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or, if the Causes cannot be known, that fimilar Effects o will explain, illustrate, and account for similar Effects.

This Principle, then, resolves itself into SIMILITUDE, and Reason acts upon it, as in all other cases, by comparing and judging. Thus we argue from truths which have been proved by direct reasoning, or which are obvious to Simple apprehension, to others which are fimilar in Cause or in Effect : and if, upon comparing and judging the Principle will bear us out, we conclude the latter to be also true; a conclusion which will suppuy us with a kind and degree of Truth fufficient for most of the uses and purposes of human life. ✓ This Method of Reasoning is. A NALOGY, which according to Quintilian, is To refer a thing that is doubtful to some*thing similar and different, that uncertain• ties may derive their proof from certainties.''

If the liberty of arguing from a similarity of Effects be once denied us, all experimental philosophy will be in a manner useless. Jones's Philosophy, p. 119.

Analogiæ hæc vis eft, ut id quod dubium eft ad aliquod fimile de quo non quæritur referat, ut incerta certis probetur. Quintilian Inft. Orat. lib, i. cap. 6.


This kind of Reasoning has a more permanent and certain foundation than, pera haps, may appear to some upon a superficial estimate of that SIMILITUDe on which it rests. · This is not,' says the excellent Builer, an appearing and metaphorical Si

militude ; it is the substituting the idea or conception of one thing to stand for and represent another, on account of a true re* semblance and correspondent reality in the very nature of the things compared. It is • defined by Aristotle, An equality or parity

of reasoning ;? though, in strictness of • speaking, the parity of reasoning is rather • built on the Similitude and Analogy, and • consequent to them, than the same with • them.''

The result of this Reasoning is, however, not properly Convi&tion ; it is only strong Presumption at best ; and, from the view of the truths we know arises an Opinion concerning those we do not know, which OPINION will, of course, vary in the de

? 'H dvakogía icórns isi aấys. Eth. Nicom. lib. v, cap. Kena

· Bretter's Divine Analogy, p. 2. .


grees of its force almost from the point of absolute Certainty through the whole scale of Probabilities, down to the confines of Doubt and Conjecture-according to the nature of the truths from which we reason-according to their greater or less extent and according as the cases and instances compared are more or less fimilar,

ANALOGY is a sort of Logic on which the Stagyrite has been as frugal of his philosophy,' as he has upon Induction. It is, however, a Method of Reasoning of most useful and important application, and almost of universal extent, in life.

It is the first Logic to convey truth and information to the mind, easy in its application, and obvious in its conclusion. And, besides this advantage resulting from its plainness and familiarity (an advantage which

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· The IIAPAAEITMA, of which he speaks in the 25th Chapter of the Prior Analytics in a very cursory way, is indeed something like Analogy, réty di wisis &x tūv óμοίων φανερόν εν ότι το παράδειγμά έσιν, έτε ως μέρος upd's onov, ára? w's pépos após pépos, trav äpiệw jer se Vad To Quròn gruerpo de Gátipov, raulio ki te ht.sic. $3,4.


the ablest philosophers and the divinest teachers have been careful to improve,) it has other privileges. Many truths of the last importance to men divine and human are incapable both of direct proof' and direct communication, and can only be evinced and conveyed to the understanding by this indirect and collateral channel. Many, which can be directly proved and directly conveyed, it illustrates with clearer and fuller light, and sets them in a point of view easier to be seen and apprehended by us.

But it has also a scientific use which is conspicuoully displayed, when it acts as a necessary suppliment and auxiliary to Inductive Reasoning without which this useful part of logic would remain very defective and confined : for, when the philosopher has founded a General Truth or Proposition upon a certain number of particular comparisons, it is by the help of ANALOGY that he gives it an extent over all fimilar instances throughout the universe, till it may happen

· See Neyton's Pțincipia.

See Berther's Analogy. Abi foredom oft Tuman hurtowny is.

to be contradicted by one in which it is found to fail.

So that by ANALOGY the whole province of Truth is facilitated, illustrated and enlarged, and widened beyond the strict and proper limits of Inductive and Syllogistic Reasoning,

Thus, we fee, this Method of Reason. ing is totally different from those preceding. Though they all agree in two general points—That they argue from Truths known before" either particular or general, and–That they reason by comparing and judging ; yet it is from different First truths or Principles, and in a DIFFERENT way. And, whilft the Student or Philosopher is deriving advantage from them all, let him take care to keep them separate and distinct, and in their proper exercise ; else, by a promiscuous application of them, he will be in danger of employing them where they will not usefully

' Ex tūv aporivor xojévwv wära didacxárıq. Ariftot. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 3.

Πάσα διδασκαλία και σασα μάθησις διανοητική έκ σρούFacxécns yoveräs yourewso' lbid. Analyt! Pof. lib. i. cap. 1.


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