or, if the Caufes cannot be known, that fimilar Effects will explain, illustrate, and account for fimilar Effects. This Principle, then, refolves itself into SIMILITUDE, and Reafon acts upon it, as in all other cafes, by comparing and judging. Thus we argue from truths which have been proved by direct reasoning, or which are obvious to fimple apprehenfion, to others which are fimilar in Caufe or in Effect and if, upon comparing and judging the Principle will bear us out, we conclude the latter to be also true; a conclufion which will fupPly us with a kind and degree of Truth fufficient for most of the ufes and purposes of human life. ✔This METHOD of Reafoning is ANALOGY, which according to Quintilian, is To refer a thing that is doubtful to fomething fimilar and different, that uncertain'ties may derive their proof from certainties." • If the liberty of arguing from a fimilarity of Effects be once denied us, all experimental philofophy will be in a manner useless. Jones's Philofophy, p. 119. Analogiæ hæc vis eft, ut id quod dubium eft ad aliquod fimile de quo non quæritur referat, ut incerta certis probetur. Quintilian Inft. Orat. lib, i. cap. 6. This kind of Reafoning has a more permanent and certain foundation than, perhaps, may appear to fome upon a fuperficial estimate of that SIMILITUDE on which it refts. This is not,' fays the excellent Inam Butler, an appearing and metaphorical Si⚫ militude; it is the fubftituting the idea or conception of one thing to ftand for and reprefent another, on account of a true refemblance and correspondent reality in the very nature of the things compared. It is • defined by Ariftotle, An equality or parity of reafoning; though, in ftrictness of fpeaking, the parity of reasoning is rather built on the Similitude and Analogy, and confequent to them, than the fame with • them.'' The refult of this Reasoning is, however, not properly Conviction; it is only strong Prefumption at beft; and, from the view of the truths we know arifes an Opinion concerning those we do not know, which OPINION will, of courfe, vary in the de * Η αναλογία ισότης ἐςὶ λίγο. Eth. Nicom. lib. v. cap. Kenm Better's Divine Analogy, p. 2. grees grees of its force almoft from the point of abfolute Certainty through the whole scale of Probabilities, down to the confines of Doubt and Conjecture-according to the nature of the truths from which we reason-according to their greater or less extent and—according as the cases and inftances compared are more or lefs fimilar, ANALOGY is a fort of Logic on which the Stagyrite has been as frugal of his philofophy,' as he has upon Induction. It is, however, a Method of Reasoning of most useful and important application, and almost of univerfal extent, in life. It is the firft Logic to convey truth and information to the mind, eafy in its application, and obvious in its conclufion. And, befides this advantage refulting from its plainnefs and familiarity (an advantage which 'The ПAPAAEIгMA, of which he speaks in the 25th Chapter of the Prior Analytics in a very cursory way, is indeed fomething like Analogy, τέτε δὲ πίςις ἐκ τῶν ὁ μοίων — φανερὸν ἔν ὅτι τὸ παράδειγμά ἐσιν, ἔτε ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον, ἀλλ ̓ ὡς μέρος πρὸς μέρος, ὅταν ἄμφω μὲν ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ, γνώριμον δὲ θάτερον. Για το π the the ablest philofophers and the divineft teachers have been careful to improve,) it has other privileges. Many truths of the last importance to men divine and human are incapable both of direct proof' and direct communication," and can only be evinced and conveyed to the understanding by this indirect and collateral channel. Many, which can be directly proved and directly conveyed, it illustrates with clearer and fuller light, and sets them in a point of view easier to be seen and apprehended by us. But it has also a scientific use which is confpicuously displayed, when it acts as a neceffary fuppliment and auxiliary to Inductive Reasoning without which this useful part of logic would remain very defective and confined: for, when the philofopher has founded a General Truth or Propofition upon a certain number of particular comparisons, it is by the help of ANALOGY that he gives it an extent over all fimilar inftances throughout the universe, till it may happen 2 *See Newton's Principia. See Butler's Analogy, of Les féroced an of the Anne Andertandig. to to be contradicted by one in which it is found to fail. So that by ANALOGY the whole province of Truth is facilitated, illuftrated and enlarged, and widened beyond the strict and proper limits of Inductive and Syllogistic Reasoning, Thus, we fee, this METHOD of Reafoning is totally different from those preceding. Though they all agree in two general points-That they argue from Truths known before" either particular or general, and-That they reafon by comparing and judging; yet it is from DIFFERENT First truths or Principles, and in a DIFFERENT way. And, whilst the Student or Philosopher is deriving advantage from them all, let him take care to keep them separate and diftinct, and in their proper exercise; elfe, by a promiscuous application of them, he will be in danger of employing them where they will not usefully * Εκ τῶν προγινοσκομένων πᾶσα διδασκάλια. Ariftot. Eth. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. 3. Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋ παρχέσης γινέται γνώσεως. Ibid. Analyt. Poft. lib. i. cap. 1. apply, |