Philofophically speaking, this Reasoning is, Under general Propofitions to reduce others which are lefs general or which are particular, where the proof is out of higher and more general Propofitions; for the inferior ones are only known to be true, as we trace their connection with the fuperior. Logically fpeaking, it is, Το predicate a Genus of a Species or Individual contained and comprehended under it," or an Accident of the Subftance in which it is inherent:" For whatever as a whole or Genus contains

* Manifeftum eft artem judicandi per Syllogifmum nihil aliud effe, quam reductionem Propofitionum ad Principia. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. v. cap. 4.

* ΚΑΘ' ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΥ-Τῶν ὄνων, τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑποκείμενα τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ ἐδενί ἐσιν° οἷον, ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καθ ̓ ὑποκειμένα μὲν λέγεται τέ τινος ἀνθρώπα, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ ἐδενί ἐσιν. Ariftot. Categ. cap. ii.

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τὰ δὲ, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν

ἐςι, καθ ̓ ὑποκειμένα δὲ ἐδενὸς λέγεται (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω, ὅ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον, αδυνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τῇ ἐν ᾧ ἐςιν) οἷον ἡ τὶς γραμματικὴ, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐςι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ ̓ ὑποκειμένα δὲ ἐδενὸς λέγεται· καὶ τατὶ τὸ λευκὸν, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐτι τῷ σώματι, (ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶμα, ἐν σώματι,) καθ' υποκειμένα δὲ ἐδενὸς λέγεται Ibid.

another

another as a part or Species, it communicates to it its nature and properties; and whatever common Accident is actually inherent in a clafs of Subftances, it communicates itself, in a logical fenfe, to every particular of the class so that, when a question arises upon any subject, the enquiry is, What is true of the Genus or Family under which it claffes for that will be always true of it whether a fpecies or a particular and vice versâ, upon the great logical Maxim, that What is true of the whole, is true of all its parts. And here we arrive at the true foundation of that agreement and difagreement, which conftitute affirmative and negative truth.

This Method of Reasoning has obtained the name of SYLLOGISM or Collection,

Quod verum eft de toto verum eft de omni.

This is generally expreffed by Dictum de omni, a Logical Axiom That what is affirmed of the genus or whole may be affirmed of all the species and individuals under it. And the oppofite Axiom is Dictum de nullo That what is denied of the genus or whole may be denied of its fpecies or individuals. By thefe Axioms all the Moods of the first Figure are governed, to which all the legitimate Moods of the other Figures are reducible.

which has been analysed by Ariftotle in a minute and laborious procefs with a wonderful degree of fubtlety and acumen, who has exhibited it to view in every poffible fhape, enacted the Laws by which it is to be governed, and invented all the Moods and Figures into which it may be cast.

Thus INDUCTION and SYLLOGISM are the two METHODS of direct Reafoning correfponding to the two kinds of Principles, Primary and Secondary, on which they are founded, and by which they are respectively conducted. In both Methods, indeed, Reafon proceeds by judging and comparing, but the process is DIFFERENT throughout. In the exercise of INDUCTION, the first thing is, To perceive and to JUDGE of Particulars from their respective Evidence by fingle apprehenfion, as the senses do of objects; and

* Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λόγες, οἵ τε διὰ συλλογιστ μῶν, καὶ οἱ δι ̓ ἐπαγωγῆς· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ διὰ προγινωσκο μένων ποιῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν· οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων· οἱ δὲ, δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλε, διὰ τὸ δῆλον sivaι tò nadinasov. Ariftot. Analyt. Poft. lib. i. cap. 1.

the

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the next, To COMPARE thefe judgments to gether, by fingle and fimple acts, and that immediately," from the agreement of a number of which collateral judgments, General Ideas and Propofitions are derived. In the exercife of SYLLOGISM, the first thing is to COMPARE, by double and complex comparifons, by the help of a third or middle term feverally applied to the two original terms of the question, making two propofitions called the Premifes: and the fecond thing is to JUDGE of these Premifes in order to col

* Εσι δὲ ὁ τοιᾶτος συλλογισμὸς τῆς πρώτης καὶ αμέσε wporárews. Ariftot. Analyt. Prior. cap. xxiii.

In arte judicandi, aut per inductionem aut per fyllogifmum concluditur. At, quatenus ad judicium quod fit per inductionem, uno eodemque mentis opere id quod quæritur invenitur et judicatur. Neque enim per medium aliquod res tranfigitur, fed immediate, eodemque fere modo quo fit in fenfu quippe fenfus in objectis fuis primariis fimul et objecti fpeciem arripit et ejus veritate confentit. Baconus. De Augm. Sc. lib. v. cap. 4.

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Ὧν μὲν γάρ ἐσι μέσον, διὰ τῆ μέσα ὁ συλλογισμός av de μn ist, di' inaywys. Analyt. Prior. Cap. xxiii. Aliter fit in Syllogifmo, cujus probatio immediata non eft, fed per medium perficitur. De Augm. Sc. lib. v. cap. iv.

lect

lect a third propofition, or Conclufion, different from them both. As, therefore, thefe Methods of reasoning proceed on different Principles, fo they are not only different but the reverse of each other; and, though it may have the fanction of Aristotle, an Inductive Syllogifm is a folecifm.

Till general truths are ascertained by Induction these third or middle terms by which Syllogifms are made, are no where fafely to be found: for it is only by the middle terms and propofitions taken from general truths, by which lefs general or particular truths can be evinced. The invention ' of the Middle Term or Argument by Induction is, therefore, one and the first thing, and the judgment of the Confequence from the

Συλλογισμὸς δέ ἐςι λόγος, ἐν ᾧ, τεθέντων τινῶν, ἕτε ρόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι, Ariftot. Analyt. Prior. lib. i. cap. I.

· Καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἀντίκειται ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ τῷ συλλογισμῷ, are the words of Ariftotle himself. Analyt. Prior. cap.xxiii. * See Analyt. Prior. lib. ii. cap. 23.

Let the truth in queftfon be Whether A contain C, and the general truth That A contains B. B the Subject of the general Propofition is the Middle Term, by which a Middle

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