argument by Syllogifm is another and the fecond.' So that another pofition of the Peripatetic, That Syllogifm is naturally prior in order to Induction, is equally unfounded : for Induction does not only naturally but neceffarily PRECEED Syllogifm, and is, in every refpect indifpenfable to its exiftence; fince till Generals are established, there can neither be Definition, Propofition, nor Axiom, and of course no Syllogifm.

And, as Induction is the first, so it is the more ESSENTIAL and fundamental instrument of Reasoning: for as Syllogifm can never produce its own Principles," it must have them from Induction; and, if the general Propofitions or Secondary Principles be imperfectly or infirmly established, and much

a Middle Propofition is formed, That C contains B, from which the truth in queftion is deduced. See Ariftot. Prior. Analyt. on the Invention of Middle Terms.

Itaque alia res eft inventio medii, alia judicium de confequentia argumenti. De Augm. Sc. lib. v. cap. 4. 8 Φύσει μὲν ἦν πρότερος καὶ γνωριμώτερος, διὰ τὰ μέσα συλλογισμός· ἡμῖν δὲ ἐναργέτερος, ὁ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. Analyt. Prior. cap. 23.

h Syllogifmus ad principia Scientiarium non adhibetur. Nov. Org. Lib. i. Aph. 31.

more

more if they be taken at hazzard, upon authority, or by arbitrary affumption like those of Aristotle, all the fyllogifing in the world. is a vain and useless logomachy,' only inftrumental to the multiplication of false learning, and to the invention and confirmation of error. The truth of Syllogifms depends ultimately on the truth of Axioms, and the truth of Axioms on the foundness of Inductions.

Thus Induction is not only different from, but prior and essential to Syllogifm, and in refpect SUPERIOR.*

Syllogifmus ex propositionibus conftat, propofitiones ex verbis, verba notionum tefferæ funt. Itaque fi notiones ipfæ (id quod bafis rei eft) confufæ fint et temere a rebus abstractæ, nihil in iis quæ fuperftruuntur eft firmitudinis: Itaque fpes eft una in Inductione vera. Nov. Org. lib. i. Aph. 14. Αδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλες θεωρῆσαι, εἰ μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς· (ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα ἔσαι δι' ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα, ἐάν τις βέληται γνώριμα ποιειν ὅτι παρχει ἑκάτω γένει ἔνια) — ἔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν καθόλα ἄνευ ἐπαγωγῆς, ἔτε διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς ἄνευ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. Analyt. Poft. lib. i.

* In matters to which the theory of Syllogifm extends, a man of good fenfe, who can diftinguish things that 'differ, can avoid the fnares of ambiguous words, and is • moderately practifed in fuch matters, fees at once all 'that

D 2

But, though Induction be more useful in the first Invention of Truth, Syllogifm, it is faid, is more useful in Teaching it when found.

Truth is more eafily conveyed than found. Induction is not only the fole Method of Invention, but of Initiation too taken in its enlarged and claffical meaning; for to it all parts of human learning, except the Mathematics, owe both their origin and advancement. Being, however, more difficult and laborious and lefs oftentatious than the other, it has been too much neglected, and almost quite abandoned, to the great lofs of Truth in general. Syllogifm affects, indeed, to be the Method of Science, and the Method of Inftruction; though, perhaps, when duly eftimated, with lefs title to those diftinctions than the former. It is, indeed, the Method of Mathematics, which have unfortunately been mistaken by Logicians for the rule of

' that can be inferred from the premises; or finds that 'there is but a very short step to the conclufion.' Dr. Reid, in Appendix to vol. iii. of Lord Kaim Sketches.

univerfal

univerfal Reasoning: and, as that word fignifies Teaching or by what men are taught, by another mistake of its meaning " they thought Syllogifm was of course both the Method of Science and Inftruction too. In all other parts of Science, however, whether we wish to add to their truths by farther inventions, or, indeed, to exemplify, illustrate, or teach what is already known, the only Method of Science, and the beft Method of Inftruction, is that of Invention and Initiation."

Thus I have taken a general and comprehenfive, but compendious, view (and they who know how many volumes have been employed upon Syllogifm alone cannot think that I have been prolix) of the whole exercise of

1 See Duncan. p. 118. and almost every other book of Logic. Mr. Harris fomewhere calls it The praxis of univerfal Logic: and Mr, Locke was perhaps as much misled by this mistaken notion as any other philofopher.

" The true and original meaning of μálnμara was, to teach men to ascend from material to immaterial subjects, that is, from Phyfics to Metaphyfics,

Scientia, quæ aliis tanquam tela pertexenda traditur, eadem methodo (fi fieri potest) animo alterius eft infinuanda, qua primitus inventa. De Augm. Sc. lib. vi. c. 2.

REASON as it advances in the DIRECT investigation of Truth, which is afcending and defcending; afcending by INDUCTION from less to greater, from particulars to generals; and defcending by SYLLOGISM from greater to lefs, from general to less general, and to particulars.

T

SECT. III.

Of the ANALOGIC Method.

O these two kinds of Reasoning which

are direct, we add another of great importance and extent, which is INDIRECT and collateral.

The PRINCIPLE in which this branch of Logic has its foundation is a native bent and propenfity of the mind, ftrengthened by experience and confirmed by habit, by which we are involuntary led to expect that Nature and Truth are uniform and analogous throughout the universe-that fimilar Caufes of whatever kind will, in fimilar circumftances, at all times produce fimilar Effects:

or,