιῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν· εἰ μὲν, λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων· οἱ δὲ, δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλο, διὰ τῇ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθέκασον. Analyt. Poft. lib. i. cap. i. Ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία. Ἡ μὲν δι' ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗΣ, ἡ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. Ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐςι καὶ τᾶ καθόλε. Ὁ δὲ συλλογιστ μὲς ἐκ τῶν καθόλε. Εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ, ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισ μὲς, ὧν ἐκ ἔςι συλλογισμός. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap.3.] from the whole of them, Analytical, Topical and Phyfica!, it is clear he was very imperfectly acquainted with the particular philofophy of the Inductive Organon: and it is apparent from a paflage in his Ethics [μὴ λανθανέτω δ ̓ ἡμᾶς, ὅτι διαφέρεσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι, καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. Εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τᾶτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐσιν ἢ ὁδός. Ωσπερ ἐν τῷ σαδίῳ, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέξας, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. ̓Αρχέον μὲν γ ΑΠΟ ΤΩΝ ΓΝΩΡΙΜΩΝ, Ταῦτα 5 διπλῶς. Τὰ μὲν γὰ ἡμῖν, τὰ ἢ ἁπλῶς. Ἴσως ἂν ἡμῖν γε ἀρητέον ΑΠΟ ΤΩΝ ΗΜΙΝ ΓΝΩΡΙΜΩΝ.—ἀρχὴ γὰρ

he would have brought an offering more valuable and acceptable to the temple of Truth than he has done by the aggregate of all his logical and philofophical productions.

It is, after the Inductive process has been industriously pursued and fuccessfully performed, that DEFINITION, fo pompously but prematurely, fo formally but gratuitously, affected by the old logicians and their disciples of the Schools, may be logically and usefully introduced, by beginning with the Genus, paffing through all the graduate and fubordinate ftages, and marking the Specific difference as it defcends, till it arrive at the Individual which is the subject of the question: And, by adding an Affirmation or Negation of the attribute of the Genus on the Species or Individual, or of that of a

τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τᾶτο φαίνοιτο ἀρχέντως, ἐδὲν προσδεήσει το ST. Eth. Nicom. lib. i. cap. 4.] that he never put it in practice in the formation of his Axioms and Principles, which he chose rather to affume gratuitously, or to fabricate out of his own invention. See Analyt. Post. l. i. c.24、 γὰρ ἐκ ὧν ὁ ὁρισμὸς, προειδέναι καὶ εἶναι γνώριμα.

Ariftot. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 7.

general

general Accident on the particular Subftance so defined, making the Definition a Propofition, the truth of the queftion will be logically folved, without any farther process. So that, instead of being the firft, as employed by the logic in common use, Definition may be the laft, act of Reafon in the fearch of Truth in general.1

But I am now anticipating the subject of the following section.

SECT. II.

Of the SYLLOGISTIC Method.

'HESE AXIOMS or GENERAL PROPO

TH

SITIONS thus Inductively established, become another fpecies of PRINCIPLES which may be properly called SECONDARY, and which lay the foundation of another and different METHOD of Reasoning.

See Ariftot. Analyt. Poft. lib. i. cap. 10.

I only except Mathematical truth.

When

When these are formed, but not before, we may fafely admit the maxim with which logicians fet out in the exercise of their art, as the great hinge on which their reafoning and difputation turn. From truths that are already known, to derive others which are not known. Or, to ftate it more comprehenfively, fo as to apply to probable as well as to scientific Reasoning

From truths which are better known, to derive others which are less known.

Thefe KNOWN and BETTER KNOWN truths are thofe of AXIOMS or General Propofitions, the existence of which this other METHOD of Reafoning not only supposes, but also that there is a subordination and gradation of them, upon which as PRINCIPLES, all its operations are founded, and on the truth and foundnefs of which its fuccefs muft ultimately depend.

• Ἐξ ἀλήθων καὶ πρῶτων καὶ άμεσων καὶ γνώριμοτέρων καὶ πρότερων καὶ αἰτιῶν τῶ συμπέρασματος. Ariftote Analyt. Poft. lib. i.

• Ex præcognitis et præconceffis.