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Philosophically speaking, this Reasoning is, Under general Propositions to reduce others which are less general or which are particular,' where the proof is out of higher and more general Propositions ; for the inferior ones are only known to be true, as we trace their connection with the superior. Logically speaking, it is, To predicate a Genus of a Species or Individual contained and comprehended under it," or an Accident of the Substance in which it is inherent :" For whatever as a whole or Genus contains

• Manifeftum est artem judicandi per Syllogismum nihil aliud esse, quam reductionem Propofitionum ad Principia. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. v. cap. 4.

* ΚΑΘ' ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΥ -Των όλων, τα μεν καθ' υποκείμενα τινός λέγεται, εν υποκειμένω δε αδενί έσιν οιον, ο άνθρωπος, καθ' υποκειμένα μεν λέγεται τα τινος ανθρώπε, εν υποκειμένω δε έδενί έσιν. Αriftot. Categ. cap. ii.

" ΕΝ ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΩ – τα δε, εν υποκειμένω μέν έση, καθ' υποκειμένα δε έδενός λέγεται" (εν υποκειμένω δε λέγω, ό έν τινι μη ως μέρος υπάρχον, αδυνατον χωρίς είναι τα εν ό έσιν») οιον και τις γραμματική, εν υποκειμένω μέν εςι τη ψυχη, καθ' υποκειμένω δε έδενός λέγεται και τετι το λευκόν, εν υποκειμένω μέν έπι τω σώματι, (άπαν γαρ χρώμα, εν σώματι,) καθ' υποκειμένε δε έδενός λέγεται Ibid,

another * Quod verum est de toto verum eft de omni.

another as a part or Species, it communicates to it its nature and properties ; and whatever common Accident is actually inherent in a class of Substances, it communicates itself, in a logical sense, to every particular of the class : so that, when a question arises upon any subject, the enquiry is, What is true of the Genus or Family under which it classes; for that will be always true of it whether a species or a particular and vice versâ, upon the great logical Maxim, that What is true of the whole, is true of all, its parts. And here we arrive at the true foundation of that

afirmative and negative truth.

This Method of Reasoning has obtained the name of SYLLOGISM or Collection, which has been analysed by Aristotle in a minute and laborious process with a wonderful degree of subtlety and acumen, whọ has exhibited it to view in every possible shape, enacted the Laws by which it is to be governed, and invented all the Moods and Figures into which it may be cast.

This is generally expressed by Diétum de omni, a Logical Axiom That what is affirmed of the genus or whole may be affirmed of all the species and individuals under it. And the opposite Axiom is Dictum de nullo That what is denied of the genus or whole may be denied of its species or individuals. By these Axioms all the Moods of the firft Figure are governed, to which all the legitimate Moods of the other Figures are reducible.

Thus INDUCTION and SYLLOGISM are the two Methods of dire&t Reasoning corresponding to the two kinds of Principles, Primary and Secondary, on which they are founded, and by which they are respectively conducted. In both Methods, indeed, Reason proceeds by judging and comparing, but the process is DIFFERENT throughout. In the exercise of INDUCTION, the first thing is, To perceive and to JUDGE of Particulars from their respective Evidence by single apprebenhon, as the senses do of objects ; and

και Ομοίως δε και σερί τες λόγες, οί τε δια συλλογισvæv, xai oi di' &z aywyñso appótepor yap dia apoytwoxoμένων ποιώνται την διδασκαλίαν" οι μεν λαμβάνοντες ως σαρα ξυνιέντων' οι δε, δεικνύντες το καθόλε, δια τα δηλον tivaTo za Jérasov. Ariftot. Analyt. Poft, lib. i. cap. 1.


the next, To COMPARE these judgments too gether, by single and fimple acts, and that immediately,from the agreement of a number of which collateral judgments, General Ideas and Propofitions are derived. In the exercise of SYLLOGISM, the first thing is to COMPARE, by double and complex comparisons, by the help of a third or middle term severally applied to the two original terms of the question, making two propositions called the Premises: and the second thing is to JUDGE of these Premises in order to collect a third proposition, or Concluson, different from them both. - As, therefore, these Methods of reasoning proceed on different Principles, so they are not only different but the reverse of each other; and, though it may have the sanction of Aristotle, an Inductive Syllogism" is a solecism.


* Εσι δε και τοιέτος συλλογισμός της πρώτης και αμέσα JOOTárews. Aristot. Analyt. Prior. cap. xxiii.

In arte judicandi, aut per inductionem aut per fyllogismum concluditur. At, quatenus ad judicium quod fit per inductionem, uno eodemque mentis opere id quod quæritur invenitur et judicatur. Neque enim per medium aliquod res tranfigitur, sed immediate, eodemque fere modo quo fit in fenfu : quippe senfus in objectis suis primariis fimul et objecti speciem arripit et ejus veritate consentit. Baconus De Augm. Sc. lib. v. cap. 4. • 12v từy ra is ukov, o T8 kg GUAAoy Guese or de peń ési, di' én@gwyñs. Analyt. Prior. Cap. xxiii.

Aliter fit in Syllogismo, cujus probatio immediata non est, fed per medium perficitur. De Augm. Sc. lib. v.

cap. iv,

lect • Και τρόπον τινα ανθίκείαι η έπαψωγη τη συλλογισμό, are the words of Aristotle himself. Analyt. Prior. cap.xxiii.

Till general truths are ascertained by Induction these third or middle terms by which Syllogisms are made, are no where safely to be found : for it is only by the middle terms and propositions taken from general truths, by which less general or particular truths can be evinced. "The invention • of the Middle Term or Argument by Induc• tion is, therefore, one and the first thing.

and the judgment of the Consequence from the

Evaroyiguès dé ist dóyos, év , Tetértwv Tuvwv, érze ρόν τι των κειμένων εξ ανάγκης συμβαίνει τα ταύτα είναι. Ariftot. Analyt. Prior. lib. i. cap. 1. .

See Analyt. Prior. lib. ii. cap. 23. • Let the truth in question be Whether A contain C, and the general truth That A contains B. B the Subject of the general Proposition is the Middle Term, by which

a Middle

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